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Becoming One with the Image 
Felix Rebolledo 
 
The primary concern of Becoming One with the Screen is the question of how 
experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. It 
deals with the problem though the experience of spectatorship in cinema. We present 
the experience of participating in a film screening as a relational and associative process 
in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen relationship reflective of the 
subject/object relation. And radiating outwards from this problem, memory looms large 
as explicatory of the integrative process. As such, we examine the concept‐cluster of 
words surrounding memory not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but 
to tie it to the historical tradition and deal with the complementary concepts of Faciality 
and The Fold from the point of view of imagistic thought and memory. Central to the 
discussion will be the process of adumbration by which the Many become One as the 
perpetuum mobile of the eventual continuity of change in actuality as being. We shall 
advance that the façade of becoming actual of the world as a moving imagistic front as 
the perception of the integrated affirmation of being one with the image world. 
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In the summer of 1971 my father took me to visit the caves of Altamira in 
Cantabria, Spain. He had arranged the visit with René, the director of the historical site 
who had been a schoolmate of his and brother in arms during the Spanish Civil War. 
René turned out to be a magnanimous host and took it upon himself to give us the 
grand tour. At that time, the caves were still open to the public and access to the site 
was not as controlled as it is today. After showing us some of the finer artifacts in the 
private collection, he led us to the unassuming, almost rustic, steel doorway to the 
caves, bypassing a mass of tourists impatiently biding their time to view the “frescoes” 
of the great hall, and proceeded to the depths beyond.  
Through the darkness of the labyrinthine halls, René guided us with a flashlight, 
at times pointing it at the ground to prevent any miss-step and at others flashing the 
beam to highlight polychrome paintings and petroglyphs scratched into the rock. He 
took us through La Hoya (the Pot) and into the Horse’s Tail—the deepest and narrowest 
tunnel of Altamira—affably pointing out features and explaining works which would 
only be accessible to a select few. We spent the better part of two hours exploring the 
many galleries and passageways within the cave and we were wending our way back to 
the exit when René stopped and turned to us, “We’ve seen many beautiful things so far, 
but I’ve saved the best for last!”  
He ushered us into the great hall while a guide was giving his show-and-tell to a 
group. I listened raptly to the guide's talk, head thrust back in awe at the figures 
collected on the vault of the Sistine Chapel of the Paleolithic: a panoply of brilliantly 
2 
 
depicted bison, deer, mountain goats, boars, horses and stylized human figures. The 
animals had been sketched out on the rock with outlines drawn in charcoal and filled in 
with red and ochre-coloured pigments which in some places had been scratched away 
to give depth and volume to the shapes. The prehistoric tableau was a beautiful 
spectacle—one could easily imagine these animals frolicking on the grasslands 
surrounding what is now Santillana del Mar! Finally, the group left the grotto and René 
asked the tour guide not to allow anyone else into the hall for a few minutes. In the 
subdued tungsten light, I could see that we were standing in a trough which had been 
dug out of the floor at some distance from the walls, leaving an island of massive rock 
covered with a heavy tarp in the middle of the room. René explained that originally the 
height of the cavern varied from 0.7 m to 2 m and that to allow viewing without 
crawling through the cave the excavation had been necessary. He urged us to find a spot 
in the centre of the space and invited us to lie back on the tarp. As we made ourselves 
comfortable on the damp canvas, René moved away from us. Standing at one end of the 
gallery, he reached into the side pocket of his jacket and pulled out a box of matches. I 
remember thinking “this is a funny place for a cigarette!” He was trying to light the 
match—an awkward feat with the flashlight clutched under his arm, rendered more 
difficult by the subterranean clamminess—but finally he was able to fire up the small 
flame. “Watch this!” he called out. He turned off the tungsten floor lights and the vault 
came to life with the iridescent glow from the solitary match: what had moments before 
just been a beautiful, albeit static, depiction of the felt nature of the animals drawn on 
the vault, became a menagerie of breathing, heaving, bleating, rearing, gambolling 
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beasts through the agency of the flickering radiance thrown by the diminutive flame of a 
single match. The play of light on the relief of the ceiling animated the lifeless stone 
which in turn imparted a vibrant dynamism to the animals depicted on the rocky 
substrate. Breathless, I stared at this flickering spectacle for a few seconds and then the 






The primary concern of Becoming One with the Screen is the question of how 
experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. It 
attempts to deal with the problem both as an "archeology of the present" and a 
"cartography" of imagistic process. And radiating outwards from this problem memory 
looms large as explicatory of the integrative process. To think of memory in terms of 
integration is perhaps an odd premise in that nowadays memory is almost exclusively 
thought of in terms of the accrual and stockpiling of information and not in terms of 
how experience comes together into a coherent whole. Yet, to conceive of memory in 
terms of the consolidation of experience is not an outlandish proposal. Words 
associated with memory such as recollection and remembering allude to this integrative 
process in that they bring forth the idea of reattachment or gathering together: for 
example, one often refers to gathering one’s thoughts to organize one’s ideas so as to 
give them order and structure when one wishes to remember what is to be said. As 
soon as we detach the suffix (re) from these memory words we are able to read the 
conjunction of the two sides differently, map out their novel meanings and observe 
their effect on our understanding of the processual advance of actuality. To paraphrase 
Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) in Foucault (1988: 53), the enterprise of an archeology of 
knowledge consists in opening up words, phrases and propositions to extract "the 
statements corresponding to each stratum and its thresholds" which in turn reveal the 
operative machinic assemblages and their functional coherence. 
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The concern for this topic originally arose from questions about spectatorship 
and the relation between the viewer and the spectacle on the screen but the research 
eventually became a more general, more philosophical engagement which the concepts 
demanded in order to deal with relation and its articulation as a methodological and 
epistemological "problem". This is not to say that cinematic spectatorship does not 
provide a rich and interesting field of study as a basis to examine experience as 
processual, but to deal with the cinematic before coming to terms with experience as 
such would be to put the cart before the horse. If anything, the contradictory dynamics 
inherent in cinema as an immersive experiential milieu where the interplay between a 
stop-and-go mechanical process and a supposedly static subject produces moving 
images constitutive of movement of thought would provide a fascinating arena to test 
the ideas to be fleshed out in this project. 
But the "problem" in my endeavour is not so much to solve it as it is to 
complicate it in such a way that in articulating that which the problem seeks as a 
solution, the work reformulates and reposits the conditions which gave rise to it in such 
a way that novelty arises not so much from the answers but from the repositing of the 
conditions of its positing and its articulation as a multiplicitous folding of thought, as a 
complication into itself, in order to foment novelty as part of imagistic thought. But to 
incite novelty for novelty's sake is not the goal here; the drive is to generate expanses of 
coherence to push forth creation according to new modes of thought, of relation, of 
feeling: as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) would say, its proposition be 
"anexact yet rigorous" (1993: 367) but its expression would need to be precise and 
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clear-cut. To pose an academic problem in such a way is obviously problematic (in both 
a Deleuzian and a non-Deleuzian way) in that the pursuit is not the sureness, stability 
and permanence of knowledge but to compose with an epistemology fraught with 
openness and indeterminacy and which openly calls into question fundamental aspects 
of coherent thought, logical systems and universals. In imagistic thought, the Law of 
Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle1 cease to have 
the firmness afforded by subjective and objective entities with precisely defined 
borders, components or a cut and dry causality. Contrary to the dialectical method of 
thought with its Kantian transcendence and Ideal perfection, imagistic modes of thought 
entail conceptual formulations which flourish on the availability of valence and the 
preservation of associative degrees of freedom in order to keep alive its functional 
validity, i.e. to perdure, through their built-in evolutive adaptability and relational 
flexibility within the creative advance of novelty as an ecology.  
To posit memory in terms of the integration of experience as imagistic process is 
a "problematic" move but in itself it is nothing new: there is a dynamic, image-based 
memorial understanding of the world as foundation for a visual philosophy in the 
Hermetic thought of the Ancient Egyptians which served as a precursor to the Stoics. In 
fact, the Stoic philosopher Posidonius (135 BCE-51 BCE) is referred to as "a visual 
thinker, a defender of monism, the proponent of the doctrines of cosmic sympathy and 
vitalism" (Edelstein, 1972:413) and an exponent of an image-based understanding 
                                                          
1
 The Law of Identity: If a thing is A then it is A; the Law of Non-contradiction: A thing A cannot be A and 
not A at the same time (at the time it is A);  the Law of Excluded Middle: A thing A is either A or not A. 
Angeles, Peter A.  Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981. 
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appealing to "pictorial representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the 
concept of substantial existence" (Edelstein, 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived 
as a dynamic process. In these few lines, one can already feel a certain "setting" taking 
place, a consistency forming—we can identify various concepts which work together (or 
are being made to work together within the confines of this paper) to reconstitute a 
coherent operational dynamic that not only serves to organize thought and the way 
thought works but creates an active associative entrainment which invites the accretion 
of thought and the aggregation of other ideas, concepts and modes of thought as 
participants in this dynamic. The words "setting" and "consistency" are a big part of it. 
Normally, these words carry connotations of tending towards a stultifying static state, 
but here they are expressions of process towards the establishing of a motive, 
subjective continuity. Setting, as in setting concrete, points to a gelling, to a thickening 
of relation, to a densification of bonding, to an expression of the complication of 
clustering which not only expresses a tendency towards a concretized solid state in the 
sense of an integrated operational circuit but as that which creates expanses of 
connectedness which constitute strata, fields, territories, planes, milieus as 
territorializing settings as landscape. Consistency expresses the same feelings—and here 
we use feeling in the sense Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) conceives it in Process 
and Reality (1929) as that which incites “the basic generic operation of passing from the 
objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (Whitehead, 
1985: 40)—but in terms of establishing the unity of expression as a coherent operational 
dynamic. We normally think of consistency as the acquisition of a repeatable, constant, 
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steady, homogeneousness as in the creaminess of pudding but not as the rendered-
smooth consistency of "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"! In acquiring meaning, 
that which is acquiring consistency by definition also comes to constitute a body in the 
most general sense of the term. One cannot think the consistent as a uniform, 
unchanging, unvarying constitution—the only constancy within the gaining consistency 
as process is the operative haphazard constancy of change in the perduration of 
processual continuity. 
 In this we can see that the consistency of process as constitutive of expanses of 
operational solidarity seem to create a montage of moving parts that works as an 
apparatus, as a machinic assemblage of organizational and functional agency. The 
device that emerges here can be likened to a machine where the cogs and gears work 
together to create operational coherence constitutive of a something other: the 
machinic assemblage as a processual entity emerges through the expression of its 
operational constitution as a working-together of parts, as a multiplicity, which at its 
most naive understanding can be seen as an apparatus contained—as the constituent 
parts inform themselves into a functional whole, the assemblage acquires a vinculating 
carapace which provides it with a homogeneous faciality which expresses itself as the 
integrity of operational coherence. But to speak of cogs and wheels working together is 
too concrete and mechanical an assemblage—the machinic looks at the ensemble as a 
functioning-in-unison, as an individuation constituted of parts which do not transform 
anything material but together generate temporality as subjectivity. The constitutive 
elements participate in the co-operative functioning according to a reciprocal necessity 
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within the machinic assemblage as a milieu where the parts maintain their individual 
integrity yet can only fulfill the role attributed to them as participants contributing to 
the functioning of the apparatus as a coherent whole. That which is produced by a 
machinic assemblage is not to be found in the individual parts nor in the entity as a 
whole; that which results is something indivisible, of a different order than that which 
constitutes the apparatus itself or the participation in its functioning. Ultimately what is 
being produced is time as temporality but it bears pointing out that the time being 
referred to here is not a metricized time but the temporality of being—what Deleuze 
would call aionic time—which refers to the individual expression of processual density 
and texture as a quality, as an affectual manifestation of intensities that is experienced 
in some way as feeling, where each assemblage articulates its being through a particular 
affective quality.   
These constitutive participants construed as wheels and cogs function as 
transmission gears, which in mechanistic thought transmit forces external to the 
apparatus through direct contact by way of a linear chain of causality. In machinic 
thought, they become instigators, attractors, proponents of relational meshings in 
machinic assemblages as productive of the fabric of relation as a continuum so that the 
circulation of forces, intensities and potentials is a communicative process which 
simultaneously conveys associative (in)formation as a sharing of structure and 
operational functionality. The manner in which causality operates and flows in the two 
modalities is key to understanding their difference. Mechanical causality is a 
reductionist, linear, one-way chain of cause and effect as to the communication of 
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information which as a first approximation is compelling but of limited comprehensive 
explanatory validity: the message, alienated and external to the apparatus of 
transmission and reception, is directly sent out by a sender and received by a recipient 
as part of a linear, binary and dualistic subject-object relation. As an approximation, it is 
reductionist in that the circuitous conjunctive multiplicity of causal determinacy is 
resolved as a unitary resultant drive where the chain is a simplistic metaphor for the 
"one-sided singling out of a rich set of interconnections" (Bunge, 1963: 128). As an 
alternative to this plodding binary process of communication and its need for stop and 
go affirmative actualizations of catenary linkage, Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) 
proposes transduction as a process which transmits energy and forces as an 
(in)formation which communicates aggregative belonging to an organizational structure 
through its cooptation to a functional becoming instantaneously felt throughout a 
system as operational integration. In this way, the transmission of information ceases to 
be an accidental process—accidental not because it arises by chance but because the 
forces flow from outside the process as a surficial mechanical transmission—so that 
(in)formation can be seen instead as the process of an unmediated structuration as 
contiguous operational functionality.   
The participating entities which we are here referring to as gears, wheels and 
cogs, can also be seen as machinic entities in their own right so that the process of 
substitution of cogs by machinic assemblies within the apparatus becomes a fractal 
recursivity. The cogs as machinic entities can be considered as relational individuals not 
because they are the relation but because the cog as a linkage makes possible the 
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transmission and flow of causal determinacy not accidentally, but internally through the 
operational coherence within the machinic assemblage, and externally to other 
machinic entities. It is important to point out forthwith that to speak of internal and 
external in reference to a machinic assemblage is doable but inappropriate in that 
within the continuum of the integrative fractal recursivity of the machinic, one can 
differentiate between one process and another as individualizations if we can keep in 
mind that they are integrally, undifferentially constitutive of one singular process—this 
conception of recursivity is different from that of mathematics and computer science in 
that there is no simple base case upon which to found the assemblage in that the base 
loses itself within the fractal serialization and concomitant associative bridging of 
assemblages as transindividualized concretizations. As such, within a machinic 
assemblage or within an assemblage of assemblages, one can introduce additional 
assemblages to complicate the works yet still maintain the integrity and intent of the 
machinic assemblage's operational coherence; at times, one can also substitute the 
workings of several assemblages by one assemblage by means of what Simondon would 
call in the Du Mode d'existence des objects techniques (1958), concretization, where one 
assemblage fulfills its operational function while simultaneously doubling up its 
functionality and fulfills the function of another one or several whose individuated 
participation need no longer be activated. But what is significant in concretization is that 
this assemblage doing double duty, or triple or more if it is particularly enterprising, is 
creating a functional associative bridge between machinic assemblages as constituting 
continuity or operational extension as consistency.  
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To see the world as a machinic assemblage should not prove to be a big stretch 
for our imagination. Henri Bergson (1859-1941) helps us over the hump with his 
undoing of the cinematograph of thought in Creative Evolution (1907) and now that the 
functioning of machinic assemblages is no longer foreign to us, we can understand the 
idea of being in the world as cogs in a bigger machine in a different way. Charlie Chaplin 
(1889-1977) showed us in his film Modern Times (1936) how easy it was to become one 
with the machine—his Tramp is the prototypical alienated industrial plantworker who 
loses himself by unwittingly embroiling himself in the works so as to literally become 
one with the machine as one of its cogs. It has always been seen as a sad image, one 
which Simondon would say is illustrative of our ingrained cultural mistrust and fear of 
technology, that of the human subsumed to the workings of an impersonal, non-living 
machine—but within this moving image we can reveal another machinic order at work; 
not the machinic order of the mechanical domain but one of functional integration of 
bodies within the flow of forces and energy as constitutive of process within the 
machinic assemblage as the advance of novelty. And further, if we let ourselves be 
seduced for a second by the trope of cinematographic thought and allow the film screen 
to stand in for the world, we can extend the conception proposed within the on-screen 
depiction of the functional integration of bodies as machinic assemblages as a moving 
image, as an image that both moves and which moves us by engaging our machinism in 
its machinism, to assert that it is itself also a machinic assemblage. 
The realization that the image is itself machinic is major in that it allows us to 
conceive the world, the image and the flat plane of the screen as a machinic assemblage 
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which when coupled to perception and the moving image that moves us extends the 
machinic "inward" as a function of the interior structures of being (Simondon, 1989: 
108). Bergson calls this in Creative Evolution the inward articulation of movement which 
Deleuze echoes in Foucault as an "interiorizing of the outside" (1988: 98) where a 
mirrored doubling takes place to show how the inside is somehow always "the folding of 
a presupposed outside" (1988: 99). The fold is possibly Deleuze's least intuitively 
graspable concept in that its metaphoric anchoring is itself a very complex, multi-fold, 
labyrinthine enfolding-into-itself so that an analysis of its conceptual emergence is 
difficult to carry out. We can relate the fold to the pictorial creation of "life-like" photo-
realistic paintings using optical devices in Flanders in the mid-1400's, to perspective and 
Girard Desargues' invention of projective geometry in the 1600's, to wave theory, to 
origami, to couture, to Hermetic thought, to topology, to catastrophe theory, to 
metamorphism in geology... each descriptive/interpretative point of view produces a 
facet of the crystal of the expression of the fold but does not provide specifics as to its 
actual constitutive workings. Not withstanding the shortcomings of the "Wise Men and 
the Elephant" indeterminacy in the general coming to terms with the fold, its conceptual 
anchoring or its actual operational location and functioning, the fold remains the big 
concept that mediates between the external and the internal, which "integrates the 
evolved with the evolved" (Bergson, 1944: 398) and establishes the correspondence 
between the world of matter and the soul.  
For Deleuze, "folding or doubling is itself a Memory: the 'absolute memory' or 
memory of the outside" related to a memory of the future and processes of 
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subjectivation (1988: 107): the fold leads us to consider memory in terms of the 
integration of experience as part of the tradition of the Ars Memoriae (the Arts of 
Memory) and as part of visual thought and imagistic process. In The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque (1993) Deleuze characterizes eidos not as an essence but as a trait or 
operative function whose role is to produce folds (1993: 3). The folds extend to infinity 
and subsist on two levels—pleats of matter on the lower and folds in the soul on the 
upper—where the two levels are connected by a harmonic resonance that transmits the 
"visible movements below into sounds up above" (1993: 4). Deleuze houses the relation 
between the two by recycling Leibniz's construct of the great Baroque montage in his 
allegory of the Baroque House (1993: 5): in the lower floor, girdled by windows 
signifying the senses, we find rooms endlessly contained in other rooms; the windowless 
upper floor contains only a stretched canvas "diversified by folds" as the monadic 
whole.  
In philosophical discourse, as soon as we encounter the words room, theatre, 
cavern, house, architecture, city, building, passages with nooks and crannies, a circuit, a 
walk or stroll, etc—i.e. anything that seems to be wanting to organize experience 
spatially—we have found that memory as the driving dynamic is lurking nearby. Usually 
these memory-location words are used out of context but to consider this misuse a 
malapropism would perhaps be too harsh a judgment; outside of the imagistic milieu of 
memory they become disingenuous characters who inadequately express that which 
they seem to be wanting to say. And the memory here being referred to is not the one 
based on the accumulative hoarding of the melodramatic nostalgia of the photographic 
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snapshot nor the version that has emerged from the "scientific Germanic psychology" of 
the 19th century as a physiochemical process (Sahakian, 1981: 103-184)—rather, it is 
memory which seeks to revitalize and reactivate the imagistic implications dwelling 
behind the façade of words such as understand, recollect, remember, recall, recognize 
and repetition and bring them back to the collective fold of memory from which they 
originate. Memory then becomes an integrative process where the image is actualized 
as it is (re)produced in its réalisation2 as it is (re)called into being through the 
(re)collection of its constituent elements and (re)membering them as part a coherent, 
machinic, operational flux. In this way, memory is "internally" no different than the 
experiential unfolding of actuality and how we come to terms with it—an integrative 
becoming which gradually gains definition as a body in the widest sense of the word.  
To think and activate memory in this way reflects an "archeological" treatment 
of memory as classically conceived in the image-based tradition of the Ars Memoriae. It 
is archeological in that it seeks to identify the various strata in its evolution as planes of 
consistency and what territories were being created rather than composing with it as a 
given.  This vibrant tradition had been alive since Antiquity and was phased out in the 
17th century when it was supplanted by the "imageless dialectical order as the true 
natural order of the mind" based on the divisive arborescence and hierarchical 
organization of Ramist memory as "memorizing every subject by the dialectical order of 
its epitome", the book as a technology of thought and Calvinist theology as 
backgrounding emergent capitalism (Yates, 2000: 234). According to Frances Yates 
                                                          
2
 We use the French verb here because it conveys the performative énnonciation of the making it "real" 
and the subjective directionality of the becoming actual. 
16 
 
(1899-1981) in The Art of Memory (1966/2000), we owe our knowledge of the classical 
techniques of the art of memory to the only extant Latin treatise on rhetoric, Ad 
Herennium (c. 86-82 BCE) whose unknown author likely drew on Greek teachings on 
mnemonic technique. This text was vastly influential during the Middle Ages and into 
the Renaissance and lay the groundwork not only for the understanding of 'artificial' 
memory and its techniques in relation to rhetoric as a discursive art but as the 
foundation for an enhanced understanding of memory in terms of an 'artificial' ordering 
of experience and the structuration of knowledge as imagistic process.  
The mnemonic method of the artificial memory of the Ad Herennium can be 
succinctly stated as being established on places and images (2000: 22). It consists of the 
serial placing of striking versions of idea-images we wish to remember at place holders 
(loci) in a circuit in the same order we wish these images to be recalled. The rhetor 
wishing to remember a sequence of ideas would walk a pre-established memory circuit 
(in the mind) and at key locations he would find the striking idea-image he placed there 
to remember and incorporate it into the narrative performative unfolding of a speech as 
ennonciation. This simple yet powerful process does not in itself bring out into the open 
the association of image or the locus or the pedestrian perambulation as the "content"; 
the mnemonic method is simply expressive of the binding "of the psychic life to its 
motor accompaniment" (Bergson, 1991: 15) as a cartography, as a mapping of the 
territory of the discourse. Yet, as unlikely as it might seem at first, the method of the Ad 
Herennium serves as the basis for a serious engagement with many aspects of 
speculative thought as emergent in the writings of Deleuze, Guatttari and Deleuze and 
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Guattari: postulating the memory-image as constitutive of the concept, it becomes 
explicative of a constellation of key concepts; namely, territorialization, faciality, 
conceptual personae, the creation of bodies, the plane of consistency and the plane of 
immanence as a machinic assemblage, among others. In considering the method 
historically, we can see the evolution of the memory-image as foundational to a 
(re)contextualizing discourse on memory that enables us to (re)member it to the 
tradition to which speculative thought belongs.  
Like the unwitting Tramp of Modern Times that is caught in the machinery of 
manufacture, we originally got embroiled in "the works" of imagistic machinic thought 
by wanting to take on the challenge presented by Alfred North Whitehead in Process 
and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929) of elucidating the meaning of the phrase ‘the 
flux of things’ in terms of spectatorship in the cinema. Whitehead considers the task of 
elucidating this phrase as “one chief task of metaphysics” (Whitehead, 1978: 208) and 
to consider carrying this out through an analysis of cinematic spectatorship seemed like 
an interesting proposition. But in reading and researching Becoming One with the Image 
we were embroiled in the ritornello of Bergson's siren song: "He who installs himself in 
becoming sees in duration the very life of things, the fundamental reality" (Bergson, 
1944: 344). We do not get to the fundamental reality, but our lashings to the mast of 
our intellectual enterprise have held. Thus, we propose to deal with the question of how 
one installs oneself in the midst of duration as an imagistic process through a selection 
of essays which explore Bergson's contention in Matter and Memory (1896) that the 
universe is an aggregate of images; the various chapters will examine what constitutes 
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the 'external' image in and of the world, the 'internal' image in and of the mind and the 
dynamic in the midst of the mirrored correspondence between the two. As was stated 
earlier, memory looms large in these considerations, so the concept of memory as a 
catalyzing creator of images and as integrator of the associative milieu of experience as 
actuality will also be dealt with. We seek to posit the functioning of memory not as 
creative of memory-images which paraphrasing Bergson "finally 'descend' to 
perception" (Trifonova, 2007: 54) but as processual aggregation/integration of image-
elements as informative of the experiential flux of actuality as novelty. Now, the way 
that we are here presenting the conceptual cluster around image and memory with 
words such as 'external' and 'internal' images, mind, memory, etc might signal to some 
an inadequate reading of Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari. But to get where we wish 
to go, we need to posit the ideas, identify them operationally and situate them in such a 
way that they can be seen as anchored, as reflective of that which most deem as the 
common sense experience of life in the world as usually understood. Perhaps this will be 
the most significant aspect of the project: to bridge the gap between the demise of 
integrative imagistic memory in the 17th century and its resurgence in the 20th century 
particularly in the thought of Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari and other thinkers in 
the speculative tradition. The endeavour is not historical per se, though some aspects 
are historiographically driven. Rather, it is a re-drawing of vectors of correspondence 
between planes of consistency as reconstitutive of the stratigraphic logic in the layered 
build-up of machinic assemblages aggregating and disaggregating territories between a 
past and a present separated by 400 years but which for all intents and purposes are 
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now immediately linked. For this reason one will find a profusion of "as" within the body 
of the text mostly as a conjunction. They are not there to evoke simile (as opposed to 
metaphor) but to underscore the layered multiplicity of the becoming-relational where 
different relational fields activate different aspects of an entity's being as associative 
empathy.  
There is something of the spoiler to our enterprise in that we move to 
understand by revealing the magic behind the magic, but it is our contention that to 
truly create with the concepts one must understand how they actually inform process, if 
not the territorializations are not philosophical but religious in nature. In becoming 
consistent, concepts perforce must lose degrees of associative freedom which curtail 
their potential for relation and creativity—without this creative curtailment there would 
only be an unlivable undifferentiable chaos not of unexpressed potential but of pap. 
Thus, what concepts lose relationally in their systematic information is not a loss but a 
trade off towards the acquisition of an attentive discrimination in terms of more specific 
association which renders them cogent and operationally coherent: the trick is not to 
make the concepts so deterministically defined, so locked-down in their specificity that 
their compositional potential is irreparably hobbled and they become incapable of 
activation except in a very limited way. The point is not to render concepts lifeless, 
useless towards creative innovation but to enable an on-going operational meta-
stability between expressive potential, evolutive adaptability and operational 
consistency and adequacy.  
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Our project will be composed of five chapters. Chapter 1, Putting the Image in its 
Place, will present the experience of participating in a film screening as a relational and 
associative process in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen relationship 
reflective of the subject/object relation. How does an emergent interconnected 
relationality arise and how does one locate its happening? If memory is constituted as 
image and place, we look at the 'external' image as part of the tradition of 'memory as 
integrative process' to better understand what the image as experience contained 
within place is about. In this chapter, we present that which is happening as an 
associated milieu in order to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place 
between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an environment where 
the milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form 
as experience. In this way, the associated milieu is the setting and environment of 
concretion where participants condition each other in order to form something which in 
turn, simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves.  
To re-activate memory as a concept literally "requires a kick in the imagination, a 
wrenching of tired words" (Daly, 1985: 190). Thus Chapter 2, Memory as an Integrative 
Process, examines and re-activates the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory 
not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical 
tradition from which speculative thought emerges. Over the past three centuries the 
fuller meanings of this constellation of words have lost their relevance in favour of a 
scientific definition of memory based on the stockpiling of information as physio-
electrochemical synthesis in the recesses of the brain magically adduced by some sort of 
21 
 
representational imagination3. Instead of the mechanistic transfer of sensorial 
impressions along nerve paths to the brain and their conversion into memories through 
electrochemical operations on networked neural bundles, we propose an alternate 
mechanism for memory predicated on the processual memory-image in terms of a 
performative (re)creation of the image content which urges us to (re)produce the image 
by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the 
unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its gradual 
coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is 
(re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent 
elements as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which it is 
operative. 
In discussing the image of thought in Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze 
considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with 
philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual 
experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of 
referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can 
be known implicitly without concepts. Chapters 3 and 4 will deal with the 
complementary concepts of Faciality and The Fold from the point of view of imagistic 
thought and memory. Central to the discussion will be the process of adumbration by 
which the many become one as the perpetuum mobile of the eventual continuity of 
change in actuality as being. We shall advance that the façade of becoming actual of the 
                                                          
3
 Imagination is here used as a transitive verb. 
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world as a moving imagistic front interfaces with perception as the integrated 
affirmation of being one with the world as constitutive of the fold. The operative 
function of the fold will be discussed through the invocation of models previously 
mentioned but primarily through the use of Girard Desargues' theorem as the 
culmination of perspective and the instauration of projective geometry as a possible 
model for the apparatus "of correspondence between mind and matter" (Bergson, 
1944: 398). This will be further developed topologically to develop the connectivity of 
the projective plane topologically as a closed surface which would allow the continuous 
associative motion of territories upon it as expressive of local machinic activity within 
the monadic movement of process.  
The final chapter completes the picture, so to speak, in order to look at the 
'internal' imagistic process. The first chapter will deal with experience, the second with 
the image of the world, the third with processual advance, the fourth with the 
interfacing of the internal and the external and Chapter 5, On the Creation of the Image 
Concept, will detail the process of imagination as a faculty. This chapter will review the 
historical evolution of the arts of memory in order to show how the development of 
memory images led to the creation of image concepts in the service of rhetoric by way 
of pictorial Renaissantist mnemonic devices called imagines agentes. We then seek to 
show how these give rise or contribute to such important concepts in the thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari as the machinic assemblage, the constitution of territorialization, 
the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of consistency and the plane of 
immanence. One will also be able to see emerge an interesting processual 
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correspondence between the workings of the image concept as an 'interior image' and 
the 'external image'; even if both types of images are seen as different in character, 
there is interesting correspondence between the way a concept is constituted internally 
within imagistic thought and the way that we've written about activity in actuality and 
its containment in the first chapter—to wit, the internal workings will inform the 
understanding of the external and vice versa in a way that echoes the ritornello of the 
operational unity of the universe as part of the mnemonic tradition in terms of an 
integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the 
microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, 
of the outside and the inside: "As above, so below". 
Becoming One with the Screen shares with A Thousand Plateaus the difficulty of 
trying to present concepts which are so polyandrously concretised within the project 
that to cause them into appearance as a linear unfolding from the first page to the last 
will not always be possible: every concept relates with every other concept concretely 
and reticularly as an on-going dynamic process that to express this multiplicity as the 
linear unravelling of a thread is not always feasible. Thus, I ask in advance for 
forbearance from the reader as they progress through the text; if a concept is explicated 
elsewhere as part of a more pertinent exposition, we will offer cross-referencing links in 
the footnotes to the relevant passages. 
We are very aware that Becoming One with the Image is a piece of academic 
writing and as such a poor substitution for that which it tries to understand: how 
experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. 
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Buddhists are fond of saying that pointing at the moon is not the same as the moon—
and there will be a lot of pointing at the moon in Becoming One with the Image! But 
perhaps reading it will make our arm less tired, or let us drop our arm to scratch our 
head to think of why we are pointing at the moon4 or extend our arm so we can touch 
the moon to attest that it is in fact Camembert cheese and shake hands with Georges 
Méliès' insectoid Selenites! All thought is political in the large sense of the word and at 
the heart of imagistic thought is an integrated ecological understanding of non-
privileged equality and empathy. If Becoming One with the Image can move us in that 
direction then it will have been a successful endeavour.  
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Putting the Cinematic Event in its Place 
 
If we ask you to visualize a room, you would likely imagine four walls, a floor and 
a ceiling. You will likely add a door so you can enter the room and a window to let in the 
sunshine and fresh air. You will decorate and furnish it and you will likely eventually 
envision yourself or people you know engaged in some activity or other within it. Thus, 
your conception of the room would likely entail physical boundaries, a contained 
volume and an intended use, so that reduced to its barest essentials, we can imagine 
the physically bounded volume to take on any form we wish; the walls, floor and ceiling 
can assume any shape or material we desire; and we can dedicate this space to 
whatever use we fancy. With these suppositions we can engage this Pandora’s box of 
ideas to reflect on fundamental questions dealing with space, place and our 
participation in actuality in terms of the event. They force us to consider questions 
dealing with the concept of the container, what delimits the container, and that which is 
contained.  
We as Westerners usually understand space in terms of a Euclidian 3-D space 
because it is the one we feel we understand implicitly and most accept intuitively as our 
model of physical reality, specially seeing how we have learned to reify it perceptually. 
We refer to space as Euclidian because its construction conforms with the intelligible 
geometrical depiction of space as laid out in Euclid’s Elements and the expression of 
geometrical truths which concur with our sensorial understanding of actuality.  
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The room is a simple and neat example of a spatial container: the walls, floor and 
ceiling isolate, delineate, outline, demarcate, confine, impound, enclose and contain a 
closed volume of space that can be understood perceptually as having depth, width, 
height. If we abstract the room and conceive it as a cube sitting in space, we end up with 
an enclosed volume—a hollow, distinct, stand-alone entity—that is differentiated from 
the surrounding space by its hard-sided boundaries. This enclosed parcel of space which 
has length, breadth and depth and contained within space is referred to as a place, 
especially in that we can relate its location to another place. As such, a “place” can be 
defined in a number of ways: by the volume contained, by the inside surfaces that are in 
contact with and contain the volume, by the outside surface of the entity which is in 
contact with the space that surrounds it, and by the “hollowed” volume in space which 
confines and allows the entity to occupy that space. The room can also be understood in 
any of these ways, i.e. it can be seen either as the physical limit of the enclosed volume 
of space as separate from that which contains it, as in a room or the room, or it can be 
seen as that which is contained within the limits of the physical boundary, room as in 
room to move. The difference between a room and a place is that a place is a more or 
less open yet delimited expanse of location for activity whereas the usual conception of 
a room requires that it be closed. As such, each definition presents different ways of 
understanding the limit function of that which occupies place and how it goes about 
doing so. However, we must bear in mind that this sets up a very significant implicit 
duality of inclusion/exclusion, i.e. of inside/outside, between that which is contained as 
the what is happening and that which contains it as that which allows the happening to 
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take place: to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, it represents the binary segmentarity of 
the dualist opposition of inside and outside (2007: 208). The container allows the 
happening to be enclosed for its own protection, in order to maintain its integrity. Place 
seems to want to make the spatial distinction between the location of that which is 
happening and that which is not in terms of activity as occupation (thereby bringing in 
aspects of temporality into the mix) whereas room seems to make the objectifying 
distinction between that which is contained and that which contains it in terms of a 
static, purely geometric understanding of space.  
In order to locate place in space, to establish its location, we make recourse to a 
relative coordinate system. Greek mathematicians had developed an objective 
volumetric conception of objects as having length, width and depth but they had not 
made the leap to a locatory description of place within space in terms of the locus of 
coordinates measured off on orthogonal axes. Relative location is derived from an 
extension of Descartes’ planar paired coordinate system into a coordinate system 
involving three dimensions: we set up three intersecting orthogonal planes which in 
turn create three orthogonal lines or axes where pairs of planes intersect. We define 
location relative to an arbitrary Origin—the point where the three planes intersect—
from which we can metrically specify relative position between different entities as 
measurements, dimensions along the axes in Euclidian 3-D space (E3). The origin, the 
“0” point for the metric determination of any local coordinate systems is arbitrary and 
can be established anywhere we wish. Even so, in order to identify the location of a 
thing or as an event x, one has to identify some motionless point of reference and 
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Newton understood this requisite in order to postulate his dynamics. To make this work, 
he situates space within an intelligible absolute, abstract, ideal void that is eternal, 
unchanging, ungenerated and indestructible. This void simultaneously permeates and 
engulfs sensible space and renders it into a determinate whole; it allows its overcoding 
and gridding (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 212). This absolute emptiness is infinitely 
extended, homogenous and isotropic both spatially and temporally yet inconceivable in 
its totality: it homogenises both space and time thereby allowing their consistent 
metrical expression. This establishes the limit of the place/space relation of actuality. 
i.e. that which contains that which contains that which contains, ad infinitum as 
contained and container where that which encloses and contains space is understood in 
terms of a theosophic construction that characterizes genesis and teleology as well as 
the mechanics of causality, potentiality and necessity through divine intervention.  
In this conception of space we have a clear notion of spatial and temporal 
location in that they are regular modalities which reflect the qualities of the 
homogenous, isotropic and infinitely extended absolute space. Time is a one-
dimensional, independent variable which functions as a Euclidian linear entity, E1, and 
ranges over the E3 space so that given two points, x and x’, “i.e. two different events, 
we have a well-defined notion of their spatial separation, namely the distance between 
the points x and x’ of E3, and we also have a well-defined notion of their time 
difference, namely the separation between t and t’ as measured in E1” (Penrose, 2004: 
385). So that given two events in space, we have a clear notion of the distance between 
the two events, two localizable goings-on, as well as a clear notion of their temporal 
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separation, i.e. the time interval between them: temporal separation is predicated on 
metricized time as the standardized measure of processual change. According to this 
model, all events, everything that happens, literally, ‘takes place’ within space; all 
activity—all that which exists as an event—happens within the confines of the cosmic 
container and is fully determinable and determinate as an entity that is separate and 
distinct from that which bounds and isolates it. Given this striated space, a space that is 
overcoded and gridded, all events xn are fully determinable and in their place and result 
from a linear cause and effect causality. “It is a space in which objects are situated 
independently of the presence of subjects” (Lemay and Steiner, 2010: 939) so events are 
seen as existing as objectified, fully-determined and determinable, stand-alone 
durational entities spatially and temporally contained as an individualization.  
If we jump from the abstract space of mathematics into a more general 
consideration of the event and of space within this conception, the event can be seen to 
be set in a place, i.e. as taking form, enclosed within the volume created by the space 
that circumscribes it or spatially contained by the walls of the room that create a place 
for it. Obviously, we can also identify the room according to what activity occupies the 
space within the room so that the activities in terms of relations that occupy the space, 
that take place, in a room are what define it: that which goes on inside is what enables 
us to label it. The intended use of the room, its teleological intention, usually defines the 
activity as event that takes place in it—its occupation—the simple act of naming its 
purpose, i.e. labelling it, immediately conditions its use. This might seem like a trivial 
statement but the functional conditioning of the label is often ingrained more deeply 
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than we realize. For example, the installation “The Empty Museum” by Russian artists 
Ilya and Emilia Kabacov shown at the 5th Mercosul Bienal in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2007 
illustrates this deep conditioning rather well. “The piece reconstructs a true-to-life 
exhibit room from a traditional museum in a room at the Bienal: all the details such as 
decoration, furniture and illumination are in place, except that there are no “pictures” 
on the walls. Although the walls of the installation are empty, with illumination 
highlighting where the “pictures” should be, the viewers engage the environment and 
exhibit of “missing pictures” in the same way as if there were “pictures” on the wall” 
(Oliveira & Rebolledo, 2010). A gallery thus becomes the place where the only thing to 
be done is to look at pictures on the wall; a movie theater is the place where the only 
thing to be done is to look at a movie on a screen; a classroom is a place where the only 
thing to be done is to listen to the lecturer. It is interesting to note that no other activity 
is likely to be tolerated that detracts from the primary one i.e. in the case of the movie 
theatre, no talking, no eating, no texting, etc. In this respect, the label acts as an order-
word, as an envelope for the implicit pre-conditions contained by the name as an 
assemblage of enunciations which “designate this instantaneous relation between 
statements and the incorporeal transformations on non-corporeal attributes they 
express” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007: 81). 
Usually the simple label applied to a place is sufficient to define its occupation 
and curtail its possibilities. It conditions how it is going to be used, how time will be 
spent and defines what kinds of bodies can participate and the types of relations can be 
entertained in the space: one does not eat in the living room, nor does one play ball in 
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the kitchen with the dog. The simple act of naming the room, of designating its 
occupation, creates a virtual, conditioned spatial container for the event—not 
metaphorically by containing it in terms of creating boundaries with walls for the event, 
but by providing a telenomical place-holder for the disposition of the unfolding 
continuity of the event as a subset of all possible relations. Paraphrasing Massumi, the 
label constitutes “the set of mediating actions shepherding the abstractly thought 
object into concrete embodiment” (2009: 7). Thus, a sign such as “Cinema 1” above the 
entrance as an identifier of a room’s purpose preconditions and limits the room’s 
potential as to its use. The label tells us that whatever activity as an expression of 
relation we choose to entertain is what gives ultimate meaning to the room either as a 
spatial unfolding, i.e. taking up room, or as a temporal unfolding, i.e. going on, or as a 
combination of both as taking place. This label provides causal traction and gives 
direction to the event although its shape, its body, is only determinable in the event’s 
unfolding. Whitehead calls the active, relational process of fulfilling the label’s telos the 
“satisfaction”—“The notion of 'satisfaction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' 
abstracted from the 'process of concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the 
process... which is both process and outcome” (Whitehead, 1985: 84). Although the 
processual unfolding of the event is preconditioned by the satisfaction as a “lure”, its 
actual unfolding is anything but fully determined and its final outcome will be the 
expression of the event. The label that we accord to the event and its unfolding is not 
only the name of the event as an objectified entity but as a lure serves as the attractor 
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which draws the memorial5 integration of the event—Whitehead’s "lure for feeling" as 
that which incites “the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the 
data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (Whitehead, 1985: 40). The 
move towards satisfaction allows concrescence within the super-saturated environment 
of relational potential and results in the “intensification of ‘formal immediacy’” 
(Whitehead, 1985: 88).6  
In contrast to the lure for feeling, Simondon proposes transduction as the 
operative causality which drives individuation. But the process requires an order-word 
which acts as a crystal seed which patterns the information as "the very operation of 
taking on form" (Combes, 2012: 9) within the super-saturated relational medium. As 
such, that which the order-word designates as seed is a given made up of an infinite 
recursivity of prior individuations which themselves can be seen as individualizations 
expressive of extremely complex junctions of inter-penetrated myriad territorialities.7 
These enfoldings of relations and potentials are integrated memorially into vast 
expanses of relational operational coherence which in turn are capable of enmeshing 
associatively as part and parcel of other individuations. The lure for feeling can only be 
effective if these indispensable order-word designates as defining elements are in place; 
without them there can be no associative aggregative accretion as constitutive of the 
event. No matter how much labelling we invoke, the pre-conditions that define the 
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 Memorial integration is dealt with in Chap. 2. 
6
 This super-saturation, this over-concentration, of potential-coming-together at the intersection of inter-
penetrated myriad territorialities as bodies results in the event expressed as a manifestation of excess, of 
coming-together-brimming-over the containment of inclusion. 
7
 This is why we must always start in the middle. 
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order-word as seed must be in place. In the case of the cinematic event, the 
preconditions that must be in place are of a technical nature8:  
• a high-intensity light source 
• a film with sprockets to match the pull-down apparatus 
• a rotating shutter mechanism 
• a pull-down claw apparatus that works in synch with the shutter 
• a gate, aperture plate or frame 
• a lens system matched to the projection space 
• a reflective screen 
• a film 
Without these technical preconditions, the cinematic event cannot emerge as 
each element is a fundamental contributor to that which constitutes the medium and an 
integral determinant of the possibility of the projection as a cinematic event. Everything 
else is superfluous: the bucket seats, the popcorn, the arena seating, the THX Surround, 
etc. And in our case, as will be seen later, the subjectifying apparatus is the associated 
milieu encompassing the cinematic effect of the constituent as eventual. 
If we consider this the constitutive seed of the cinematic event we can move on 
to consider its conditions of possibility as causes of existence (Combes, 2012: 13). There 
is a tension within the constitution of the event between the idea-word that proposes 
the necessary essential preconditions as given for the event's coming into being and the 
progressive satisfaction of the lure for feeling of the event, but neither is the event. The 
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 This pertains specifically to the cinematic event during projectino specifically and not to spectatorship. 
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tension is progressively and gradually resolved through the activation of conditionings 
and their integration. The pre-constituted given as seed offers the what to latch onto 
and the lure draws it towards satisfaction—yet, the satisfaction which linguistically we 
can call a perfection will never be perfected because the event will never consummate 
its full potential as to what can unfold from ite. And although the space of the event is 
indefinite and the participative relational possibilities are wide open, this localized 
intensification of relations which expresses itself as an individuation, as the event taking 
place “contained” in the getting into the film as shared experience between all 
participants (human and non-human alike), once operationally coherent as a screening 
it can be seen as an individualization that stands out from the “background”. As an 
individuation its operational coherence is recognized and identified but the inter-
connectedness of the continuum is maintained; there is no break with the processual 
unfolding of the world—this local individuation is coherent and consistent with the 
general unfolding of process.9 However, considering the event as an individuation is not 
a question of rendering it a static object: the event as such will never exhaust its infinite 
relational potential—the expression of the operational coherence of the relational 
dynamic of projecting a film onto a screen is an open-ended proposition. Hence, 
Simondon points out that “individuation must be understood as the becoming of being, 
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 Only the mapping, the attentional focus, need be changed to bring out en relief, to foreground, some 
other new event. 
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and not as a model of being that would exhaust its signification” (Simondon, 2009: 13). 
10 
Thus, apart from the room as container which dictates its use by its label, or by 
the activities taking place within it, there needs be a conspiracy of conditionings within 
the space which inform the what and the how an activity can take place within the 
space. Take for example any empty room with blank walls. As an environment, its 
potential is unlimited in terms of “housing” an event. As we modify it, dress it, adorn it, 
decorate it and fill it with objects that condition our movement and relational 
expression and occupy the space, its degrees of freedom in terms of what can and 
cannot be done in that space will be curtailed. This physical occupation will define the 
functionality of the room, reduce its options and limit its potential in terms of its ability 
to express occupational possibility not only in terms of volume but in terms of what 
activities can literally take place within it: by adding a bed, a dresser, a bedside table, a 
lamp, etc. we will eventually conclude that we have content within the room which 
conditions that which will be able to take place within it and how—it can be the site for 
sleeping, for sex, for healing, for playing, for reading.... And if we become willing 
participants within this relational ecology repeatedly and compose with the given 
contents so that the same relational activity repeats itself, eventually, in the sense of 
becoming-event, we will be able to call this manifold collection of recurring relational 
possibilities within the delimited space a “bedroom” as the operative order-word. This 
belies a another tension between the "order word" and the lure for feeling in that if we 
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 It bears pointing out here that the seamless, organic process of individuation is the becoming of being 
in terms of relational dynamic is the “eventual” unfolding of actuality. 
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propose "bedroom" as the order word a variety of lures for feeling can become 
simultaneously activated and produce unexpected becoming-events as untoward 
novelty. Thus, the becoming-event composes with the relational potential available 
within the container of information as creative possibility in which there is always an 
element of surprise because of the indeterminate causal conditionings at play. However, 
if we can lessen the indeterminacy of the relational potential, when we return to the 
room and (re)call into being our habituated conditioned movements and gestures within 
this space and (re)member these relational conditionings to the experiencing of the 
location as repeatable event taking form through the (re)collection of all the constituent 
relations conditioned by the environmental participants, we end up with an operational 
solidarity as a navigational familiarity as cartography of memory. That which we 
eventually end up with is “not the result of a simple step-by-step accumulation, or of a 
piecemeal adding together of elements. It is non-decomposable. It is holistic. It’s not a 
structure... It does not add elements together to form a structural unity. Rather, it is a 
holism effect that adds a whole new dimension of existence to the elements’ diversity” 
(Massumi, 2009: 11)—but what can be advanced in novelty is also operative in 
repetition if the constituent causal determinants are in place. As such, what was just 
eventual has become the event perfected as the consummation of the relational 
possibilities as an operational coherence proffered by the agencement of the 
conditionings in place—here agencement is understood simultaneously as agency and 
information11 immanently arising from the relational conditioning as causal determinant 
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 Information in the Simondonian sense. 
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resulting from the disposition of the participants as an assemblage. The agencement as 
a fielding of conditioned relationality as subjective arises from the immanent territory 
which takes places as a plane of experiential consistency as operational coherence 
where activity informs the becoming as the eventual (re)calling into being of the 
individuation as memory pulled along by the lure for feeling. The room itself, as four 
walls, has now become almost irrelevant other than it allows for the simple designation 
of the location of the event, and what we are doing is moving towards composing the 
room not as a spatial, volumetric construction but as the location that houses the 
repeatable expression of the conditionings of relation, i.e. place as the location of 
memory. Hence, that which constitutes the place of the event—the taking-up-space 
within the room—is not the room qua room in terms of physical containment, but the 
locus of participation created by neighbourhoods of conditioned relational occupation 
where the homeostasis afforded by participation sustains the meta-stable tension 
between that which takes place and that which gives room. The locus of participation as 
that which takes place is easy to conceive as the body of the event and its shape is the 
manifestation of the event itself at the location where it takes place in its unfolding. 
Case in point, recently, it has become commonplace in Montreal for various 
festivals to offer free open-air screenings for the enjoyment of film-loving Montrealers. 
Films are projected on impromptu screens set-up in parks, in the street, on the walls of 
buildings, etc. The conditions for the cinematic experience are in place within the non-
specific urban setting but the how of the cinematic event’s containment is more difficult 
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to pin down12—one would think that by removing the roof and the walls of the cinema, 
the event would lose the preconditioning of the environment which gives it form. There 
is a liberating aspect to watching a film projection out of doors, à la belle étoile... until it 
begins to rain. Containment curtails the activity's relational freedom and "frames" it by 
enclosing it and structuring its future (re)productive compossibility but at the same time 
it protects it from external forces seeking its undoing and affords it durational heft. If we 
consider a cinema's screening room's volumetric extension as a room—the room qua 
room—we can see that to a degree it is almost irrelevant to the conception of the event 
other than in considering capaciousness as determinate of extent as the subjective 
expression of the holding together of the event. The room's walls are relevant only if 
while creating capacity for relation they are also concretely13 creating conditioning 
modalities other than containment towards the arising of the event: other than the 
single "gesture" of containing the screening event, the walls of the cinema provide 
darkness, soundproofing, protection from the elements and somewhere to hang the 
screen. So that the room as container for the event is a red herring in that it does not 
create the space within which the event occurs... if anything it contains it so that the 
event may more easily be posited as a closed-off system created through external 
agency or at best as an isolated causal system.  
The location per se is not the event nor constitutive of it—the event only needs a 
location and room for its unfolding: the room as room is only metonymical. The 
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 It is the containment created by the relational field. But it is intuition as that which allows one to 
recognize the agencement through the novel assemblage. 
13
 Concretely in the Simondonian sense of doing double duty or more (if it is particularly enterprising), as 
creating a functional associative bridge between machinic assemblages as constituting continuity or 
operational extension as consistency. 
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containment is a body as a self, contained, self-contained expressive of the unity 
created by the identified and named processual operational coherence of the activity at 
hand as event. The constitution is a fragile attentional coercion induced by the relational 
directivity necessary for the coming-to-being of the event. This relational directivity is 
not to dictate the outcome of the event, but to (re)call and (re)collect the elements that 
together as a coming-to-being lead to the event's constitution. The relational directivity 
of the associative operational coherence of environmental factors is constituted by the 
gradual application of a set of accretionary inductions that can be understood abstractly 
as compelling the unfolding but which act in a concrete way to activate relations which 
lead experience where it needs to go. These accretionary shifts which inform the 
becoming event are also eventual, in that they are events which alter the unfolding 
thereby changing the dynamic as reflective of the activated memorial circuit as 
becoming. Thus, the event is a dynamic cohesion composed of the gradual inter-
penetration of the immanent co-arising of territorialities and bodies. Territorialities can 
be understood as active, material and non-material conditioned expanses of relation 
that go beyond the internalism/externalism debate: they are open, fuzzy-bounded, 
gradated zones of integrated relational intensities where that which conditions 
constitutes ingression and cohesion.14 As such, these territorializations as expanses of 
consistency or operational coherence interact as relational entities that condition as 
they themselves become the becoming aggregative accretion of the event as an 
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individuation. Even though there is a multiplicity of these territorialities, we can identify 
several major ones that condition the space of relation—these territorializing 
preconditions can be experiential, technical or material—although it is sometimes 
difficult to draw the line as to what is which. Within a movie theatre, they are intended 
to encourage a heightened relation with the screen by entraining the accreting 
becoming-event into sequences of imbricated expanses of relational consensus which 
meld and dissolve into one another as giving way or leading to the various phases of the 
incipient experiential event taking hold. For example, the experiential could be linked to 
the posters in the lobby, the sham glamour, the expectant line-ups, the ticket-taker 
tearing tickets, having a pee before the show, buying popcorn and a soft-drink, the 
cinema-based quizzes, the turning off of cell phones, etc. The technical include a 
darkened exhibition space, plush stadium seating, full-range surround sound, superior 
optics to the projector lens, high-intensity projector lamp, large format film, etc. In the 
cinema,  the screening room itself constitutes the major set of material environmental 
territorializing preconditions in that the room is conceived for a specific purpose and 
subscribes to the exigencies of accommodating this particular type of event. The floor is 
sloped away from the vertical wall supporting the reflective screen and terraced to 
accommodate stadium seating; the speakers are for the most part oriented towards the 
seating area; the projector is placed behind the seating diametrically opposite to the 
screen; etc. The seats themselves are relevant and indispensable in conditioning the 
event: for example, merely by occupying the space, by filling up the volume of the room, 
through their affirmation of the directionality of the relation, they restrict movement, 
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limit degrees of freedom, curtail the potential of what can be done in the room. These 
constraints induce relation to be expressed in specific ways, if anything to make sure the 
event unfolds as it should and that there is no variation when it is repeated. The 
modality of relation that these environmental constituents as active participants impose 
not only conditions how the screening takes place but how the human spectators move 
within the room, relate to each other and to the screen: they colour the event itself in 
that all participants will engage (or not) each other as a function of the relational 
preconditions established by the spatial disposition of these material accessories or 
inductions. For example, the fact that the seating is facing the screen curtails the 
possibility of interaction between the spectators, i.e. the directionality of the seating 
communicates a specificity as to that which can unfold and how it will unfold as activity 
in that space. The screen is an attractor that encourages and directs attention and 
conditions the modality of relation so that "eyes on wall" is the operative drive. But 
perhaps the most important aspect of this analysis is that these furnishings considered 
as participants in the event not only take up space, they, in conjunction with the human 
participants, are simultaneously cause and attribute to the creation of the event: as 
such, the gradual accretionary effect of progressive territorializations constitutes and 
expresses an integrative immanence “as the unity of efficient and formal cause” 
(Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen as the result of linear cause 
and effect but as an interdependent co-arising. 
Material and experiential pre-conditions have temporal and proximal values 
attached to them: their impact is weighted according to values of intensity in terms of 
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spatial and temporal distance. But non-immediate conditioning inductions cannot be 
discounted: experiential pre-conditionings that will impact on the experience of the 
screening could include reading a film review on a blog, a discussion about film over tea 
by two of the spectators the week before the screening, the physical resemblance of the 
one of the actors with the next door neighbour, or a screening of another film at 
another cinema. Although the impact of these non-immediate conditioning inductions 
might be deemed irrelevant or unimportant to the unfolding of the actual event, they 
underscore the progressive expression of the intensification of the event as a gradual 
processual coming-into-being over time. These inductions—material, non-material, 
environmental, experiential, etc—work as a haphazard concertation and contribute to 
the modulation of attentive interest as informational drives which increase the 
probability of an event's occurrence; they have a directive role in the pre-constitutive 
phases of the event’s life-arc as productive of continuity and negotiate the relational 
continuity of coming-into-being as a memorial integration of (re)membering the 
constitutional direction of the coming-into-being. The coming-into-being is not a 
clustering as an instantaneous singularity that happens when all the elementary 
ingredients are assembled together in the container. The formation of the event as such 
is a progressive imbrication in time which requires the layered creation, dissolution, 
amalgamation of pre-constitutive steps leading to an aggregation of participants which 
as a gradual gaining of definition create the body of the event as an ontogenetic 
process. These pre-constitutive steps are pre-conditioning and not per se constitutive of 
the event as direct participants—as "stepping stones" they participate in the directed 
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relational bridging of causal determinacy from phase to phase of the informational 
process of the constitution of the event as a memorial discourse.15 We would be remiss 
at this point if we neglected to underline that this relational inter-conditioning is at the 
basis of the continuity of actuality that Whitehead would call the extensive continuum: 
without that, this cannot be; without this, that cannot be—this inter-conditioning can 
be extended to infinity so that an organic continuity of relational process is established 
throughout as a continuum. This continuity blurs the demarcation of the lines of the 
where and when of the event, what constitutes participation and how deep we need to 
go so as to establish the genetic origin of the event. 
What about the human participants? How does the “me” enter into experiential 
relation in the seminar as an event? In order to answer these questions, instead of 
preserving the “I” as an entity, as an unchanging, objective identity, we need to think in 
terms of individuation. The words “I” or “me” refer to a continual re-inventing of the 
self, to the continuous production of new relational entities, as that which create new 
modes and states of relation not only with each other, but with the environmental 
inductions of the event by dynamically (actively in motion) engaging all others—the 
gradual accretion of the aggregation as eventual changes the internal constitution of the 
aggregating body of the event as well as that of the associated participants. This is an 
important point because in the event as an individuation the subjectivizing dynamic is 
not the human; the event as subjectivizing, vinculates the participants and extends 
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 Later we will see these as territorial entities. Territorialities can be understood as active, material and 
non-material conditioned expanses of relation: they are open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zones of 
integrated concretized relational intensities. 
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beyond the human participant or the self as static spectator within the knower-known 
relation. To quote Deleuze, “This dimension of the Self is not a preexisting 
determination that can be found ready-made… A line of subjectivation is a process, a 
production of subjectivity in an apparatus: it must be made to the extent that the 
apparatus allows it or makes it possible” (Two Regimes: 341).  
Although we have been referring to the human participants as preconstituted 
entities, the preconstituted “I” as a participant in the event does not per se exist. 
Instead, the spectatorial “me” can be seen as the dynamic, indeterminate plurality of 
the continuous reconstitution of relations as an individualization within fields of 
experience. This indeterminate plurality of relations is deemed a body, not in terms of a 
human body, nor in its “simple materiality, by its occupying space (‘extension’), or by 
organic structure. It is defined by the relation of its parts (relations of relative motion 
and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its 
environment or milieu and its internal milieu” (Baugh, 2005: 31). And for each and every 
participant in the screening, human and non-human alike, we can say the same thing—
they each carry the same democratic participatory heft in establishing the event qua 
event. Territorialities entrain, captivate and entrance bodies into relation by 
“grounding” or “preconditioning” the reciprocal recursive causality of relations that are 
setting up the incipient experiential event taking hold as an individuation, as a body at 
the level of species. It becomes a “system of individuations, an individuating system and 
a system individuating itself” (Simondon, 2009: 7). The event becomes an immanative, 
dynamic, coherent whole, a body composed of a multiplicity of bodies informed by 
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enabling constraints, inflected by disparate physical and non-physical inductions 
through their effects and their abilities to enter into relation. Here, participants are 
environmental, human, material or affective: they are physical and non-physical alike 
where “Participation... is the fact of being an element in a greater individuation...” 
(Simondon, 2009: 9) où c'est la memoire du monde qui nous emporte.  
I am ensconced in the darkness of my neighborhood cinema, in a plush club 
chair, my line of sight slightly above dead center of the curved screen, at the focal point 
of the 5.1 surround sound. I can sense the audience slowly coming together, getting into 
the mindset of watching a film. Everyone is forgetting their cares, connecting with their 
movie companion or distracted by the innocuous trivia and advertising flashed onto the 
screen. I allow the dampened noise of people finding their seats to wash over me and 
the hushed conversations and laughter to permeate my being. In the penumbra of the 
cavernous cinema, the dark tones of the wall coverings and the club seating lulls 
everyone into a homogeneous multitude—into a shared spatio-temporal headspace. By 
the time the feature film starts, the “me” no longer realizes that it is sitting. It is halfway 
to forgetting that it has a body. It is becoming one with the chair which is already one 
with the hall, which is one with the projector, the arc in the bulb and the modulated 
light beam coursing through space, the narrativized energy reflected on the screen, 
impinging on my retina which has been impatiently expecting it to close the machinic 
loop. As Brian Massumi asks, “Didn’t Bergson argue in Matter and Memory (chapter 1) 
that we are beings of light, effects of differential movements? That our bodies, or for 
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that matter all of matter, are interactions of light with surface dimensions of itself?” 
(Massumi: 1998) 
I disconnect for a second… the guy behind me just kicked my seat while trying to 
find his own center of comfort. The deterritorialized “me” is reminded that the 
production of the relational meta-stability with the spectacle is a fragile one and I would 
like to inform them of that fact. As I turn around to establish a new field of relations, i.e. 
to either chide him or give him a dirty look, my attention is drawn by the faces of the 
spectators behind me. I see the white of their eyes oscillating in unison, in concert with 
the modulating coloured glows on their faces. I can sense that everyone is now 
breathing as one, gasping as one, flinching as one, laughing as one, crying as one: one 
for all and all for one within the feedback process of the spectacle unfolding before us 
within which we are enveloped. The all of "me’s" have become lost in this communal 
flurry of ocular saccades, sonic sampling, shared micro-bursts of memory, and jolts of 
pleasure melding into one from the sheer enjoyment of consciousness unwittingly being 
so emphatically and polyphonically turned-on on so many levels. I turn around, and 
immediately get back into the movie to become one once again with the enormity of 
the giant screen, the power of the surround sound, and the plushness of the seating. 
That which was “me” is now continuously engaged in a continuous process of de-
territorializing and re-territorializing relations as the film unspools. The content of the 
film redefines the “me” at the same time that I redefine it as my aggregative 
understanding of the unfolding narrative as my experience within the conditioning 
environmental, technological, spectatorial conditions that are equal participants in that 
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which we are calling the cinematic event. This working together of tangible and 
intangible relations, the creation of relational territories through de-territorializing and 
re-territorializing assemblages within a durational continuity is what constitutes the 
associated milieu of the cinematic event. In other words, in the cinematic event as a 
machinic assemblage, the experience incessantly re-invents itself as a subjectified 
cluster as a recurrent, reciprocal causal dynamic: the associated milieu is not so much an 
apparatus or machine which transforms but the expression of the integrated sequential 
process which oversees the alternation between the aggregation of planes of 
consistency as a simultaneous, reciprocal constitution imbued with duration and its 
subsequent dissolution or break up to make itself available as potential constitutive 
material towards the aggregation of new planes of consistency as machinic assemblages 
capable of extending the duration of the event.16 
Usually, the event as a significant occasion is defined as a happening taking place 
at a particular location and at a particular time, where entering the designated location 
and starting the event at the scheduled time constitutes the inception of the event as a 
stand-alone entity. Although one usually refers to the cinematic event as the screening, 
which starts when the lights are dimmed and the curtain of the arco scenico goes up, or 
when the projection begins, this “instantaneous” crossing of the threshold fails to 
consider the gradual coming-to-being of the event and is part of the conception of the 
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 Yet, the projection as an event can in turn be related to other events that are simultaneously taking 
place: the importance of the spectacle relativized to other happenings in the room allows it to stand out 
as the dominant and distinct individuation from all others—i.e. people necking, eating popcorn, texting or 
daydreaming without paying attention to the film, etc—the film becomes one-event-among-a-possible-
many and not the-one-and-only event at that time. And though this “democratic” deployment of possible 
activity might seem disruptive, spectators are cognizant that there are other activities taking place while 
the main one is happening even if they are more or less tolerant of these other events taking place. 
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stand-alone, self-determining, objectified event and of the inside/outside duality. At 
best, the gradual dimming of the lights and the slow raising of the proscenic curtain can 
be said to stand-in or symbolise the crossing from the before the event to the actual 
happening as taking place—as in the time-worn cliché where the groom carries the 
bride through the threshold. A gate or arch is more descriptive, i.e. a richer expression, 
of that which constitutes crossing the threshold in terms of what can be expected 
beyond as often illustrated by the “Gates of Chinatown” in Montreal, San Francisco, 
Incheon or Manchester. These illustrated gates as images "instantly" prepare us for the 
inside and outside shift between connected milieus17. The contemplation of their 
ornamental narrativity provides the gradual transition from one environment to the 
next. 
As we have seen, the becoming of the event is a gradual aggregative accretion 
whose inception is difficult to pinpoint—an exacting binary "on/off" is difficult to 
provide if anything because of the fuzzy nature of the event. If we examine the enabling 
pre-conditions which give way to the event and decide on a point that establishes where 
the cinematic event takes hold, "beneath" the territorializing assemblages which work 
together to constitute the event, there are always underlying territorializing 
assemblages that constitute the preconditions to the underlying territorializing 
assemblages that constitute the preconditions, etc—and we can continue this 
regression ad infinitum, to the beginning of time if we wish.  
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As we saw earlier, environmental and architectural inductions guide and inform 
the gradual formation of the event, experiential inductions gradually prepare the way 
for what awaits us. In our cinema screening example, wending our way through the 
crowds of the lobby, taking the escalators to the designated cinema, the ticket-taker 
ripping our ticket, the frisking of my bag for camera devices, lining up to buy popcorn 
and a soft drink, making our way to our seats, the dimmed lights, the advertising and 
the on-screen quizzes, etc constitute transitional events which in themselves constitute 
mini-events which not only announce the coming-to-being of the screening-event as 
one line of convergence among many but establish imbricated relational layerings which 
are activated and de-activated in order to allow the activation of other relations etc as 
progressive linkages, as stepping stones which appear when needed and disappear 
when they are no longer needed. As stepping stones, they show the way and cue the 
incipient micro-events which constitute the becoming.  
As such, the succession of territorializations (and prior and subsequent de-
territorializations) as convergent relational inducements of micro-events as bodies is a 
better expression of the constitution of the event—a process that “conserves within 
itself a permanent activity of perpetual individuation” (Simondon, 2009: 7). The event's 
progressive gradual coming-to-being requires the concurrent coming together, the 
spatio-temporal convergence, of territories and bodies as constitutive subsidiary events 
so that strictly speaking it is almost pointless to determine the where and how and 
when of the inception of the cinematic event. Thus, we need to conceive differently the 
threshold that must be “crossed” for the event’s being considered as happening. 
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The gradual coming-to-being of the event is a relational intensification where its 
heft in terms of concretization can only be defined experientially as a knowing that one 
is in fact in the event. There is no line in the sand which serves as threshold: in the event 
of day giving way to night, the point in time where day actually becomes night is very 
difficult to define, though we know when night has come. As the gradual intensification 
of night overwhelms day, we realize that a threshold has been crossed when it is no 
longer day and we stand in the darkness of night. We can arbitrarily define a measurable 
threshold that will define night, e.g. a measure of the intensity of light, but in terms of 
the event, we can describe the coming of night as the sun going down, the appearance 
of stars in the sky, the substitution of the sea breeze by a land breeze, workers heading 
home after work, families preparing for dinner, children preparing for bed, etc. But even 
in this mundane example, we can see that the constituent territorialities and bodies as 
actual occasions defining the event are imbued with disparate temporalities of gradated 
intensification and duration which are themselves entrained into the concrescence here 
understood as day giving way to night. Once territorialities and bodies actually engage 
and interpenetrate they can be said to enter into relational participation in the event as 
an overwhelming, as a beyond the threshold. At the intersection of overlapping 
territorializations and bodies, thresholds are crossed in order that the individualization 
can be deemed accomplished. At each juncture, the threshold “interposes itself 
between two diversities, whose discontinuity it marks by a change in intensity 
accompanied by a qualitative change in the defining properties of the system.” The 
threshold is both spatial and temporal: it marks “that moment at which the system 
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makes the leap into operative-self-solidarity” (Massumi, 2009: 12). And once the 
experiential threshold has been crossed, in that the participants have come into relation 
and the event is in full formation, “we must recognize not only the genesis of what 
participates, but also of what is participated itself, which accounts for the fact of its 
being participated” (Deleuze, 1992: 171). 
In our conception of the event as the dynamic inducement of the becoming-
conjunction of these relational conditionings as bodies, the equation of their coming 
together is not a simple sum, it is not a + b + c + d = the event as one, but where the  
participation of bodies as variables in the relation is what dynamically defines them as 
they simultaneously, reciprocally instigate their own becoming within an individuation 
that is different and operationally other than the simple containment of constituent 
parts in a room as holding tank—the event is a unity that is more than one, “more than 
unity and more than identity” (Simondon, 2009: 6) in that it is not so much 
quantitatively the sum total of its parts, the container and the environment which holds 
them but qualitatively in terms of potential as to what a body can do.  
The event as an emergent amalgam of territorialities and bodies acquires and 
expresses its own spacetime in that it overcodes the spatial extent and individual 
temporalities of the constituent relations. The event integrates them into a coherent 
operational entity which expresses its own particular spacetime through the affective 
tonality of the ensemble as a becoming-body within the experiential milieu that involves 
and enfolds the participating entities. In French, the term milieu does not only refer to a 
physical environment or setting, it means “surroundings,” or a “medium” as in 
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chemistry, or as “middle.” The milieu is normally understood as the ensemble of 
external conditions within which a living being lives and develops or as the assemblage 
of material objects and physical circumstances which surround and influence an 
organism. Conceptually, “milieu” can also be seen as an environment in the widest 
ecological sense of the term, i.e. as the locus of the dynamic interaction of all the factors 
and mechanisms that participate in the sustenance of an ecosystem. To paraphrase 
Massumi (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: XVII), the term milieu should be read as a technical 
term combining all these meanings. It also changes our understanding when asked to 
start from the middle, from the milieu. 
The concept of the associated milieu, conceived by French philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon in his book Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (1989), is a useful 
model to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place between the participants 
and the conditioning territorialities as an environment. The descriptive term 
"associated" when applied to describe milieu refers to a specific mapping of an 
ensemble made up of constitutive elements and conditioning environmental modalities 
which come together to create an individuation through the ongoing exchanges of 
energy that take place within that specific milieu (Simondon, 1989: 57).  
The milieu allows for a reciprocal recursive relational causality to take place 
between the elements so that we may conceive of spacetime as the immanent plane 
from which the subject and object arise as the generic activity of passing from the 
objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity as a process.  “The 
associated milieu sustains, unites and brings together bodies: it is not a stage upon 
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which a scene unfolds, or a play where only the actors perform, or a canvas upon which 
the pigments run into each other, or a manuscript where the words follow each other in 
sequence.” (Oliveira, 2010). The associated milieu is the setting and environment of 
concretion where participation conditions as information which in turn, simultaneously, 
allows the relational to take form itself as operational coherence as unfolding. In other 
words, the milieu is not a substrate—it allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being 
as an event of taking-form as experience. According to Deleuze and Guattari: “The 
notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from 
one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially 
communicating” (1987: 313). 
The associative milieu allows the bringing together of the various participants in 
the event where memory is expressive of the aligned directionality of the causal efficacy 
informing and guiding the becoming. As such, memory accommodates process to 
dissolve the tension in the adaptive evolution taking place between the idea-word and 
the satisfaction of the lure for feeling. Memory guides the (re)constitution of the 
relational as the eventual coming together which (re)constitutes the event through its 
(re)petitioned becoming by not only (re)calling itself into being, (re)collecting the 
elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of the actuality as event. The 
information of the event as memorial is durational through its gradual coming into 
definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of its self-expression as an 
individuation as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of 
its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage within the memory circuit in which it 
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is operative. In this way memory is not essential to the event but conspiratorial with it 
and with the rest of the world which allows its operation. In this way, memory is not 
eidetic but paradigmatic in that it is a self-informing knowledge which informs without 
any external coercion. 
*  *  * 
In this chapter we have attempted to present the cinematic event in terms of the 
film screening. We have shown how the progressive, gradual accretionary 
agglomeration of relational conditionings whose locus of participation is that which 
constitutes the body of inclusion of the event. We have demonstrated how the event is 
constituted as an open-bodied, fuzzy-bounded, concrescence of inter-penetrated 
territorialities expressed in terms of gradated zones of intensities formulated through 
considerations of material, environmental and experiential relational conditionings 
which inflect its unfolding. We have steered away from presenting the event in terms of 
human subjectivity, and replaced it by the internal logic of the event's becoming as 
subjectivity. By defining the event in this way, we are trying to build a conceptual 
scaffolding which will allow us to postulate the event as memory driven. The first step of 
this construction is the framing of activity as a containment which will then allow us to 
constitute circuits of memory as informing and guiding process to dissolve the tension in 
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Thus far, we've seen the event as  a coming together of participation and have 
managed to recognize the genesis of the participation. And to paraphrase Deleuze, we 
still need to come to terms with the what is participated, and that which accounts for its 
being participated (Deleuze, 1992: 171). What is at stake in the cinematic event as a 
screening is obviously not the assemblage of the happening of the getting together as a 
screening: not too many people are willing to shell out $12.99 to sit in a dark room for 
two hours. It is somewhat like purchasing a drill—nobody wants a drill as such, they just 
know that if they want to make a neat hole in the wall they're going to need a drill. In 
the cinematic event, spectators come to see a film projection. The perfection of that 
drive is not the attestation of fact that an image appears on the screen but a question of 
the experience of the satisfaction of the integrative memorial process of becoming one 
with the screen. And as we saw earlier, the preconditions that must be in place for the 
projection to happen are of a technical nature. Without these technical preconditions, 
the cinematic event cannot emerge as each element is a fundamental contributor to 
that which constitutes the medium as milieu and an integral determinant of the 
possibility of the projection as a cinematic event. As such, these are the sine qua non 
which constitute the order-word of the cinematic event and it is around the assemblage 
of these elements as a technical object that "everything" happens. But what is it that 
happens? They allow the projection of sequenced images on a screen and the creation 
of the world that surrounds it (Deleuze, 1989: 68).  
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In the last chapter we formulated the event as a dynamic amalgam of causal 
conditionings as constitutive of territorialities and bodies emergent in an associated 
milieu and, as such, it is a convincingly coherent depiction of the event in that it concurs 
with our experience of it.18 The organizational aspect of the order-word of the cinematic 
is focused on the appearance of an image on the screen, which also concurs with the 
desire for an appearance of an image on our internal screen—the images that appear 
are putatively "the same" but their constitution is of two different natures: on one side 
we have the event as an aggregative accretion having its own internal logic and on the 
other is the event's taking place seemingly for our benefit and satisfaction. Yet this bi-
polar anthropocentric self-serving you-rub-my-back-and-I'll-rub-yours dynamic, seen as 
the external manoeuvring of the world solely for the satisfaction of humanity's needs 
and the humans' formulation of needs that are eventually satisfied by the world, is 
expressive of a very limited understanding of relation and the interwoven dispersal of 
causal determinacy of process. We can impute this self-interest to every participant 
within the assemblage, each one selfishly tugging at the edges of the sheet of relation 
for their own exclusive satisfaction, but the immanent unfolding of actuality is anything 
but egocentric; becoming is effortless in its shared co-operative ecology: each relation 
of terms is marked by completion, by perfection, by their consummation so that there is 
no possible differentiation between terms and relation as constitutive of the event—
terms and relation exist as conjunction, as contractual possibility within its constituents 
and as constituents.  
                                                          
18
 If we go along the diminished role of human agency. 
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So that what makes the event eventful is the fulfillment of participative 
expectation, of the satisfaction as operative coherence through their integration of the 
participants' desire for completion. It is this concretization of relations where each 
participant loses itself as it contributes to the completive satisfaction of the everything-
other as perfection is not a selfish, self-centred pursuit but one where completion is 
understood as shared communal experience as the affirmation of society. The shared 
concretization of relation as reciprocal and mutual is the realization of completion in the 
advancement into novelty of the event's information.  
But what makes this memorial?  
* * * 
To think of memory as integrative is an odd premise in that nowadays memory is 
almost exclusively thought of in terms of the stockpiling of information as images which 
reconstitute the past and not in terms of how experience as information comes together 
into a coherent whole. Yet, to conceive of memory in terms of the consolidation of 
experience is not an outlandish proposal. Words associated with memory such as 
recollection and remembering allude to this integrative process in that they bring forth 
the idea of reattachment or gathering together—as in the act of gathering one’s 
thoughts in attempting to organize one’s ideas so as to give them order and structure 
and remember what one wishes to say—as they once did in the memory treatises of the 
Ars Memoriae from Antiquity to the 17th century. However, over the past three 
centuries the fuller meanings of these words have lost their relevance in favour of a 
scientific definition of memory based on the stockpiling of information as physio-
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electrochemical synthesis in the recesses of the brain magically adduced by some sort of 
representational imagination19.  
A common-sense understanding describes the activity here related to memory 
as the result of the mechanistic transfer of physio-electrochemical sensorial impressions 
along nerve paths to the brain and their conversion into memories through 
electrochemical operations on networked neural bundles whose mysterious interaction 
provide us with the "sound and light show" of consciousness. However, the "imagery" 
which construes consciousness somehow persists within our brain as the result of 
impressions made upon the fabric of networked neural bundles. Using the example of 
vision, the lens of the eye creates an optical image on the retina and its effects make 
their way through the optic nerves where they imprint themselves onto the mind—a 
process which concurs with the Ancient's ideation of perception as an impermanent 
imprint onto a wax tablet with a stylus20 or as the mirror-image imprint of the matrix of 
a signet ring on a wax seal. The perduration of the impression can either occur as a 
result of intensity of impression or through repetition and habituation—the deeper the 
impression the longer its staying power. Intensity is ideated as the result of a powerful 
image in terms of shock value or sheer luminous intensity where the effect of either one 
can be likened to a hot branding iron to the mind: the effect of intense luminosity can 
be observed in the firing of a high-intensity strobe light which overwhelms the 
dissipative capacity of the retina and creates an after-image which perdures but which 
can be overprinted by succeeding after-images. This is the foundation for the 
                                                          
19
 Imagination is here used as a transitive verb. 
20
 This is like as an Etch-a-Sketch 
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persistence of vision theory where the residual image resulting from cinematic 
projection as impression is one of the main tenets that lay the groundwork for cinema 
as a memory-based medium.  
The perduration of memory attained through repetition and habituation can be 
likened to the progressive cutting of a groove or furrow resulting from the repeated 
treading upon the same path. In terms of memory, at first the impression is faint and 
ephemeral, then, with repetition, the impression becomes impressed, ingrained, in our 
neural pathways: the pattern of repetition becomes woven into the fabric of our very 
being and comes to be expressed as a reticulated behavioural habit which conditions 
our being as experience in the world. As the body's imagination, as the expression of the 
body's ability to create images that are non-pictorial, these sensoria as impressions are 
what we see, what we touch, what we smell, what we hear and how we move—they are 
the impressions we label images that we recall and remember as the reconstitution of 
memory. However, these images are barely pictorial in the sense that if we close our 
eyes and try to bring up one of these images to the mind’s eye, we end up with thin, 
evanescent 'phantasma' which in no way resemble the rich perceptual images from 
which they were drawn and to which they are compared. If one listens to the first 
movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's (1770-1827) Symphony No. 6 (1808), one would 
readily "visualize" rolling countryside, birds chirping, trees swaying in the wind, sunlight 
streaming through the leaves... but if we really look at the image created by the music's 
programmed content, we can see that there is no pastoral landscape to speak of—or at 
least not in terms of pictorial imagery; nor can we say that what the music sounds like 
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the countryside! What is the image of the awakening of happy feelings? And to call 
these impressions in the mind’s eye an image is a big statement, for it is quite evident 
that there is no pictorial image there—the images evoked are memorial and memory-
images are actualized only when performatively expressed.21 It is only as a by-product, 
as an epi-phenomenon of their performance can memories be enlivened and 
(re)actualized. This memorial imagistic re-constitution can be either be as powerful as 
the original direct perception from which they were derived, more powerful or less 
powerful: it all depends on the richness of what is (re)collected in terms of the 
(re)membered resultant integration.  
But one only needs to observe how one sees to know that we don't see in 
frames and that the image of the world is not printed on the retina as an image. Vision is 
at first hand immersive: one "sees" a presentation of the world before us; we can feel 
our eyes dart to and fro upon/within that visual immersive environment as reality 
without everything becoming a stop-and-go understanding made up of successions of 
jumbled swish pans and stills of imagery. The screen upon which the audio-visual show 
of reality presents itself is at first view stationary and allows us to "pan and scan" upon 
it as if we were looking at a surround, true-to-life pictorial rendition of the world—we 
can hold our head steady, and move our eyes within that presentation while 
acknowledging that the "background screen" remains static. This optical relationship to 
the world retains the stereoscopic reconciliation which informs depth perception and 
                                                          
21
 Memory can be performatively expressed via any narrative device or enactment as constitutive of  the 
movement of thought. 
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where the indeterminacy of the reconciliation of colour differences between the two 
sides creates the perceptual volume of space.  
  
Fig. 1.1 Mars Landscape Stereo-pair Photographs22 
This can be demonstrated with a set of stereo-images. We can attest to this by 
visually superposing one image on top of the other by crossing our eyes over the stereo-
pair, and staring at them without a stereoscopic viewer, locking the integration and 
once the 3-D effect locks in, allowing one's eyes to literally wander over the images. 
Thus, this reveals a disjunct between the way we see and the way that experience as 
resolved into an integrated coherent whole as what is. However, it is this resolved static 
image as our immersive reality which constitutes the screen as the integration of 
experience into the general unfolding of actuality.23 It is this static screen which appears 
to exist and allows our eyes to wander on top of it and not see "differently". And it is 




 This points to the firmamentum as static background and the constellations of stars moving before it. 
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here that the screen of vision finds its analogon in the cinematic screen: the panoramic 
size and extent of the cinematic screen seeks to duplicate the immersive embrace of the 
visual. The cinematic screen replicates the relation of vision to the internal screen in 
that our eyes can travel on the surface of the static screen much the same way that the 
eyes travel on the surface of the screen of the world as vision. And just as our eyes were 
locked on the stereo-pair of the surface of Mars as constitutive of the plane of the 
screen of vision, our eyes are locked on the screen of cinema—and it is because of this 
invariable parallactic lock on the screen that we interpret the moving spectacle of the 
projection as just that, a spectacle.24 
And at the center of this problem memory looms large as explicatory of this 
fusional imagistic process—not because it pulls together images of pastness to be 
resolved but because memory itself is the process of integration. As Bergson would say, 
"Practically, we perceive only the past," (Bergson, M&M p. 150), and we would add, that 
it is not a question of "practically" for all intents and purposes, but that what we 
perceive actually at face value is the relationally imagistically bygone as passed, for by 
the time the image has been created in our mind's eye as a result of our six senses,25 
whatever was its cause, that which produced it, is now gone as "part of the past". But 
                                                          
24
 The suspension of disbelief has a physiological foundation in the parallactic lock in that as long as my 
eyes do not need to invoke the correlation of focus to parallax angle the spectacle is "not real". We no 
longer need to learn this lesson as the first filmgoers had to when they first leapt out of the way of the 
oncoming train at the screening of Train Entering the Railroad Station (1898) by the Azerbaijani film 
pioneer Aleksandr Mişon (d. 1921), or more recently as the Cuban peasants in a remote mountain village 
learned "spectatorship" in the Cuban documentary Por Primera Vez (1967) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKf4maMqbVo. 
25
 This can be interpreted naïvely as that which we see, or more scientifically as the complexification of 
retinotopic mapping on the lateral genticulate nuclei (LGN). Goldstein, Bruce E. (2010) Sensation and 
Perception. 8th Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. p.76 
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we can take this further and say that we perceive in the past because the past is the 
integration of memory as a dejà-felt of progressive satisfaction of the implicit desire 
within becoming. 
Yet in spite of the disjunct between that which we call an image as a pictorial 
offering and that which we refer to as a memory-image, we persist in referring to the 
processes around memory in imagistic terms: it would appear that the concept of the 
optical image is central to the process of the integration of experience as memory. And 
in trying to explain consciousness as a reflection of experience, experience has come to 
be expressed as imagistic—i.e. as a pictorial image which fully expresses the 
manifestation of the world as it appears before us—even if to express experience solely 
in terms of the optically pictorial is to shortchange its indescribable fullness: there is not 
only the sense data of the other five senses to contend with26, but their combined 
inexpressible affectual elusiveness as well as the indiscernible 'hidden' of the stratified 
plateaus understanding experience. These negatives refer to a lack while simultaneously 
expressing an existence by the double negative which expresses that which is in terms 
of that which is not that which is not: it is the light left over once obscurity has stopped 
encroaching upon it.27 Yet we persist in referring to these impressions as images and we 
reify and perpetuate the belief in the image as an image of pastness not only for the 
                                                          
26
 The visual, the tactile, the olfactory, the auditive, the gustatory and the proprioceptive. Even though 
our age favours the visual as constituting the image of choice the image of memory is a composite of all 
the senses. 
27
 Still the question lingers: how can we fully express positively the uncorroborable affectual 
manifestation of experience as process?  
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short-term memory of the recent past or for the long-ago past of distant memory but 
for the immediate pastness of perception as an on-going individualization.28 
To conceive of memory as solely imagistic in terms of a pictorial image is naive 
even if nowadays it is seen as the dominant popular or common sense of understanding 
memory—one which is based on the melodramatic nostalgia of the photographic 
snapshot.29 But to subscribe to the non-imagistic version emerging with the "scientific 
Germanic psychology" of the 19th century founded on an experimental physiochemical 
mechanistic causality (Sahakian p. 103-184) is to sell memory short. This rift in how 
memory is conceived, i.e. the pictorially imagistic versus the non-imagistic 
scientific/experimental, has its roots in antiquity in the divide that emerged between 
the image and the word30. But this split proved inconsequential until the widespread 
proliferation of books in the 16th and 17th centuries31 which made the dynamic systems 
of the practical arts of memory obsolete and gave way to the dominant non-imagistic 
word-based dialectical approach as a linear integrative method of understanding. The 
appearance of the book as a systematic structuring and organizing technology of 
knowledge did away with the work of memory and made the Ars Memoriae, the arts of 
memory, outmoded in terms of making sure everyone was on the same page but in a 
different way.32 The linear exposition/acquisition of knowledge from writing creates a 
                                                          
28
 The half-second lapse between the impression and the perception. 
29
 And which is now being called melancholic. 
30
 The story of Theuth and the King God Thamus in Plato’s Phaedrus would indicate that the divide was 
felt by the Ancient Egyptians before it was handed down to the Greeks. 
31
 As a result of the invention of the printing press (1440 C.E.) and the instauration of a dialectical method 
of memory. This is covered n more detail in the last chapter. 
32
 We do not wish to be flippant here. On the same page refers both to the pictorial image proper on a flat 
surface and to the page of words in a book as integrative. 
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restricted dynamic of cause and effect whose logical progression can ascertain truth 
more readily than the potentially deceptive sense-based image where the image is not 
only worth a thousand words but in that there's much hidden in what it shows even if it 
shows everything. 
Nowadays, the popular understanding of memory is such that most everyone 
conceives of memories either as a collection of snapshots pasted in an album or digitally 
stored in a hard drive as "zeros and ones", as reconstitutable images or as "memory 
images as snapshots" squirreled away somewhere in the brain. These collections are 
usually classified thematically (relationally) or chronologically. No matter how these 
images are organized and stored, it reflects both a mistrust in the innate ability of the 
brain to remember and a faith in scientific technology as a superior "substrate" for the 
upkeep of our memories.33 In accounts of the aftermath of catastrophic disasters where 
a person's home is washed away by flood or ravaged by fire, we often hear the following 
plaints: "My priceless memories were simply washed away" or "My cherished memories 
went up in smoke." The expression of the obliteration of memories as a result of 
catastrophic events as disasters is certainly correct, but perhaps not in the way that it is 
popularly understood!34 This destruction of memories existing as objective entities 
outside of the self resides on the belief in the inviolate perduration of the objectively 
material as opposed to the evanescent, changing and perfidious nature of the ideatic 
                                                          
33
 I readily associate this to the distrust of the senses and a mistrust in artists and artistic creation which 
always calls upon the truthful experience of "reality".  
34
 The cataclysmic disaster as the instigating catalyst of the event is of significance because the event gives 
way to the obliteration of the past in terms of memory as leading into the future; the event serves as a 
novel realignment of memory which reconfigures the expression of being along new lines (of flight into 
novelty).   
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mental or the spiritual immaterial. The "I refute it thus!"35 attitude towards snapshots as 
memory images is in itself interesting in that in expressing the need for the physicality of 
the snapshot there is a metonymic transference operating on tactility as a stand-in for 
truth. The trope involves the transfer of the generation of truth from touch as opposed 
to vision as in the disciple Thomas' affirmation of the presence of Jesus by touching the 
stigmata and the analogous truth value of the image in the snapshot emergent in the 
sensation of having the material snapshot in hand, where the corroboration of memory 
resides in the physicality of the print.  
 
                                                          
35
 57. Refutation of Bishop Berkeley. "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time 
together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every 
thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is 
impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with 
mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- "I refute it thus."" Samuel Johnson. Boswell: 




Fig. 2.2 Duane Michals’ This Photograph is my Proof (1967) 
These ideas are evoked by Duane Michals’ This Photograph is my Proof (1967) 
which comes with a handwritten inscription on the oversized bottom border of the print 
"This Photograph is my proof. There was that afternoon, when things were still good 
between us, and she embraced me, and we were so happy. It did happen. She did love 
me. Look see for yourself!" At face value, the photograph invites us to engage with it as 
a testament of fact—an image imbued with truth—a permanent record of the past as it 
"really" was. 36 And not only is it an image imbued with truth because it concurs with 
that which the "I" as the character in the picture and supposed narrator experienced but 
it was created through the agency of a mechanical device whose disinterested 
functioning represents an objective point of view free from the vagaries of the senses. It 
is the snapshot as an object which not only portrays truth, its physical being 
substantiates it and its perduration as an object reinforces its truth value. The 
photographer can tell you all he wants about the shot, the narrator can fill you in on 
issues that are not apparent, and any spectator can interpret it any way they like, but 
the snapshot sums it all up—it captures the moment, it seizes the instant, it creates an 
objective image which can be grasped, perceived in its entirety within the frame 
established by a particular point of view. Putatively, the snapshot concurs with what the 
photographer saw when the shutter release was pressed and with the image impressed 
upon the photographer's brain. Thus, the snapshot is not only a valid representation of 
                                                          
36
 This is a very complex photograph couched in a deceptively easy-going, innocent packaging which 
would require a much deeper engagement to deal with all the aspects of spectatorship, authorship, point 
of view, pictorial narrative, generation of truth value, etc. These issues are not lost on the author but this 
is not the place to explore the implications. 
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the memory-image, but a "better" one: the memory as an image is more securely fixed 
upon the paper and unaffected by the competence of the memory-holder; the image as 
snapshot is "more permanent" because by being affixed to the backing it is not affected 
by the ravages of time and will likely outlast the party interested in the perduration of 
the image as memory.37 Memory is thus popularly understood as a process whose sole 
undertaking is the storage and retrieval of snapshots of memories in their correct serial 
progression. As such, in this way of seeing, memory is the accrual of static, imagistic 
entities which are either stockpiled in the storehouse of memory as a result of new 
experiences or erased by the deteriorative effects of time or through physical damage. 
This conception of images as outside the self constitutive of identity and 
corroborative of the inner dimension of being as a continuation of having been, as proof 
of the perduration of the self as a continuity is often echoed in popular culture. If we 
compare the presentation of images of memory in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) 
with the Wachowski’s The Matrix (1999), we see the popularly held conceptions of 
memory at work as we fall back on the familiar territory of the visual image as memory, 
as an objective entity stored somewhere in the head and externally corroborated with 
snapshots. In the first movie, memory is presented in the traditional form of a passive 
repository filled up with imagistic content: the snapshot of Zhora left behind in Leon’s 
hotel apartment, or the memory “implants” presumably added during inception of the 
Nexus 6 replicants which are related or performed by Rachael in Deckard’s apartment—
                                                          
37
 We all seem to be subject to the prejudice that the objectively physical or the materially memorable is 
more durable than the psychologically memorial in spite of our being fully cognizant of the deterioration 
of physical images over time no matter their substrate. 
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namely, the story of the spider and the nostalgic piano solo where she is unsure if the 
memory's are really hers or Tyrell's niece—or when Roy Batty evocatively relates his 
exploits of war in the off-world colonies and muses to Hannibal Chew, the eye 
fabricator, “if only you could see what I’ve seen with your eyes”. For the replicants, their 
understanding of their "human essence" is based not so much in terms of their 
appearance or mortality but in their belief and faith in their continuity of being 
constituted by pastness which has given way to a progression of presents which they 
can express as memories of having been participants in the world—they relate to 
themselves as memorial beings through the intercession of memory-images/snapshots 
as memories. The Matrix presents memory in somewhat different terms by adding 
seriality to the image: when Neo (Keanu Reeves) is first connected to the learning 
program, he is given a complete training in martial arts through the plug—a prod which 
is inserted into a receptacle in the back of his head directly connected to his brain—as a 
massive download of static serial images to which he replies when he realizes the extent 
and depth of the content with the trademark wide-eyed underwhelmed Keanu Reeves 
“Gimme more!” But what is the realization? The awareness of the size of the file making 
room for itself amidst the other memories in store? The sensation of massive amounts 
of information coursing through the probe? That he suddenly ‘remembers’ that he 
knows all the moves of Jiu Jitsu? Or that he can (re)member it to his store-house of past 
experience? Neo’s “Gimme more!” is not only the response to the result of an 
integrative process arrived at from the consolidation of serial order and structure 
expressed as a novel integration of experience which results in a "Eureka!" moment but 
73 
 
to the desire implicit in the opening up of new vistas, new horizons opening up as a 
result of the new bodies he is now able to assume and their novel perceptual 
potential—the same feeling of elation we should have after watching a movie! The 
satisfaction of these new desires are achieved performatively in the exercise of the 
memory so that when Neo realizes his knowledge, makes it actual, i.e. activates his 
memory, he remembers how to do Jiu Jitsu when he ‘unpacks’ it in combat with 
Morpheus. But the desire is implicit in the novelty; desire is insatiable and incessant in 
that newness begets new bodies whose newness creates new desires and their 
attendant integrations thus perpetuating the appetition of novelty.  
Curiously, in Michals' photograph and in Neo's activation of memory there is a 
common aspect which is not readily explicit: the (re)creation of memory through its 
performative expression—both works would seem to indicate that memory is 
(re)productive as an activation through narrative (re)creation. In Michals' photograph 
the inscription invites us to "look see" for ourselves and Neo remembers Jiu Jitsu by 
hashing it out with Morpheus: thus, we actualize the image of memory as it is activated, 
i.e. when it is realized38 through gestural activity, as in its being (re)imagined as the 
(re)seeing of the photograph, or by its (re)creation through the performance of the 
physical intuitions which inform Neo's pugilistic interaction with Morpheus. Michals' 
snapshot invites us to see the pictorial image in the same way as the absent narrator 
supposedly does—as a memory image in terms of a performative (re)creation of the 
image content by urging us to "look see" and (re)produce the image by (re)calling into 
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 The French verb réaliser is a better choice here for realize in that the French conveys both the 
performative making it real and the awareness of the becoming actual of the memory-image 
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being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them into a coherent whole 
where the snapshot plays the role of the stand-in for the nec plus ultra expression of 
(re)collection and (re)membering. The image as memory acquires duration through the 
iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, 
in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as an assemblage, i.e. in the memory 
circuit, in which it is operative. 
As the last paragraph indicates by the profusion of parenthesized re's, the 
concept-cluster of words surrounding memory needs to be examined and activated 
anew not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical 
tradition from which speculative39 thought emerges. To paraphrase Mary Daly, the 
discourse of memory "requires a kick in the imagination, a wrenching of tired words" to 
(re)vitalize and (re)activate the imagistic implications dwelling behind the façade of 
words such as understand, recollect, remember, recall, recognize, repetition and bring 
them back to the collective fold of memory from which they originate.  
*   *   * 
According to Yates' The Art of Memory, there were two kinds of memory in 
Antiquity: the natural memory with which we are all endowed, "which is engrafted in 
our minds, born simultaneously with thought" and the artificial memory which uses 
techniques through which the mnemonic faculties are "strengthened or confirmed by 
training" (1992: 20). Thus, the artificial memory augments our innate capabilities by 
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 The speculative in speculative thought is not only the one suggested by its Latin root speculare as 
watchtower or lookout but also ties in to speculum, the mirror. The speculative as based on the visual 
readily ties into imagistic thought as pertaining to vision but also of that which is occulted by it. 
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building upon the natural through the use of techniques which cultivate and enhance 
our inborn powers in order to "Let art, then, imitate nature, find what she desires, and 
follow as she directs" (Benson, 1988: 297). We owe our knowledge of these classical 
techniques of the art of memory to the only extant Latin treatise on rhetoric, Ad 
Herennium (c. 86-82 B.C.E.) whose unknown author likely drew on Greek teachings on 
mnemonic technique. This text was vastly influential during the Middle Ages and into 
the Renaissance and lay the groundwork not only for the understanding of memory and 
its  techniques in relation to rhetoric as a discursive art but as the foundation for the 
enhanced expression of memory in terms of the ordering of experience and the 
structuration of knowledge.  
The mnemonic methods of the Ancients relied on astonishing or striking 
imagery, so that to remember something one only needed to associate the image of a 
whatever was needed to remember and associate it to something outlandish. For 
example, if one wanted to remember someone's name, the rhetor using these methods 
would associate the name to some physical feature on the face of the person in 
question. So that if the person's name was Daigle40, they could visualize a large eagle 
beak replacing the person's nose. The association of these two images would be 
sufficient to (re)mind the rhetor of the person's name as the identity relation for that 
person. Person with huge aquiline nose=Daigle. Thus, rhetors would go out of their way 
to present their images in outlandish ways so as to create the necessary memorial 
impact and retain the image as a memory-image.  
                                                          
40
 Daigle or D'aigle in French means of an eagle. 
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This method was extended to being able to memorize a series of items by 
generating striking memory-images with all the items and "pegging" them to some kind 
of pre-conceived ordering sequence. By retracing this sequence of memory-images one 
would end up with a narrative sequence composed of memory images as a memory 
circuit. "The artificial memory is established from places and images (Constat igitur 
artificiosa memoria ex locis et imaginibus), the stock definition to be forever repeated 
down the ages. A locus is a place easily grasped by the memory, such as a house, an 
intercolumnar space, a corner, an arch, or the like. Images are forms, marks or simulacra 
(formae, notae, simulacra) of what we wish to remember" (Yates 2000: 22). The method 
essentially consists of the serial placing of outlandish versions of the images we wish to 
remember at place holders—image containers—or locus in the same order we wish 
these images to be recalled. The person wishing to exercise their artificial memory 
would first have to create a set of loci (plural of locus) upon which to place the 
outlandish images. This would entail setting up a route, a circuit, which would serve not 
just once, but over and over as a reusable platform or foundation upon which one could 
place or impress images to be retained in memory so that in the words of Cicero "we 
use places as wax and images as letters." (Yates 2000: 38) To find one's own personal 
loci one would follow very specific rules that would guarantee a practical locus. "One 
must employ a large number of places which must be well lighted, clearly set out in 
order, at moderate intervals apart." (Yates 2000: 38) Thus, in Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, scholars and rhetoricians wishing to heighten their powers of artificial memory 
would be seen walking, retracing their steps over and over, in large buildings such as 
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churches, palaces, or their courtyards or within cities or landscapes, memorizing the 
layout a building or lay of the land in order to build up a satisfactory locus which would 
exist as a cartography of memory. The objective here was to commit to memory the 
greatest number of sequentially ordered loci so as to make available as detailed a serial 
order as possible to the perambulation to provide an adequate and comprehensive 
structure with enough memory pegs to allow as fine grained a reconstitution as possible 
of that which one needed remembered. The simple process of Ad Herennium does not 
of course in itself bring out the elements into the open such as the image, the locus and 
the pedestrian perambulation as the binding "of the psychic life to its motor 
accompaniment" (Bergson M&M: 15) at a gross scale—this is obviously not a reading of 
Bergson at the scale he intended but our application is an interesting echo of the 
ritornello of memory. It forces the consideration of these three elements and look for 
their integration as the expression of memory. The perambulation of memorial 
reconstitution of Ad Herennium is the method, where method from meta- "after" and 
hodos "a traveling, way" constitutes the organization of knowledge. As the lay of the 
land, as a cartography of knowledge, the method of memory allows for the systematic 
reconstitution of knowledge through the discursive unfolding of territory as the 
narrative of memorial revelation: it allows one to systematize knowledge as an 
enfolding/unfolding where all knowledge is spatially organized and performatively 
revealed. The enfolding/unfolding happens at every stop of the circuit which contains a 
memory-image constituted by another memory-circuit which in itself can be constituted 
by countless other memory-images and circuits. The enfolding of knowledge is itself 
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infolding within enfolding so that the arborescent recursivity of memorial reconstitution 
of the method of Ad Herennium is not only the organizational dynamic of knowledge, 
the organizational is the dynamic. In this way, we can conceive of a reticular 
organization of knowledge where nodes in a network of relation are memory-images 
forming part of the recursive memorial composition shared with other memory-images. 
As such, memory was seen as the systematic organization of information not only of 
knowledge but of the world. 
Within this perambulatory method of keeping track of knowledge, we can see 
parallels to our keeping track of events in our own lives. We walk through life, pegging 
significant events as memory-images to a temporal unfolding as a relational reticulation 
where the inter-relation of the memorable moments is what constitutes the pegging of 
one event to another—yet reticulation does not do justice to the understanding. 
Reticulation implies a distinction between the terms and the relation where there is 
none: the nodes are both nodal and relational simultaneously. As such, we can organize 
the logic of life's unfolding, understanding its method so to speak, according to the 
causality implicit in memory: one can either subscribe to a top-down linear, reductive 
cause and effect, or to a  consensual, horizontal relational complication of causal 
determination. Both can be said to be temporal in that change takes place, but one 
expresses it as the numbered succession of before and after as chronos time and the 
other in terms of the relational denseness of experience  as intensity expressed as 
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temporality—what Deleuze calls aionic time.41 As such, the serialized imagery of both 
understandings unfolds temporally but their logic is poles apart: the associative 
relational unfolding creates a narrative which is different from the linear mechanical 
cause-and-effect narrative of historical sequential account in that the directive line is 
not based on a what-came-before logic of cause and effect but on a narrative of 
relational flow where the reason for the why of what's happening does not lie in a cause 
and effect rationale based on the "what came before must be the cause" reasoning but 
on the novelty from the coming into relation as the expression of temporality in the 
making. The logic of becoming of the relational has a different recounting:42 it is 
experiential in its unfolding in that in its immanence it tends towards the immersive as 
the all-encompassing drive of integration. The expression of the relation as a 
reconciliation of the duality of the terms of relation as constitutive of the advance of 
novelty is always the overwhelming as an alteration of the course of events. 
It results from a mapping of time as a topography of intensities which serves to 
organize the various durations of our life whether they are seen in terms of days, weeks, 
years, career, relationships, apartments or cars and determine eras of durational 
consistency according to the terms upon which we wish to settle on stratigraphically: as 
a cartography of intensities these territorializations as expanses of consistency or 
operational coherence interact as relational entities that condition as they themselves 
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 As per Heraclitus. David Kennedy and Walter Kohan have an interesting discussion between three 
different ways of understanding time: Aión, Kairós and Chrónos. They describe Aion as childhood time, as 
the child's way of experiencing time. This has notable repercussions in the reading of Simondon's division 
between minorité and majorité. Aión, Kairós and Chrónos: Fragments of an Endless Conversation On 
Childhood, Philosophy And Education. Published in Childhood & Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 8, 2008: 5-
22.  
42
 It is also what differentiates the oneiric narrative from the historical.  
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become the becoming aggregative accretion of the event as memorial individuation. I 
pull out a photo of my silver 1987 SAAB 16 valve Turbo 2-door hatchback... How did the 
ownership of that car structure my being? How was my life in 2005 organized by it? 
What kind of durational consistencies did that car afford? What intensional clusters 
informed themselves through it, within it, alongside of it, orbitally around it?  
 
Fig. 2.3 A Saab 900 Turbo 16S, 1984. http://www.caranddriver.com 
The constellation of images that arise immediately evoke the commonplace 
ordinariness of everyday life of the time, such as where I lived, who I was dating, where I 
worked, but they also allude to seemingly unrelated patterns of engagement and 
conceptualization of relation such as the expression of mobility, the wariness towards 
independent entrepreneurs, my image of self as a sailor, expectations towards the 
postal service, the aesthetics of driving and the development of a taste for Swedish 
vodka. These islands of relational coherence conspire towards a way of being as a 
consistency of expression as an integration that is a dynamic of relations as a corporeal 
being as an individuation of interpenetrated relations and not as a flesh-and-blood 
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being doing stuff.43 Each of these patterns of engagement contract agreement within 
and between themselves as involved in the relation and extend outwards to create 
fields of relation as polyandrous territories which alter the landscape of association 
which together create sheets of past. But they also contract in the sense of contraction 
as elision towards concretization of the shared relation and in the sense of an infectious 
shared incorporation by transduction. The photo of a Saab 900 immediately steps on 
the clutch of my memorial gear box and proposes the possibility of changing gears in the 
machinic assemblage of my memory circuits. It brings round the relational potential 
available for engagement of the constellation of the could be of the already-has-been as 
sheets of past; it seeds the activation of the reconstitution of relationed fields of 
experience as memory-images; it sets the relational stage for a novel agencement of 
conditioned causal becomings; it posits propositions for relational conditioning—it adds 
a new dimension to existence as a possible activation of potentials to redirect the 
unfolding of actuality by producing a shift within the integration of actuality as a 
memorial process. As such, the intrusion of the snapshot as a memory-image, as a plane 
of coherence and relational consistency, opens the possibility of diverting the circuit of 
unfolding unto another circuit of unfolding of possibility as the accidental in the event—
and we can extend this kind of thought-image to the cinematic frame and to the 
cinematic in general as a successive process of eventual intrusion where each incoming 
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 Isn't this what's operative in Andrei Tarkovski's (1932-1966) Solaris (1972)? Where the alien life form is 




frame alters the memorial unfolding: it changes that which has transpired, that which is 
transpiring and the way the future transpiring will take place.  
Thus far we have been using the word memory in an atypical manner. We have 
been  presenting memory-images as what may be understood as an integrated image 
not of pastness expressed pictorially but as an expression of the relational in terms of 
the activation of potential as a circuit of memory. We need to clarify here that memory 
is not to be understood as an individualization of pastness, as a static image depicting 
the past as pictorial but as a process descriptive of individuation as the integrative touch 
that assembles relationality as the quality of participation as constitutive of the 
unfolding of actuality. Memory is not a Foucauldian disciplinary matrix; it is not a seed 
crystal and it is not a storehouse; memory is the process which holds the repeatable to 
account for its becoming.   
We can now see the complex of words around memory in such a way that we 
can appreciate its integrative dynamics. As such, we can say that memory is the 
performative (re)constitution of the relational as content which urges us to (re)produce 
the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them 
as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its 
gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image 
as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its 
constituent elements as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which 
it is operative. But to speak in terms of constitutive elements is to render the process 
too much as an assemblage of discrete parts working together—instead we need to 
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think this as a flowing immanent becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings 
constitutive of being. And here of course one would ask, relational of what if there are 
no parts? Of whatever it is that constitutes whatness—the multiplicity of terms of the 
relational as they become the au delà of the threshold that limits something as not 
nothingness and whose affective tonality constitutes the clinamen. We are invoking the 
clinamen as the differential in action at the indeterminate point of its possibility at the 
incipience of becoming as the expression of the event or the eventual as pure 
détournement.44  
* * * 
The role of memory within event as process is both cumulative and adumbrative 
in that it integrates experience and the experiential past without our being aware of it. 
It is cumulative in that the process doesn't just change the now, but changes the 
consistency of the past as a memorial object and this new conception of the past as its 
new future-facing face hides, and it adumbrates everything that came before even 
though it presents the where it's at as the resultant as a what has happened as it is 
happening. But this future-facing dynamic façade or front of flow as the immanent 
becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings constitutive of being is to be seen as a 
happening together of moving forward as creative advance as a sheet of consistency 
and operational coherence. These future-facing faces of happening as phases can be 
understood in various ways as machinic. Machinic in that they are desire-generating 
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 We like the word détournement because it expresses the activity of change of course as agent and 
change as active and perfect, but it also has the negative connotation of hijacking and corruption of a 
minor which coupled with Simondon's conception of minor transposed to aionic time as altering the 
temporality of becoming. 
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machines which introduce slices which can remain unstated as layers of operational 
consistency that can beget extensive continuity; machinic in that they generate the 
pulsion to move ahead; machinic in that as an assemblage they produce novel 
possibilities of becomings; machinic in that as organizational and informational they 
propagate the causal determinacy of the system; machinic in that its invocation 
activates and sets in motion other machines which in turn activate other machines... We 
can write machinic to invoke the full-potential of that which is hidden in machinic but to 
enunciate it we need the directive machinic of memory to activate its gest discursively 
for it to become operational. And in producing these layers of operational consistency 
how thin can we make them? As thin as the emulsion of the image on a piece of film or 
thinner or as thick as a SAAB 900 or all eternity.  
In this chapter we have come to terms with what is participated, and that which 
accounts for its being participated on the screen. We have looked at how the image 
frames work memorially with and through each other as a completion towards 
advancement which performs double duty in its simultaneous backward-gazing and 
forward-gazing stance in the unfolding of the cinematic spectacle. We have discussed 
the creation of the screen, the dynamic of superposition of frames and the instauration 
of the montage effect, the dynamics of the desiring-machine at the core of the 
cinematic assemblage. Now we are ready to move on to look at how the internal screen 
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In discussing the image of thought in Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze 
considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with 
philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual 
experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of 
referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can 
be known implicitly without concepts. However, "whatever the complexity of this 
process, whatever the differences between the procedures of this or that author—the 
fact remains that all this is still too simple" (Deleuze, 1994: 129). However, if one 
continues to peel back the layers in order to pursue this regression, one will 
immediately have to make recourse to the agency of memorial process as constitutive 
of whatever is to be known implicitly. The pre-philosophical, pre-conceptual formula of 
the "Everybody knows" is still too far along the chain of supposition and to ascribe 
conceptual philosophical thought as having its implicit presupposition as composed of "a 
pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of 
common sense" (Deleuze, 1994: 131) short-changes the problem in favor of a derivative 
image of thought which is dogmatic, orthodox or moral. For one, the common sense 
presupposes God, the Good and the moral right implicit in Natural Law which at this 
point in the development of these ideas would be misplaced and irrelevant. Deleuze is 
correct to point out that to say that "we do not speak of this or that image of thought, 
variable according to the philosophy in question, but of a single Image in general which 
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constitutes the subjective presupposition of philosophy as a whole" (Deleuze, 1994: 
132) as the foundation of common sense and therefore the basis for Truth is to present 
as a fait-accompli the machine that produces that which Deleuze and Guattari call the 
face and facialization. "The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of 
the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a 
multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head included, has been 
decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the face" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 170). And to deconstruct this abstract machine requires a "radical 
critique of this image and the 'postulates' it implies" (Deleuze, 1994: 132) by removing 
the Image from the mental and the Ideal and setting it back in the body. It requires 
examining how the constitution of the pre-suppositioned comes to be.   
If a child were to ask “what is a circle?” few of us would answer “It is the locus of 
points at a predefined set distance, the radius, from a predefined point, the centre” or 
“it is the closed curve that will contain the largest area for a given perimeter” or “given a 
Cartesian coordinate system, a circle is the resulting shape that satisfies the equation x2 
+ y2 = r2”.45 We could demonstrate what a circle is by picking up a pen or pencil and 
drawing a semblance of one on a piece of paper wherein by demonstrating the drawing 
of the circle, we create a correspondence for the child between the physical gesture of 
drawing a circle and the pictorial result on paper. If the child is not particularly adept at 
“aping”, we can take this a step further: we can grasp the child’s hand and guide it 
through the gesturality of drawing a circle. Either way, the child will in turn be able to 
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 In Montreal, first graders are told that the circle is a closed curved line. 
88 
 
pick up a pencil, replicate the gestures and plausibly obtain a similar result—with pencil 
in hand and after a few repetitions, the child comes to coordinate the movement of 
parts of the body in conjunction with vision46 in such a way that the gestures will result 
in drawing a closed loop. We can say that as the drawing of the circle is being executed 
it is performatively being composed through the co-operative, simultaneous, co-
ordination between the proprioceptive, the ideal and the visual.47 In time, with 
repetition, there will be no separation in the child’s mind between the result on the 
paper and the closed set of gestures which constitute the circle—unnamed as such and 
pre-philosphically and pre-conceptually conceived— as an ingrained non-pictorial image 
woven into the fabric of neural pathways as an associated mapping of the visual and the 
proprioceptive.  
Deleuze and Guattari take up the discussion of the creation of the circle in A 
Thousand Plateaus (1988: 367) in a way which might be linguistically difficult for 
Anglophones to grasp the nuances since they are working on the distinction between 
rond/le rond (roundness/the round) and le cercle (the circle) which is not usually 
conceptually obviated in English. Le rond as a vague essence is pre-conceptual to the 
circle in that a French child will understand le rond before they understand the circle for 
what it is. So "fais-moi un rond" (make me a round) will be understood by a six year old 
child out of kindergarten whereas "dessine-moi un cercle" (draw me a circle) will require 
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 Here the most obvious would be to say that it is the fingers, hand and arm which provide the 
proprioceptive image of circularity, but it is the body as a whole which engages in the performative 
expression of the proprioceptive image of circularity.  
47
 The other senses could also be brought in: e.g. the auditory sense could also be implicated as regulatory 
through the auditive clues arising from the action of the pencil on the paper as an indication of speed.   
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a few more years of schooling.48 This difference illustrates the vibrational dynamic 
between the corporeally vague and material essences which are vagabond, anexact and 
yet vigorous (le rond) and their fixed, metric and formal ideal conceptual essences (le 
cercle) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 407-408). So here it is important to make a number 
of important distinctions within this set of circulating ideations: 
1) The understanding of "rond" as a blind, proprioceptive and corporeal intuition 
of roundness... the non-visual, body-feeling of the movement of roundness. 
2) The establishment of "le rond" as a proprioceptive circuit constituting a 
memory image. 
3)  The availability of "le rond" as a performative choreography which can be 
(re)called into actuality whenever the conditions exist that require its (re)petition.  
4) The Circle understood as a facialized conceptual image that exists as an 
integrated  memory image (which even if closed, is open to conceptual emendation). It 
exists as an adumbration of an enlarged set, as a complication, of constituent elements 
whose base is still "le rond" as a schematic or vague essence (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 408). 
5) The comparison of the rear-projected complexified and facialized conceptual 
image of the Circle with the perceptual visual image as guidance during the 
performative proprioceptive choreography of drawing a circle. 
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 We can interpret "make me a round" differently and tell the child that it is up to each one to make 
themselves into a round; that one cannot make someone else a round; and that to make oneself a round, 
the whole body needs to get into the rounding as becoming round. 
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What this is trying to say is that the Circle is not a God-given Form but the result 
of an on-going process of enfolding of an iterative, evolutive development which 
compares and contrasts that which one does in the world with that which is abstract 
and ideal but regulated by the visual49: the supervision of the corporeal performative 
choreography in accordance with the established Law of the Ideal as regulated by vision 
as a perceptive process. The Circle as an idealised Form, as a 'despotic formation', is also 
a conceptual entity and as such can be revised: its definition as a conceptual body, as a 
windowless monadic conception, is still open to emendation and modification: It can be 
"rocked by incessant revolts, by secession and dynastic changes, which nevertheless do 
not affect the immutability of the form" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 385). Vision 
regulates the execution and enforces the proprioceptive choreography in the world to 
conform to idealised norms and forms. "It is noteworthy that the dogmatic image, for its 
part, recognises only error as a possible misadventure of thought, and reduces 
everything to the form of error" (Deleuze, 1994: 148). The visual serves to progressively 
refine the conformity between the doing and the ideal towards the eventual full-
compliance with the Ideal as telos. This iterative process of enforcing conformity, of 
control and command, through visual compliance, implies the sense of 'comply' not only 
as a continual folding over itself, as a complication towards the attainment of a 
perfection in the execution which will coincide fully with the ideal and exhaust its 
potential in its expression, the projective superposition of one image over the other for 
comparison, but as an expression of civil complaisance in conduct and action. The 
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 In this case the visual because it is the operative sense we are considering. If we were considering a 
different sense, the resulting image would be have a different sensorial nature. 
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society of control is the drive which reduces the mobility, the degrees of freedom, of an 
executant body through the continual on-going regulation of its doing by a supervisory 
surveillance which progressively constrains and constricts the variance of conduct and 
action to attain uniform behaviour through a prescribed conformity to an ideal; the 
body as controlled through vision as enforcer of that which we have internalised as the 
abstract vague essence of the Good as a common sense. 
The obvious presupposition here is the Circle as the guiding idea which regulates 
the gestures of the body towards the execution of the circle as the result of a gestural 
protocol informed by the non-pictorial mapping. But we can take this one step further 
and bring the circular gestural protocol of the body-feeling50 coenasthetic creation of 
circular motion as the proprioceptive intuition that guides the manifestation of 
corporeal motion as that which can be labelled as roundness—le rond as the expression 
of roundness through the body. If I pick up a pencil and repeat the same identical 
circular motion over and over again, over and over on itself, as I trace the same circular 
figure on the paper, the differences of the repetitions will constitute the limit of 
possibility of that gesture as a resultant of what that circumscribed bodily movement 
can be. "Thus, the goal is no longer defined by an essential form, but reaches pure 
functionality, as if declining a family of curves, framed by parameters, inseparable from 
a series of possible declension or from a surface of variable curvature that it is itself 
describing" (Fold p.19) The parameters answer the question "What can a body can do?" 
given the body being (re)called upon to emerge for every iteration, so that the memory 
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 Here feeling is used in the sense given by Whitehead in Process and Reality, where feeling is the general 
operation of passing fom the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity as a process. 
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of the body-becoming-circle (re)members the elements which constitute the moulding 
of the form according to a circuit as a prescribed choreography.  "Moulding amounts to 
modulating in a definitive way; modulating is molding in a continuous and perpetually 
variable fashion" (Deleuze, 1993: 19). Can we not affirm that modulation is what Leibniz 
is defining when he states that the law of series posits curves as "the trace of the same 
line" in a continuous movement, continually touched by the curve of their 
convergence?" (Deleuze, 1993: 19) The limiting commonality of the movement as the 
that which constitutes the definitive circularity of the circle between all the inherent 
possibilities in the iterations of the movement constitute its Ideal Form as a bodily 
intuition which is first learned as a body-based intuitive geometry of habitual expression 
which can be expressed a posteriori. The communality in the iterations as a common 
sense of the circle as an actuality lies in the experiential concurrence of similar results 
from the execution of the same choreography by different individuals and the yielding 
of similar results. In this sense, to say that "roundness exists only as a threshold-affect 
(neither flat nor pointed) and as a limit-process (becoming rounded), through sensible 
things and technical agents, millstone, lathe, wheel, spinning wheel socket, etc" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 408) is not to tell the full story as all these derivative 
expressions of roundness pre-suppose roundness as already in the world. So the 
proprioceptive intuition of roundness is not only a threshold-affect, it is the 
foundational-affect which once set up as an objective truth created in the making, as an 
established circuit emergent in the performance of its becoming, that once facialized 
serves as a stepping-stone towards subsequent intuitions—the feeling-doing of 
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roundness as an associated metonymical construct. The (re)petition into being of the 
very same sensori-motor intuitions, i.e. the guided recalling of the proprioceptive 
protocol of drawing a circle or other things circular, will be re-cognized as the bodily 
movement which produces a circle on paper as well as the circular movement-becoming 
of circle-making-as-a-body in terms of a common sense affirmation of circle-making 
potential. But again, we can (re)view the difference between "fais-moi un rond" and 
"dessine-moi un cercle" as operating on two regimes. The first, as the expression of a 
body-becoming-roundness, is open-ended and in touch with the virtual potential of the 
expression of 'what can a body do?' Whereas the second, as the conformation of the 
body of the round as an individualization. One could not just have the bodily movement 
without the guidance of a perceptual image of the circle within the coordinative 
eyeballing of its creation—as Massumi would say, "It requires a coupling of at least two 
movements: a chaotic51 appearance and disappearance of spacelikes and formlikes and 
a movement of the body with them" (Massumi, 2002: 149).  It is important to emphasize 
that the circle as a pictorial image as the end result of drawing a circle is only the 
satisfaction of the re-constitutive drives emergent in the performative execution of the 
body-movement-becoming-circle which re-petitions the proprioceptive image into being 
as the performative sensori-motor intuition of the re-production of the circle which 
through vision as perceptual regulatory guidance allows its re-cognition as a fused 
association between the gesture as executive and the visual as regulatory integrated as 
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 Chaotic is here used by Massumi not as haphazardly disordered but as a random coming into and out of 
existence of all possible particles.  
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an actual satisfaction evidenced by the pictorial result.52 As such, the proprioceptive 
image as a memory circuit of the performative execution is the basis for the conceptual 
basis of that which can be labeled 'Circle'. 
Genetically speaking, the Circle as a Form is a statistical reduction which emerges 
as a singularity "surrounded by a cloud of ordinaries or regulars " (Deleuze, 1989: 60). It 
is an expression of the totality of the intersections of the countless intuitions of circle-
making-as-a-body in the world as an asymptotic striving of the fusion of proprioception 
and vision to the ideal Form as telos. No matter how precisely, cautiously or attentively 
a circle is created in the real world, it will never attain the expression of the Form or 
exhaust its potential whose Ideal perfection can only be attained by God. Thus, we sin 
the circle: our striving to create a circle will always fall short of the Ideal Circle and as 
such, any and all of our efforts will always be an affront to God's Creation. In our 
performance of the circle-making-as-a-body to create a Circle, in our attempt to 
emulate the work of God, we sin. Our circle-making-as-a-body will never attain the 
perfection of God's creation; thus, the body will never attain the perfection that the 
mind, as that which is closest to God, can attain. We are born with original sin as the 
faculty of humanity's innate imperfection as to the emulation of God's ideal creation 
and none of humanity's creations53 will ever attain God's creative perfection: the 
tentativeness of the lived world will never attain the instantaneous certitude of the 
                                                          
52
 If I close my eyes and trace the image of a circle in the air, that gesture will be noticeably different than 
tracing the image of a spiral. But the effort will be lacking coordination without the visual feedback. 
Painting with light into a long-exposure photograph readily demonstrates this fact, even with individuals 
who are practiced and proficient at free-hand drawing. So the tactile sensori-motor intuition requires the 
visual as a determining component to its proper exercise.  
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 Including progeny. God's son was Jesus; Adam's progeny were Abel and Cain. 
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Ideal. And in seeking knowledge in order to attain a perfection to our understanding, we 
insult God by rebuffing the gift of pure experience through our disdainful pride in our 
pursuit of knowledge—thus, research/creation is the handiwork of the Devil.  
When the child perceives a pictorial circle, the mind will hearken back to the 
gestural protocol which results in a circle of sorts. The repeated activation of this 
sensory-motor intuition, the habituation which results in a circle, will in time, succumb 
to a “shorthand” where the proprioceptive image of the circle in the mind can be made 
to be represented on paper without requiring the conscious evocation of that very same 
proprioceptive activation. It is the same dynamic as when a child encounters for the first 
time a polysyllabic word such as 'repetition'—i.e. pointing out and sub-vocalising each 
syllable with their index finger, associatively assembling pairs of syllables, until they 
manage the full integrative satisfaction of the word as a whole, as a one: re-pah-tee-
shan, repah-ti-shun, repah-tishun, repahtishun, repetition! Once the word has been 
learned, there is no need to re-perform its cognition every time it is encountered as its 
understanding becomes immediately operative.  
The usual explanation implicit in presupposition is that the circle itself is an 
object created by a subject where, at face value, the circle is a Circle—the pictorial 
image of a circle as a Circle tells me all that the circle is but doesn't tell me a thing about 
it. It takes for granted that "everyone knows" what a circle is and this familiarity as the 
communal, common-sensical knowledge of the circle presents a front which indubitably 
and truthfully reveals all that a circle is but dissembles its constitutional emergence: it is 
a mask, a disguise, in that it conceals the coming to being of the circle as a processual 
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becoming, covers up the durational structure of its underpinnings, usurps the value 
implicit in becoming as a creative enterprise and presents itself as what is. This 
tenaceous, static overcoding as an adumbration of creation is called faciality by Deleuze 
and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (1987) and they present the concept of the face as 
a white screen in that it projects all the virtual potential of what it is to be a circle, yet it 
is a black hole in that it takes in anything and everything one throws at it as far as 
coming to terms with it and gives nothing back.54 In our example, the circle-drawing 
child subject and the drawn circle object constitute a relational system where "each 
serves as a correlate of the other" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 172) as participatory 
entities in a mirrored subject-object, doubly-reciprocating machinic assemblage 
whereby in the creation of which the face as a front reveals "all" about the circle as an 
actualization and as the full expression of the virtual potential which can be actualized 
within the given ecology of becoming. Faciality as a machinic assemblage identified as 
such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false fabrication—
thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the image of truth in the 
world. And by extension, the abstract machinic assemblage can be seen as the 
processual creation of truth. In the clash of collision of planes of consistency, the 
ensuing deterritorializations and reterritorializations will constitute an event which will 
set up new planes of consistency and machinic assemblages different from our pre-
conceived memorial expectations. 
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 This process of facialization is the prototypical reification of allienation in that the end product as 
resultant usurps the creation of value production in favour of an interested strangement where the end 
product is divorced from its nature and appears as a fully-formed object not as the satisfaction of creation 
but as the satisfaction of ulterior need as a creation of value.   
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The role of memory within event as process is both cumulative and adumbrative 
in that it integrates experience and the experiential past without our being aware of it. 
It is cumulative in that the process doesn't just change the now, but changes the 
consistency of the past as a memorial object and this new conception of the past as its 
new future-facing face hides, and it adumbrates everything that came before even 
though it presents the where it's at as the resultant as a what has happened as it is 
happening. But this future-facing dynamic façade or front of flow as the immanent 
becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings constitutive of being is to be seen as a 
happening together of moving forward as creative advance as a sheet of consistency 
and operational coherence. These future-facing faces of happening as phases can be 
understood in various ways as machinic. Machinic in that they are desire-generating 
machines which introduce slices which can remain unstated as layers of operational 
consistency that can beget extensive continuity; machinic in that they generate the 
pulsion to move ahead; machinic in that as an assemblage they produce novel 
possibilities of becomings; machinic in that as organizational and informational they 
propagate the causal determinacy of the system; machinic in that its invocation 
activates and sets in motion other machines which in turn activate other machines... We 
can write machinic to invoke the full-potential of that which is hidden in machinic but to 
enunciate it we need the directive machinic of memory to activate its gest discursively 
for it to become operational. And in producing these layers of operational consistency 
how thin can we make them? As thin as the emulsion of the image on a piece of film or 
thinner or as thick as a SAAB 900 or all eternity.  
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As presented earlier, the information of an event requires an order-word and a 
lure for feeling. If for example I am sitting with my partner at home and she asks me to 
make her a cup of coffee, I would embark upon a considerably lengthy and complicated 
protocol called "Make a cup of coffee" which can take on various expressive 
manifestation but which all end up with a cup of coffee. The protocol "make cup of 
coffee" as an order-word consists of an obviously simple set of procedures which most 
everyone masters in some form or other and executes daily without giving the protocol 
a second thought. I will outline the protocol constituting the procedure of making a cup 
of coffee and will be quite detailed about it even at the expense of being tedious 
because in doing so one can actually be made aware of the adumbrative nature of 
memory and its habit-formed expression: 
1) Get up, push back the chair, walk to kitchen 
2) Go to cupboard and get coffeemaker and grinder 
3) Go to freezer and take out coffee beans 
4) Go to utensil drawer for measuring spoon: realize that it is not there 
5) Go to dishwasher and pull out measuring spoon. Note: the dishwasher 
needs emptying55 
6) Measure coffee beans: a flush or heaping spoonful? 
7) Grind coffee: fine, medium or coarse 
8) Unscrew the coffeemaker 
9) Fill the reservoir with water 
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 This is just to show that the unfolding of the event is not immune to distractions and becoming others, 
even if the event is bookended by an order-word and a teleonomic lure for feeling. 
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10) Place ground coffee in coffee maker basket: halfway or to the top 
11) Screw the coffeemaker together 
12) Turn on the stove and set the coffeemaker on the burner 
13) Go to the cupboard and take out two mugs 
14) Go to the other cupboard and take out the brown sugar 
15) Get milk from the refrigerator 
16) Empty the dishwasher 
17) Turn off the stove 
18) Pour the coffee into the mugs 
19) Add sugar and milk 
20) Stir the sugar and milk. Think how the stirring motion allows one to 
conceive circularity as a circle56 
21) Bring the two mugs of coffee out to the deck and enjoy 
The expression "make a cup of coffee" as simple and banal an example as it is 
illustrates the adumbrative aspect of memory and its expression through language. 
When we hear "make a cup of coffee" we don't need to have the 20 plus steps of the 
process spelled out: we know what needs to be done—we have come to understand 
implicitly the processual unpacking in the doing as the performative unfolding of the 
protocol. Now, each step in this protocol can in turn be broken down into a series of 
protocolary processes, each of which can in turn can be broken down again and again ad 
infinitum into its constituting elements, relations and conditionings as participants 
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which are indeterminate, concrete and ultimately non-individualizational. And in spite 
of Zeno's Race Course Dichotomy Paradox57 we have faith that this infinite series is 
convergent because actuality happens and takes place—we end up with actuality and in 
this case hopefully with a cup of coffee. Further, each step, as an identified action, no 
matter how insignificant, has itself already been integrated as part of a labeled stand-
alone individualized memory circuit which can in turn become part of an overarching 
process—in our case the assemblage of all these protocolary units are "covered" or 
"adumbrated" by the expression "make a cup of coffee" and belie its satisfaction which 
is bookended by the order-word and the lure for feeling as the enjoyment of the cup of 
coffee. To paraphrase Bergson, the steps succeed and condition one another according 
to a determined order (Bergson, 1988: 226)—each step is necessary and integral to the 
success of the outcome and every step is as important as the next as without any of 
them to "make a cup of coffee" will not be able to take place. And here again, to refer to 
each step as an individualization is improper in that the individual steps can be 
recognized as such because the image of their satisfaction is a coherent operational 
surface of phasing towards becoming, but they do not exist on their own—as William 
James (1842-1910) would say, it is like "the front edge of an advancing wave-crest" 
(James, 1912: 69). Further, as each step is carried out and aggregated to the accretion of 
steps that came before, the past as the given as ground for the next step is changed and 
provides a new "face" for what comes next as a succession of phases of becoming—
which is the matter of fact in every creative processual advancement into novelty which 
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 In a race between a tortoise and a hare, the hare will never be able to catch up to the tortoise because 
the hare will always have half the remaining distance to cover before overtaking the tortoise. 
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Bergson refers to as the coexistence of the present with the past.  The expression "make 
a cup of coffee" overlies the processual protocol as a kind of "miracle" which guides the 
information of the protocol as an understanding, but it can only be said that it 
establishes a harmony between the constituent participants as constitutive of the 
"make a cup of coffee" as an individuation within the unfolding of actuality once all is 
said and done as perfective, as a satisfaction. But this miracle is not just one miracle but 
the constant progression of the miraculous as transitional where the agency at work is 
the conspiracy of memory as informant—"the conspiracy which conditions it from 
within" (Deleuze, 1989: 77). 
As a subjective entity, "make a cup of coffee" does not exist preindividually so 
that in the progressive, transitional gradation of its becoming there are no modifications 
to or of a pre-existing individual.58 The invocation of "make a cup of coffee" is not an 
ordering "initiated by the spark of the exceptional event" (Simondon, 1989: 156), but a 
putting into movement or activation of relational potential at hand—it has a life of its 
own. The directionality of the memorial unfolding of actuality is nudged so that a new 
dynamic becomes gradually operative through the integration of new linkages of 
relation. This veered unfolding of memory as eventual is expressive of a conditioning 
causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of the proposition "make a cup of 
coffee" as an individuation through the progressive and gradual integration of the 
fractal recursivity of protocolary steps which taken together as an accretionary process 
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constitute the informant memory which results in "make a cup of coffee". The progress 
of becoming is progressive in that the protocol requires that certain steps as phases of 
becoming need to be satisfied before proceeding; it is gradual in that the becoming of 
the individuation "make a cup of coffee" is not instantaneous (not even with instant 
coffee) and does not happen all at once and as an individuation gains definition, 
acquires focal clarity and corporeal heft. Its becoming is fraught with persistent eventual 
change which shifts the existent memorial circuit as a given giving way in its completion 
to a new memorial circuit as a momentous event—by definition, the event is the 
outcome of any causal dynamic which alters or disrupts the unfolding of the integrative 
process of memory; the event is accidental in that it is considered to be external to the 
"uneventful" unfolding where the unfolding of life as process is all event. The event as a 
significant event is one where the intensity and density of relation as processual change 
is so high that a threshold is passed so that the topos upon which a particular memory 
circuit is operative is replaced by a different topos as definitive of the body being 
created through the activation of new relations. 
In fact, Bergson might say that the expression "make a cup of coffee" is a 
perception that "consists in condensing enormous periods of an infinitely diluted 
existence into a few more differentiated moments of an intenser life, and thus summing 
up a very long history." And to this he ads, "To perceive means to immobilize" (Bergson, 
1988: 208)—and this immobilization is the individualization as an excision from process; 
and this happens at every step or phase we can identify either within the protocol or as 
the protocol as a whole (itself excised from a larger protocol as an individualization). The 
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immobilization referred to by Bergson resides in its Latin root of perception as alluding 
to the ability of the mind to grasp, seize or collect. But what is there to be grasped? It 
requires something seizable, clearly an object of some kind, an objectified form of 
something that has been 'collected' together—in our case that which is to be grasped is 
the expression "make a cup of coffee" as an object, as something that is presented 
objectively to the sight as a material59 entity that is fully formed and distinct and 
external to the mind. By making the expression "make a cup of coffee" a distinct object, 
the resultant is definitive and, seen as such, has no loose ends, no degrees of freedom 
that leave room for misinterpretation as to what the result of the expression ought to 
be, and no opportunity for it to link with any other objective entity to create an 
undesirable or unexpected outcome than the one intended—so in that respect the 
expression "make a cup of coffee" is objective, static, closed and definitive in that it is all 
encompassing as far as making a cup of coffee is concerned until it is rendered specific 
way as in "make me an espresso". Yet as an object, the expression "make a cup of 
coffee" is an image that is a (re)presentation that presents itself as a whole, as a 
coherent (re)collection of the participating constituents where each one is in turn a 
subsumptive image because each step can be understood as constituting its own closed 
static objectival entity (even if this is not what it is). But to use the word perceive in the 
context that Bergson uses runs counter to the subject and object becoming one. A 
happier choice to replace 'perceive' might have been 'cognize', as once "make a cup of 
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coffee" is cognized it can be '(re)cognized' and yields interpretative wiggle room to the 
process and what it can do as a body. 
But the relatively simple break-down of the sequence of gestures and actions 
involved in making of a cup of coffee reveals a pattern of aggregation or compilation, a 
repeatable (re)collection of the under-standing steps or phases of becoming as a 
sequence of frames, which when seen in this way make up the self-fulfilling prophesy of 
the fractured yet continuous linear mechanical top-down causal pattern we popularly 
use to constitute the processual continuity of making a cup of coffee. The dialectical 
analytic manner in which we broke down the protocol as an ordered, numbered list 
where each step follows on the heels of another helps to organize the A begets B begets 
C etc causal progression, where A precedes B, and both must precede C etc, so that by 
ordering the processual progression according to an ordered numbered list one can 
follow the procedure according to the sequence laid out by the protocol and end up 
with a cup of coffee. The ordered-number line serves the ordering purpose of a 
convenient and familiar memory loci by offering the structural and organizational 
backbone to the experiential unfolding and affords a continuity to the process in terms 
of an atomistic mechanical step-wise sequence. This series of discontinuous, static, 
procedural objective entities which lead to a certain satisfaction fits in very nicely with 
the understanding of causality as an action-reaction dynamic and to the necessities of 
irreversible temporal progression.   
*  *  * 
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If the expression "make a cup of coffee" means something (to us), we see that it 
reveals all yet hides everything. It reveals all because implicit in the expression "make a 
cup of coffee" we posses the memorial understanding of all that which constitutes 
"make a cup of coffee" yet hides everything that came before and the possible forms 
that the event-body "make a cup of coffee" can take on. It is in this respect that memory 
is adumbrative. However, in spite of the concreteness and definiteness afforded by the 
expression "make a cup of coffee" and our proposed step-wise procedural protocol, we 
can see that the entire arrangement, even though linear, can be jumbled about 
somewhat in that it doesn't matter whether I get the mugs ready first, or take the sugar 
out of the cupboard later, as long as the operational critical path is followed which will 
consistently, efficiently and reliably yield the desired result: 
1)  Unscrew the coffee maker 
2) Fill the bottom to the appropriate level with water 
3) Place coffee basket in the bottom container 
4) Measure out the desired amount of coffee beans 
5) Grind the coffee beans 
6) Place ground coffee in basket 
7) Screw top onto the bottom of the coffee maker 
8)  Put the coffee maker on the round and fire it up 




But even if this procedure were to be simplified to its barest essentials, i.e. if we 
invoke the order-words infuse hot water through ground coffee into a cup, what this 
says is that every step in the process has forward-feeling needs—desires—which must 
be satisfied in order for the process to coalesce into a coherent whole as an operational 
perfection. There's a logic to the process where progress proceeds from a (pre)existing 
conditioning as a given to that which follows: the process cannot proceed until the 
necessary preconditions for advancement are in play; this has had to have taken place, 
before it can move on to satisfy the memorial advancement towards the lure for 
feeling—I cannot screw the top of the coffee maker before I put the ground coffee into 
the recipient, nor can I put the coffeemaker on the round before I put the water in the 
bottom container. The satisfaction, the completive perfection, of each of these 
conditioning requirements constitutes the concretive fusion which enables the future 
becoming desire for coalescence of the next step. So that each step in the process is a 
bridge between the coalescence of the past that yields it and the future it is begetting to 
which it is coalescing—what Whitehead calls the prehension, i.e. "the activity whereby 
an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things" (Whitehead, 1985: 52). In our 
coffee making example, we are grinding coarsely indeed, but we can scale down the 
grind to see that every aspect of "make a cup of coffee" subscribes to this backwards 
and forwards-gazing coalescence. And as each completion towards advancement 
performs double duty in its simultaneous backward-gazing and forward-gazing stance in 
the unfolding of the process, we come to grasp the ontogenetic significance and 
relevance of Simondon's concept of concretization not only in terms of the material 
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doing double-duty but in terms of a conditioning double-function both as a bridging of 
temporalities and operational functionality.  
The progression here is not mechanical in the sense of the action-reaction 
dynamic exemplified by a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. It is more of a tressing 
or pleating of strands which run through the process conditioning the textural 
interlacing of the participating elements as transversal vectors. And it is a curious weave 
in that the transversal vectors as yarns that constitute the warp of becoming do not 
necessarily need to run the entire length of the individuation. The yarns of the 
processual warp are discontinuous—they each play their role as a participating 
constituent imbued with their own duration and temporality—and enter into the weave 
when and where they are needed and allow other yarns to take their place whenever 
that which they offer is called upon as necessary to complete the complex plait. But it is 
their concretized intertwining about the inexistent directive outline constituted by the 
synced, out of phase desires of the multitude of participating constituents which gives 
heft and substance to the stuff of becoming as matter as a body, as an ecological 
economy of functional becoming. In this respect, the memory loci are the way points in 
the making of becoming as performative of the causa sui as a progressive, processual 
immanence in terms of a concretized sequence of planes of consistency. As such, agency 
is implicit—it resides in the self-propelling drive of memory where the causality is lured 
forward by the processual satisfaction of the reciprocal and simultaneous desires 
implicit in the dynamic becoming of (re)collection and (re)membering. The order of 
becoming as the progression of unfolding serves as its own memory pegs which allow 
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one to find one's relative position along the process and (re)produce the operative 
conditions at that point. Yet these topoi, these constitutive categories of being as 
participants, are in themselves indivisible in terms of the motion which constitute them 
just as the flight of Zeno's arrow's flight constitutes its own indivisible movement whose 
satisfaction creates a landing site that both creates its "landing site" by landing upon it 
and locates the "landing" as an expression of creation of a territorialization of 
landscape.  
If for the sake of argument we assume that the process of integration we have 
been examining can be said to be vertical, we can ascribe to each step a level of 
attainment, a plateau of accomplishment, an achievement of realization which melds 
with the one preceding it and eventually with the one that succeeds it. Each plane of 
consistency integrates that which came before it; the antithetical progress, 
differentiation, allows us to distinguish the constituent participants as tendencies of 
becomings which when integrated become cogent, concretized actualizations. Thus, we 
have a continuous processual advancement of simultaneous individuations as 
becomings where each plateau reveals a new consistency which adumbrates the one 
which it covers. We can now also apply this model of continuity horizontally and say 
that the extensive continuum which emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling 
into being, of the expression "without that this cannot be" and its necessary corollary, 
"without this that cannot be" and we see that the necessity extends itself not only 
locally but globally. Relation as such is infinitely multi-dimensional in that it is not only 
relation between two terms, or three terms, but in that it is a relational articulation to 
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infinite concretized relational possibility in number and extension. The roasted coffee 
bean, like any and all of the other participants in the making coffee exercise, is not only 
the resultant expression of a concretized, unstated, and profound processual unfolding 
which is all its very own, but which is also the expression of the full interconnectedness 
of becoming in the unfolding of nature as a process. It is simultaneously a one and 
many, not as a one or as a many, but as a one as many and many as one, rolled into that 
which is a becoming in terms of its role as an identifiable participant in the assemblage 
which requires it. As circular and paradoxical as it is, the reconciliation between these 
expressions of understandings are reconciled thus: as the expression of the coffee bean 
as a participant being, as a coffee bean being. As such, our "human" actuality as a 
perceptual image is the graspable resultant of the fully integrated interconnectedness of 
nature as a monadic concretization: the image reveals all yet hides everything. Only 
through the (re)petition in memory as a performative unfolding of (re)association can 
the participants be (re)collected as a coherent imagistic whole (re)membered as a body 
constituting the under-standing of the image.   
The creative advance of the world as a continuous integrative process is thus 
understood as the succession of (pre)conditioning plateaus of becoming as constituting 
a memory-image in movement where each instance is called into existence and 
attached to the collection as a temporal concretization. If this creative advance into 
novelty is somehow remarkable, important "as an aspect of feeling whereby a 
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perspective is imposed upon the universe of things felt" (Whitehead, 1968: 11)60 and 
bears (re)producing, the conditionings can be (re)called into play so that the 
participating elements can be (re)collected, (re)membered into a society as "a nexus of 
actual entities which are 'ordered' among themselves" (Whitehead, 1985: 89). To 
paraphrase Whitehead, in the (re)petition to order, the process of concrescence as the 
processual creation of coherence becomes its own reason, its own causa sui, by which 
the lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency (Whitehead, 1985: 88).61 And to say that 
memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as content is not only 
applicable in terms of reconstituting the image of the past it is the constitutive dynamic 
of the coming together of actuality.  
In film, the protocolary process is replaced by the montage of superposition as a 
memorial process of one frame over the next. Each frame exists as its own impression 
which builds on the nothingness of black as foundation, as the frame of reference of 
change through comparison. The stroboscopic shuttering of the image in film 
complicates the serial progression by intercalating a frame of black between each image 
which throws an unexpected into the works. Not only does the process of impressive 
superposition create the two-fold process of modifying the memory content of what has 
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 And here it is important to underline the specific meaning which Whitehead gives to feeling as "the 
basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in 
question...[which] is a process). Process and Reality, p. 40. 
61
 Although Whitehead's concrescence and Simondon's concretization come from the same root, the first 
refers more to the creation of coherence in a cross-section of the universe as a duration (Whitehead, 
1985: 125), whereas the second refers to " the multi-functionality of operative solidarity... toward future 
uses." (Massumi, “Technical Mentality” Revisited: Brian Massumi on Gilbert Simondon. With Arne De 
Boever, Alex Murray, and Jon Roffe). 
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been seen, but it complicates the future-gazing dynamic by  desire and expectation with 
the Fort-Da62 mechanism of the butterfly shutter. 
Jean-Luc Goddard’s assertion of cinema as "truth 24 frames a second" is only half 
right. In fact, the way that film projection works is that every film frame is seen twice in 
order to reduce the flicker effect of the shutter blades passage before the projector 
lamp. This creates a peek-a-boo, the-image-is-there-and-then-it’s-not, now-you-see-it-
now-you-don’t dynamic: when the image is not there, you wish it to be there, and when 
it is there, you wish it not to go away. Fort-Da. Fort-Da. Fort-Da. The alternation 
between the pleasurable (agreeable state) and the unpleasant (disagreeable state) 
creates what Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) refers to as an intersection between a play of 
occultation and an alternative scansion of two phonemes. But contrary to the usual 
conception of Freudian pleasure in the Fort-Da game between mother and child where 
pleasure happens in seeing the mother and displeasure in her absence, perhaps the 
pleasure exists elsewhere. Freud discusses the erotogenic pleasurable aspects of sucking 
(for its own sake, i.e. a pacifier without milk)—perhaps a parallel sensorial mechanism 
(pleasurable machinism) can be extended to the activation of sight for its own sake? 
According to Guattari’s reading of Lacan, there seems to exist a desire mechanism in the 
Fort-Da game where “the wait for the return of the object is constituted as an 
“anticipating provocation.” In playing the Fort-Da refrain, the projector becomes a 
producer of desire (negative affect) during the black out and a generator of satisfaction  
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 Fort-Da literally translates from the German into Gone and Here. The Fort-Da game described by 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) refers to playing peek-a-boo with his 
grandson Ernst.  
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(positive affect) during the instances of light. This creates a genderless masturbatory 
“compulsion to repeat” that is checked or contained by the presentation of content on 
the screen. Further, most film spectators do not realize that a film frame is projected 
twice. So instead of seeing a frame of film for 1/24th of a second (i.e. 24 fps), we see the 
image frame 1/96th of a second, black  1/96th of a second, the image frame again 
1/96th of a second, black  1/96th of a second, then we see the new frame 1/96th of a 
second, etc.  And to reinforce this desire-driven hunger for more, the twice-repeated 
projection of a frame perhaps could very possibly condition a habituative expectation of 
its continued projection—like they say in French, jamais deux sans trois!63  Although 
most dismiss the shutter effect as too rapid to be sensed (even subliminally) as a Fort-
Da process, Oliver Sacks has shown through clinical study in his own practice that 
certain patients with Parkinsonism react to vibratory stimuli many times faster than the 
shutter of the cinematic apparatus. The fact still remains whether we "see" it or not, 
when we watch a film from a film projector, we spend half the time looking at a black 
screen. Thus, we foreground the Fort-Da of the shutter flicker as a generator of 
memorial drive which demands immediate satisfaction in its unfolding. The strobing of 
the shutter is a Fort-Da refrain that runs as a bass line to the parallel polyphony of all 
other drives, i.e. transverse vectors, seeking integration within the film i.e. narrative 
content, plot, character development, art direction, dialogue, music and sound effect 
tracks, visual stylistics, etc: the (usually underplayed) variable affective intensities of the 
plane of expression that run simultaneously with the enunciative assemblage of the 
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 If it happens twice, it will happen a third time.  
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plane of content. This desire-generating machine makes film eminently more watchable 
over other moving image projection systems and differentiates this desire-generating 
medium from all others. The combination of these two effects, the desire implicit in the 
Fort-Da beat of the butterfly shutter and the expectation created by the doubly-
repeated projection of the frame work together to make of cinema a powerful 
generator of desire and expectation as its driving undertow. And we should emphasize 
that the desire is not an expression of Oedipal lack but of a working-together-towards 
and a satisfaction-in-the-making. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the 
desiring-machine, the dynamic set-up of, and set up by, the cinema projector is a 
perfect prototype of its expression in that the shutter blades provide the "system of 
interruptions or breaks (coupures)" that slice away, removing portions, from the 
immense thigh of a pig (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 36). 
In film, the montage of superposition as a memorial process of one frame over 
the next builds on the protocolary  model developed earlier where each successive 
frame constitutes a step in the processual advance. The word montage as used in 
French connotes both an assemblage constitutive of a mechanical device or assemblage 
and as used in film editing as the creation of meaning arising from the proximate 
association or juxtaposition of film sequences.64 Although the mechanism producing the 
cinematic effect presents as a step-wise advance  the result of the doubly-repeated 
projection and the dissipative fade of the superimposed impressions (usually) produces 
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 However, montage also refers to the generation of meaning emerging from the considered 
juxtaposition of how cinematic elements are treated, presented and work with themselves and with each 
other throughout the film.   
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a transitory fluidity between one frame and the next. The cut, whether it occurs 
between frames65 or shots, represents that simultaneously backward- and forward-
gazing junction which presents the face of the past as associative potential being pulled 
from the future as a modification of the past as it simultaneously creates the novel 
which it engages as actuality. The imagistic drives within the frame as internal drives 
seeking integration within the film constitute the internal logic as a memorial drive 
which seek integration and as such create the experiential as satisfaction made actual. 
The elements constituting the image within the frame participate in the tressing 
or pleating of strands as transverse vectors which run through the process of 
superposition as conditioning memorial integration as the textural interlacing of these 
very same participating elements: this can include such aesthetic elements such as the 
lighting, camera movement, actor direction, art direction, shot length, lens choice, etc. 
And as mentioned before, the weave of the yarns that constitute the warp of meaning 
created by the montage of these transverse vectors do not necessarily need to run the 
entire length. The yarns of the processual warp are discontinuous—they each play their 
role as a participating constituent imbued with their own duration and temporality—
and enter into the weave when and where they are needed and allow other yarns to 
take their place when what they offer is called upon as necessary to complete the 
complex plait, but it is their concretized intertwining about the director's direction as 
the guiding hand of memory's unfolding. Memory is then an invisible external agency 
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 There is always a jump cut between one frame and the next—montage is operative at every structural 
level in film. There is always an element of movement between two frames, at the micro-structural level 
of the film grain and also in terms of temporality of the image capture and projection.   
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constituted by the synced, out of phase desires of the multitude of participating 
constituents which makes the cinematic play, play and gives heft and substance to the 
stuff of becoming as matter as a body, as an ecological economy of functional becoming. 
The cinematic event as a film screening constitutes a memorial narrative in that all the 
elements are integrated into the processual unfolding of the film. Each aesthetic 
component that we can deem a constitutive element of the image within the frame 
constitutes a memorial narrative through and through in that its unfolding not only 
reifies the memorial drives inherent in the film but constitutes the becoming 
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The geometry of the screening room is rather simple and can be quite readily 
understood through basic Euclidian optical geometry. However, the questions that can 
be raised while examining the relationship between the spectator and the screen 
present geometrical/mathematical implications which bear teasing out. To better 
understand the spectator’s becoming one with the unfolding spectacle on the screen as 
an aspect of coming to terms with the cinematic event, one can ask the following 
questions: What is the nature of the shared experience of spectatorship? What is at the 
root of the commonality of cinema? How does one become one with the screen image?  
What constitutes the shared experience of the cinema is not simply the content 
of the spectacle, the film in itself, but the relation that all spectators have with the 
screen: pretty much everyone is in-line, on-axis with the projection and the screen;66 
and as such everyone is "seeing" the same thing, everyone is on the same page67: there 
is no subjective difference in terms of optical point-of-view between one spectator and 
the next. They all share the same perspectival relation to the images unfolding on the 
screen. Every spectator is served the same relational proposition as a "replacement" to 
their own individual subjectivity: the spectator willingly checks at the ticket counter 
their expression of subjectivity as a being in the world and it is replaced by the pre-
packaged being in the world of the unfolding spectacle.68  In the cinema screening, 
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 Even if one is seated off-axis, in one of the side seats, the axis of the point of view of the projection is 
maintained in that there is no variation to the subjective axis of the presentation. 
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 Of course this means, that each spectator can read the page differently but they are working off the 
same "data". 
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there's less chaos to contend with in that the visual faculty has a lot less to do than 
when being presented with raw, real life—if anything because half the time the 
spectator is looking at a black screen and the rest of the time, the screen is a still... the 
spectator doesn't have as much information to process so there's a lot of processing 
headroom for the spectator to come to terms with the image being cast onto the 
screen. But becoming one with the screen image is a more complicated matter. 
In the previous chapters we have been progressing from the external to the 
internal and attempting to construct an extensive continuity constitutive of the 
integration of actuality. In this chapter we look at the formation of the image as a visual 
conception. As we saw earlier in chapters 2 and 3, the image of the world we live in is 
the image we have inside. It begins with the traditional model of the retinal impression 
of the external on the retina and its production of an image in the mind. But there is no 
difference between the image of the world and the image we have inside. They are one 
and the same. There is no inside and no outside; it is all one and the same. In the same 
way that we could understand the event as individualization as part of individuation 
within creation, the perceptual image of the outside is the same image that is inside. 
How can we come to terms with this realization? How can we formulate the image that 
we have come to accept as "residing within our brain" and simply state that that which 
is out there is exactly the same as that which is inside? How can the inside be the 
outside simultaneously? 
We will seek to answer these questions through Deleuze's concept of the fold 
through a consideration of geometrical optics derived from Euclid, the optical 
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perspective models of Alberti and Viator, Kepler's explorations of continuity through a 
generalized understanding of conics and perspective, as well as some of the implications 
of projective geometry through Desargues’ theorem and their extension into topology. 
It is decidedly an ontological exploration mathematically informed and as such no 
different from using any other descriptive program: we do not see any other way of 
going about comprehending the operative dynamic of this concept without tracing it 
back to its origins. As Sha Xin Wei (2005) would say, we cannot confound “mathematics 
as ontology” with “mathematics is ontology” and his point is well taken—I hope that I 
am not catching myself in the Pythagoric Snare by confusing contingent attributes of 
informal models with the necessary consequences of the axioms (Nierenberg & 
Nierenberg, 2011: 586). If the Fold means anything, then its foundational essence must 
reside in that which we know as a fold; when someone writes the "unfolding of 
thought" there is an underlying logic to the statement which must make sense at some 
level, for if it didn't Deleuze could have called the Fold a camel or JimmyJoe. But how 
does one fold thought? Or how does the fold name the relationship? Or how does the 
fold achieve "a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity, that presume a simple 
interiority and exteriority" (Deleuze Dictionary p. 103)? What we seek to define is the 
operative intuition behind the concept. 
* * * 
Deleuze is right when he writes in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque that the 
Baroque (1590-1725) refers not to an essence but rather to the operative function of 
endlessly producing folds. But what is that he means by that? A plausible answer lies in 
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the etymology of the Latin root pli which in English replicates itself as plic-, pli- plect-, 
plec-, plici-, -plex, -plexity, -plexus, -ple, -pli, -plic, -plicat, -plicit, -plicate, -plication and 
reflective of the Latin: plicare, plecare, to fold, bend, curve, turn, twine, twist, 
interweave, weave, unfold and unroll. These meanings emerge in different ways 
throughout Deleuze's writings as part of his rhetorical explicatio, in his explanations, 
explications and expositions. But these meanings are derivative; the first meanings of 
explicatio are unfold and unroll and these refer to the act of unrolling papyrus or 
parchment scrolls prior to the invention in the first century CE of the bound codex or 
book of sheets of vellum or a concertina-style folded scroll. The act of unrolling the 
scroll metonymically came to be understood as the explication of the text written on the 
scroll in terms of its linear unfolding and later as the exegesis of the text. 
Another answer, also linguistically bound, could arise from the myriad 
possibilities that arise in words which include the root -pli. These words of Latin descent 
are equally found in English and French, mean more or less the same thing and imply 
many aspects of thought and its operations. Words such as amplify, apply, complement, 
complicate, discipline, example, explain, explore, implicit, implicate, replica, replicate, 
reply, simple, triple etc can all be seen as complicit and implicit in the complexification 
of thought to express the richness of the Baroque—not in terms of inventiveness but in 
its deployment of amplification, multiplication and plication in all things Baroque.   
 Yet there is another take on folds but it requires us to take as point of 
departure the world of painting of the pre-Renaissance. If one compares the depiction 
of pictorial space in art prior to 1450 and after, it would be an easy thing to say that up 
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to the end of the Middle Ages the depiction of pictorial space was fraught with disunity, 
discontinuity and incoherence until the invention of perspective in the 1400’s. In David 
Hockney’s epistolary exchange with Martin Kemp in Secret Knowledge, there is 
discussion as to how the first half of the 15th century served as hinge in the paradigmatic 
shift in the history of pictorial representation. Their comparison of paintings before and 
after those years reveals a quantum leap in the abilities of artists in two European art 
centres, Florence and Flanders. And key to the emergence of these new-found abilities 
appears to be the use of optical devices in art, i.e. mirrors. The use of mirrors resulted in 
techniques which revolutionized the way that architects and painters would pictorially 
depict the world: it resulted in Filippo Brunelleschi’s putative discovery69 of perspective 
in 1412 in Florence, and Jan van Eyck’s painterly naturalism which emulated the 
photographic in Flanders.70 
Although the use of mirrors likely provided both painters with similar departure 
points, the two regional concerns provided markedly different outcomes. In Florence, it 
was primarily with perspective as a depiction of coherent pictorial geometry, a visually 
rational depiction of depth and the relative position of objects not only to one another 
but projectively in relation to the world and the spectator. In Flanders, though the 
depiction of depth and the relative position of objects was important, the emphasis was 
on conveying the reality of the scene not as objects outlined relative to the viewer but 
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 There are Roman wall-paintings with perfect geometrical perspective. See Battisti, 1981, p.102. 
70
 When we refer to lenses in the 15
th
 century, we are referring to the use of concave mirrors in a camera 
obscura to project their subject onto a canvas. Prior to this there was the pinhole camera obscura, where 
an inverted image would appear as a projection on a wall in a dark room as a result of a small hole 
opposite connecting to a brightly lit exterior.  In the late 16
th
 and into the 17
th
 centuries, painters will 
move towards the use of glass lenses as the technology emerges for the fabrication of microscopes and 
telescopes. In the 19
th
 century, artists will move towards the use of the camera lucida.  
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what one could describe as the effect on the eye. In terms of the rationalization of 
pictorial space as a depiction of space,71 these two techniques have been conflated as 
the emergence of a naturalistic pictorial perspective by the back-gridding of history and 
other than pictorial perspective, what it did contribute to painting was the ability to 
depict photo-realistic fabric folds like never before. However, the rational and the 
affective need to be considered separately since the pictorial results emerging from 
these two techniques have profoundly different intuitions one is capable of deriving 
from them. If we subscribe to the usual historical presentation, the first half of the 15th 
century gave us: 
(1) the discovery of perspective in 1412 as a systematic pictorial rendering 
technique as demonstrated by Florentine architect Filippo Brunelleschi (1377–1446). 
(2) the geometrical rationalization of perspective as presented by Florentine 
painter Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472) in his Della pittura of 1435-36. 
(3) the use of mirrors as a tool for naturalistic “painterly” pictorial rendering first 
by Flemish painters and later by Italians but not specifically for the geometric rendering 
of space.  
According to most historical accounts, Brunelleschi is deemed to have discovered 
perspective in 1412 as a result of his work with mirrors and as demonstrated in front of 
the Baptistery of San Giovanni in Florence.72 The demonstration was such that when the 
viewer stood at the same spot where the painter had stood in creating the drawing in 
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  We ought to keep in mind that space qua space would not be understood as such until the late 
Renaissance. 
72
 The two most recognized biographical accounts of Brunelleschi’s demonstration are by Antonio 
Manetti (1423 –1497) and Giorgio Vasari (1511 – 1574). Manetti writes, “I have had it in my hands and 
seen it many times in my days, so I can testify to it.” (Saalman  
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front of the Baptistery, and the created portrayal was perceived through a hole in a 
mirror, when “held at the correct distance, painting and reality are interchangeable.” 
(Hockney, 2006: 208) Apparently, this demonstrated that Brunelleschi had found “a 
practical means for securing a rigorous two-way, or reciprocal, metrical relationship 
between the shapes of objects definitely located in space and their pictorial 
representation.” (Ivins, 1938: p. 9) Whether the mirror aided Brunelleschi’s creative 
intuition as to the geometric functioning of perspective or as proof positive of his 
understanding of the geometry of perspective is beside the point; what really counted is 
that Brunelleschi had come upon a method of depicting nature in an optically correct 
manner. The likeness of nature was apparently perfectly reflected in his image, and no 
wonder—it had been executed off a mirror! Yet, what is particularly significant in 
Brunelleschi’s demonstration of this heightened naturalism is not so much the 
possibility of a new method of depicting nature, but the discovery of a new way of 
understanding sight, una nova perspettiva. 
Throughout the ages, the term perspective referred to what we would now call 
optics, so when it is said that Brunelleschi discovered perspective, what he discovered in 
fact was a new optics, a new way of seeing. Instead of the “unsatisfactory or disjointed” 
depictions of space in painting up to the mid-15th century, Brunelleschi presented an 
integrated, rationalized whole: the mirror served as a picture plane, a flat surface, on 
which the eyes could rest to take in optical perspective and visually give pause to attest 
to the convergence of parallel lines. The mirror was a visual aid towards integrating the 
implicit disparate “perspectivities” of individual ocular saccades into a unified whole—
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what Foucault might call a rationalization of the disorder of our impressions (Foucault, 
2002: 77). The mirror allows the eye “to quiet down so it can listen”—to stop moving, so 
it can see: by short-circuiting the eye’s “restlessness”, i.e. its continual adjustment of 
binocular parallax and the reflex accommodation resulting from saccadic ocular 
movement, the eyes get to see what the lines are doing on the picture plane.73 Once the 
eye’s incessant “darting to and fro” is stopped, and the head held motionless by fixing 
the gaze unto the mirror, the eyes can see that orthogonals do converge and thereby 
begin to realize that the “I” is here and that the “there” can be spatially rationalized 
from “here” as an independent coherent whole. The stilled eye allows for the 
establishment of a direct geometric correspondence between the external world of 
nature and the internal world of the mind as projected into the eye and mapped out 
imagistically "in the brain". The stilled eye lays the foundation not only for the logical 
two-way, reciprocal correspondence between the pictorial representations of objects 
and the locations of those objects in space as a projection but situates the spectator in 
relation to those objects according to a knowable and repeatable, geometrically-correct 
reciprocal correspondence between the pictorial representation of objects and the 
spectator. This is what formally constitutes the knower-known relation at its most 
fundamental.74 
Leon Battista Alberti in his Della pittura of 1435-36. His technique, the 
costruzione legittima, would prove to be his biggest achievement and serve as the best 
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 This is the visualization which is at the foundation of projective geometry and will be discussed in 
upcoming pages. 
74
 In terms of cinematic projection, the technologically built-in perspective of the cinematic apparatus 
imposes an order appropriated from the world and offers this appropriation to others thus robbing them 
of their subjectivity. 
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method for producing perspective on a flat panel for generations (Ivins, 1938: p. 14). 
“Whatever its debt to Brunelleschi, this treatise is the starting point of much of later 
Renaissance artistic theory and practice.” (Grayson 1963: 14) Alberti’s stroke of genius 
was the establishment of the picture plane perpendicular to the ground so as to slice 
through the pyramid of vision. Although, to say that Alberti “demonstrated for the first 
time a complete understanding of the primary geometry, i.e. the relationship between 
spectator, picture plane and object and the resulting visual array formed by projection 
lines intersecting the picture plane” (Dubery and Willats, 1972: 53) is perhaps to be 
overly generous. Alberti had based his solution to the problem of perspective “upon the 
simplest kind of practical ingenuity.” Through his research-creation75 project of boxing 
perspective, he was able to “determine correctly the intervals of recession of the 
transversals in relation to a chosen distance point.” (Grayson, 1964: 17) From Alberti’s 
demonstration we can see that his perspective method provides coherence and gives 
relational order to that which appears on the picture plane within a frame from a 
singular point of view: the perspector or point of perspective. What Alberti had done is 
“discovered that, pictorially at least, form and position were functions of each other, 
and thus were relative and not constant, and also that there could be no statement of 
position in three-dimensional space in anything short of a three- or four-term relation.” 
(Ivins, 1938: 32)  
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 In his piece on Alberti, Grayson tries to figure out Alberti’s terminology and method simply from the 
translation of the text. Because the pamphlet has no drawings, in order for it to reveal its insights, the 
reader must construct the perspective box that Alberti created. This is something that Ivins did in 1938 
and as a result his observations and conclusions are that much more insightful. 
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Although it would appear that producing a correct perspective drawing of a 
scene in front of a painter is the most obvious thing in the world to do—in that if he 
goes to the nearest window he can simply trace the lines of the world outside his 
window in correct perspective, it was not done in the 15th century because the 
technology had not been invented to produce a pane of glass big enough, flat enough or 
clear enough to do it! Technologically, to create a flat piece of clear glass was a difficult, 
if not impossible, undertaking; it would have to be made from a blown piece, cut, laid 
flat and then polished by hand and then there was no guarantee that the glass would be 
clear—and definitely not of optical quality. In the early 15th century, windows of any size 
would be manufactured out of small pieces of flat glass assembled with H-sectioned 
lead cames as in the Gothic stained-glass windows or out of circular pieces of blown 
glass bull’s eyes as depicted on Van Eyck’s The Arnolfini Wedding (1432), The 
Annunciation (1434) or The Madonna of Chancellor Rolin (1435). So the idea of the pane 
of glass window as the support for a drawing of perspective was not a likely prospect at 
that time. Alberti had predicated his theory on a window (fenestra) as an easily 
understandable location of the perpendicular intersectional picture plane bounded by a 
frame. It had to be orthogonal to the scene at hand and somewhat above it. In Alberti’s 
words, “I inscribe a quadrangle of right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to 
be an open window through which I see what I want to paint.” And instead of a pane of 
glass Alberti uses a quasi-transparent scrim or veil—a screen: “Nothing can be found, so 
I think, which is more useful than that veil which among my friends I call an intersection. 
It is a thin veil, finely woven, dyed whatever colour pleases you and with larger threads 
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[marking out] as many parallels as you prefer. This veil I place between the eye and the 
thing seen, so the visual pyramid penetrates through the thinness of the veil” (Alberti, 
1980: 68).76 By placing the veil, i.e. by inserting the picture plane across the cone of 
vision, the representation on the screen will create a strict formal relational network 
between the elements on the plane and within the frame relative to the viewer, and it is 
in this way that Deleuze can assert in The Fold (1993) that “the screen makes something 
issue from chaos”77 (Deleuze, 1993: 76). “This relation alone furnishes the law, the certa 
ratio78 that henceforth exists between all the elements in the representation. The 
representation implies an immanent rationality based on the possibility of relating each 
element to the others and to the whole. The painting is a representation endowed with 
the force of a sanction, permitting one to “know” each element as a relational element 
in the whole that one “sees””79 (Hallyn, 1997: 68-69). And the perspective which is 
established as that which one knows through that which one sees is the singularly 
coherent point of view which renders the world objective to an individual subjectivity. 
In 1505, the French diplomat and man of letters Jean Pelèrin dit le Viator in his 
De Artificiali Perspectiva took Alberti’s method and improved upon it by establishing 
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 Very much like a rear projection system, indeed! 
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 Although Deleuze states this in a more general sense, his metaphor originates in Alberti. As will be seen 
later, the relation between monadic substance, the fold, the window and the screen as discussed in 
Deleuze’s The Fold and in Heidegger’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1988) is not lost on the 
author. 
78
 The precise relation. Interestingly, in Ethics, II, p13 Spinoza determines the essence of a body by a certa 
ratio motus et quietis which Ramond translates as a ‘precise relation of movement and rest.’ Duffy, 
Simon. The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity, and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. Ashgate 
New Critical Thinking in Philosophy. Aldershot and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. P.137 
79
 Curiously, Hallyn brings out the immanent relationality between the elements on the plane but fails to 
grasp that the immanence of the relation also encompasses the viewer and the world beyond the screen. 
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distance points80 on the horizon based on the convergence of parallel diagonals to a 
single point. This not only allowed the correct depiction of depth recession but also 
established three point perspective i.e. two lateral vanishing points and one central 
vanishing point. Where Alberti’s was an intuitive and arbitrary method, Viator’s 
demonstrates a “more considerable effort of geometrical imagination and knowledge” 
(Ivins, 1938: 27). Viator’s diagrams demonstrate a richer comprehension of the method 
and a more abstract understanding of the relations inherent in perspective. His most 
important realizations are that “his center point and his two distance points are located 
on a line at the level of the eye, and that his two distance points are “equedistans du 
suiect: plus prochains en presente, et plus esloignez en distant veue.81”” (Ivins, 1938: 
27) As a result, Viator’s diagrams are deemed to be believable, naturalistic and optically 
correct. Although there are significant differences between Alberti’s and Viator’s 
schemes, both methods produce almost identical results: where Alberti’s lateral 
distance points do not concur with the point of intersection of parallel diagonals, Viator 
uses the point of convergence of parallel diagonals as the point of perspective to 
generate the optically correct and rationalised position of foreshortened depth parallels. 
As a method of depicting pictorial perspective, Alberti’s costruzionne legittima is well 
and good but geometrically Viator’s is more legit: Viator makes recourse to the 
convergence of parallel lines as the premise for the correct pictorial depiction of 
recession thereby presenting a more coherent statement of perspective in the optical 
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plane. By relying on distance, Alberti’s method is metrical and intuitive and remains 
based on the compass and straightedge methods of Euclidian geometry, whereas 
Viator’s construction is based on the straightedge alone82 and is only fully explainable in 
projective geometry i.e. why we can say that parallel lines converge in infinity. As such, 
Viator’s constructions “work” and the expression of the convergence of parallels at 
distance points on the horizon lays down the foundations for French architect, engineer 
and mathematician Girard Desargues (1591-1661) to present the most generalized 
description of geometrical thought in terms of projective geometry. 
* * * 
Perspective allows one to establish the optical concordance between that which 
offers itself visually to the lens of the eye and its supposed opthalmic projection onto 
the back of the eye according to a rational, determinate, knowable relation that can be 
geometrically ascertained and thereby depicted pictorially. As a pictorial method, 
perspective allows the draughtsman to depict that which offers itself visually to him in a 
way that corresponds to the opthalmic projective transformative83 mapping which can 
be paired with the image as an ordered, coherent and integrated whole created in the 
mind and which concurs consistently, and repeatably i.e. habitually, with the intuited 
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 Although every depiction of the workings of perspective presents a black and white tiled floor pattern it 
has been presented by modern scholars as a perverse preoccupation by Renaissance painters and 
geometers with tiled floor panels rather than as a very effective demonstration of convergence of 
parallels and the depiction of depth recession on a 2-D plane. The ability to create the tiled floor pattern 
using only a ruler can also be seen as the construction of the coordinate grid for affine geometry. 
Reference to the construction in the Real Projective Plane 
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 Opthalmic projection onto the retina is transformative in that it maps 3 dimensions onto 2. 
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metrical84 geometry created by sensori-motor interaction with objects in the world. And 
contrary to what is usually said about perspective creating a dualisitic binary 
relationship between knower and known85, we propose an alternate interpretation of 
this duality and say that the knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the subject 
and object create each other simultaneously as a reciprocal-ordering pair: the subjective 
pole and the objective pole emerge concurrently as the immanent subjectivity of 
perspective. Perspective short-circuits the rational and undermines conscious 
understanding by the homotopic presentation of the world through its transformational 
mapping because once one sees in terms of perspective, it is very difficult to undo—
primarily, because of the geometrical correspondence between the “somagonic”86 
metricality and the optical as opthalmically correct: once you “get” perspective there’s 
no turning it off to “unget” it—the experimentation with pictorial representation in 
painting over the last two centuries could be said to represent the struggle to undo the 
coercive perspectival stranglehold on vision. This means that in the “intervention of the 
understanding” there is a double bind: on the one hand we have perspective as a 
representational device and, on the other, we have perspective as an optical model 
which rationalizes vision by giving it order. Like Molière’s Bourgeois gentilhomme (1670) 
who was unaware of speaking in prose, most of us are not conscious that we are seeing 
“perspectivally”—when we see a pictorial image that does not conform to the 
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perspectival schema, we feel that it is wrong87—yet, perspective as such does not exist 
in the world. Is the perspectival schema a description, an explanation, a representation, 
or bodily experience?88 
Implicit in the expression of the uniocular, static perspectival gaze is the 
reconciliation of the opposing theories of intromission and extromission of light rays as 
cause of vision. In terms of perspective, the ophthalmic geometry of the eye presents 
light rays to the retina according to specific geometric rules, but the establishment of 
the uniocular point of view of perspectival vision invokes the necessity to still the eye to 
create the subjectivity which allows for the composition of order and coherence to the 
seen/scene and concurrently allows for the phenomena of nature to present themselves 
to the eye in a geometrically coherent fashion: the parts of the whole as an integrated 
system “have no relevant properties independent of one another.” Thus, we can also 
affirm an organicist take on optical perspective as a system whose specific totality 
“conditions the mode of being of its parts according to the internal logic of its own 
coherence.” (Hallyn, 1997: 17)  
Perspective allows us to depict the world in a way that corresponds to the 
integrated opthalmic projective transformative mapping which can be paired with the 
image created in the mind and which concurs consistently, reliably and repeatably with 
the intuited geometry created by the body’s sensori-motor interaction with things in the 
world. It allows us to bring physical experience to the mind and back again. Perspectivist 
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88
 At this point this will remain a rhetorical question and will be addressed in the section post-Kepler. 
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knowledge is not only knowledge of perspectivist phenomena—as the rationalization of 
sight, perspective serves as the primary (technological) gateway for the expression of 
correspondence from the outside to the inside and vice-versa. It creates and closes the 
loop between the visual, the mind and the body. In a visual sense, “the boldness of the 
perspectivist paradigm consists precisely in presenting this controlled access to the 
world as the real possibility of a valid rationalism embracing human experience.” 
(Hallyn, 1997: 69) Perspective becomes a transductive89 process whose axiomatic 
veracity is based upon the duality expressed in incidence90: in the symmetrical relation 
between lines and points, in the strict correspondence between a pencil and a range, 
the intromission and extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality 
emerging from the perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a 
point. In the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point 
onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the “there”, the 
duality of perspective states that they are both the same and simultaneously 
reciprocally created. 
* * * 
In 1604, Kepler published the Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena quibus Astronomiae 
Pars Optica traditur (Optics: Paralipomena to Witelo and the Optical Part of Astronomy) 
in which he developed the doctrine of optical perspective of the Polish Scholastic 
theologian, natural philosopher and mathematician Erazmus Ciolek Witelo (b. ca. 
1230—d. bet. 1280 and 1314). “It began as an attempt to give astronomical optics a 
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 As the concept of projective geometry 
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solid foundation, but soon transcended this narrow goal to become a complete 
reconstruction of the theory of light, the physiology of vision, and the mathematics of 
refraction.” (Donahue: 2010) One of Kepler’s big mathematical achievements in this 
book was his presentation of the conic sections as “different manifestations of a single 
curve,” (O’Leary, 2010: 299) and from there to formulate a theory of continuity. This 
was laid out in a chapter entitled “On Conic Sections” where he points out “that a plane 
section of a cone can be a straight line, a parabola, a hyperbola, or an ellipse, and that 
“a straight line goes over into a parabola through infinite hyperbolas, and through 
infinite ellipses into a circle.”” (Rosenfeld p. 744) The manifestation of different curves 
from one conic section can be intuitively seen from the reconstruction of a figure from 
its two projections. The most widely known example is the reconstruction of an ellipse 
cut from a cone of revolution as performed and illustrated by Dürer. (Coolidge, 1940: 
111) This can also be deduced from geometric construction: if we construct a parabola 
with compass and straightedge91 (or an ellipse or hyperbola), and play with the position 
of what Kepler termed the focus, or foci,92 we end up with a way of describing conic 
curves according to the position of the focus and a directrix. But more elegantly, this can 
also be shown by combining the theories of conics as laid out by Apollonius with the 
perspectival representation of the conic sections. If we again construct an ellipse with 
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 The parabola is thus constructed as the locus of points defined by the intersection of concentric circles 
with center at F and radius r, and lines parallel with the directrix L, at a distance equal to r from L. (Holme, 
Audun. Geometry: Our Cultural Heritage, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010 p.337) 
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 Most everyone translates the word focus from Latin as hearth and invokes the parallel with parabolic 
“burning mirrors” and reject by omission the reference to the sun as the divine fire which was held with 
religious awe by the Ancient Greeks  and lauded with such titles as Hearth of the Universe, Tower of Zeus 
and Throne of Zeus. Guthrie, W.K.C. (1962) “Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,” in A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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compass and straightedge and map it out onto a perspective plane with one central 
vanishing point (the one with the black and white tiled floor), through projection we end 
up with an ellipse. And if we pursue this construction method with the hyperbola, we 
end up with one branch laid out on the projective plane which extends to the horizon, 
i.e. into infinity, as one half of an ellipse and the other branch engulfing us from behind 
as the other half of the ellipse whose second focus resides within us as the corollary 
projective point to the polar at infinity before us. (Stillwell, 2010: 138)  
From Kepler’s ophthalmic investigations on refraction and vision, he was able to 
demonstrate by using glass globes filled with fluid—much like the vitreous humour of 
the eye—that light rays which traverse the eye converge at a single point through the 
action of a lens. And contrary to Alhazen and Galen, who believed that the image was 
formed on the lens of the eye, Kepler concluded that the image was formed on the 
retina but laterally reversed and vertically inverted. Once on the retina, the image was 
transmitted to the brain via the optic nerve to the sensus communis (the common 
sense) in the brain93 but how that happens, according to Kepler, is no longer a problem 
of optics or the physicist’s concern but for the physiologists to figure out94. (Xuan Thuan, 
2008: 66-67) “Kepler looked upon any source of light as a collection of luminous points, 
from each of which, as from a little star, rectilinear rays shot out in all directions. Such of 
these rays as entered our eye formed a divergent cone having its vertex in the star point 
and its base in the pupil of the eye. As these rays passed through the inner structure of 
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 In Descartes, the theatre of the mind takes place in the pineal gland because it is shared by both 
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the normal eye, they were all refracted so that they reassembled at a single point on the 
retina. In so doing they formed a second convergent cone, which likewise had its base in 
the pupil of the eye but its vertex in a point on the retina. These two divergent and 
convergent cones, back to back, so to say, coupled with the punctiform analysis of 
luminosity, provided the essential structures in Kepler’s theory of vision.” (Rosen, 1975: 
282) Thus, the line segment which extends from the focal point of the ray emanating 
from the light source and traverses orthogonally the lens of the eye to focus on the 
retina creates “two ends of the line as meeting in infinity so that the line has the 
structure of a circle.” (Kline, 1972: 290) In modern mathematical parlance one would say 
that the 1-D projective line—the one from the drawings in perspective extending to the 
vanishing point on the horizon, defined as a line segment R plus a point at infinity95—
will come to be defined as the space of 1-D subspaces in 2-D space so that a straight line 
can be extended on both ends, i.e. to +∞ “forwards” before us and to –∞ “backwards” 
behind us, where they eventually meet, to reconcile the two extremities at infinity so 
that the line has the structure of a circle of infinite radius.96 This in turn will allow the 
definition of the real projective plane RP2 as the space of 1-D subspaces in 3-D space, as 
a plane plus a projective line.97 Thus, through the principle of duality, the projective line 
is seen as all the 1-D sub-spaces, i.e. the 2-D pencil of lines through the origin, and the 
projective plane will be seen as the projection of the 3-D pencil of lines through the 
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 This states that the 1-D projective line—the one from the drawings in perspective extending to the 
vanishing point on the horizon, can be defined as a line segment R plus a point at infinity. 
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 Although I am trying to build a linear exposé and build the argument chronologically, it is difficult to 
bring out the significance of some of the concepts without taking flash-forward liberties to mathematical 
ideas which were only discovered later.  
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origin in 2-D space98: this projection was not only of importance to Kepler but to 
Descartes as well as it allows the transference from scale-invariant 3-D coordinates in 
non-metrical projective space to ordinary Cartesian 2-D coordinates: is this not a 
“generalized expression” of what happens in the eye?—it allows for the 
transformational mapping—i.e. establishes the correspondence—between general 
projective geometry and metrical algebraic geometry; optical perspective, as subsidiary 
and explainable by projective geometry, can now also be mathematized.99 But all this 
would only be able to be fully expressed in the 19th century; the 20th century will see this 
presented afresh through differential geometry and topology, but the proposition of 
mapping a 3-D space onto a 2-D plane remains essentially the same.   
Kepler’s discoveries, however, found relevance in the 17th century: his work on 
conics proved to be invaluable in that they would be of use to Desargues in the 
development of projective geometry and to Fermat, Descartes to unify algebra and 
geometry in terms of coordinate algebra and for Leibniz and Newton to formulate the 
calculus and redefine mechanics. The geometrical conceptions developed by Kepler, 
particularly those on conics and continuity, would now be able to be expressed 
mathematically by Descartes through co-ordinate geometry and the ensuing analytical 
algebra as “the identification of the algebraic correlation with the geometrical locus.” 
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(Whitehead, 1958: 88) Thus that the idea of form as expressed through its loci (i.e. 
straight lines, circles, ellipses, etc) could be expressed in terms of ordered co-ordinate 
correlation and general algebraic expressions between variables. In the Cartesian 
coordinate system, the general form of the conics is ax2+2hxy+by2+2gx+2fy+c=0 so that 
the “equation of every conic section can always be put into this shape.” (Whitehead, 
1958: 104) This not only “relates together geometry, which started as the science of 
space, and algebra, which has its origin in the science of number” (Whitehead, 1958: 84) 
but fuses the entirety of the conic system into an aggregate of discrete points. This 
innovation ties in nicely with the new corpuscular theory of matter and the mechanical 
philosophy. Thus, we now have a geometrical method and an algebraic numerical 
method as the basis for the understanding, description and expression of conics where 
any section or non-degenerate slice “represents reconstructing the parent cone.” 
(Kendig, 2005: 3) In both of these methods, the plane cutting the cone becomes a 
“screen,” a projection giving a particular view of the conic.100 In the fist, by moving the 
foci, we can slide from one conic section to the next, from one view to the next, and see 
in the continuous deformation the extensive non-metrical manifestation of continuity: 
we can plastically deform a conic curve from a circle, to a parabola, to an ellipse, to a 
hyperbola as equivalent representations of the parent cone. “From the standpoint of 
screens, they’re simply different views of the same thing.” (Kendig, 2005: 3) Similarly, 
we can say that the general algebraic expression of the conics provides the same 
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function and thus, both methods of expressing the relation between the parent cone 
and the continuity in extension of the subsidiary curves allow one to take an easy 
abductive leap to be able to state metaphorically that these two methods represent 
diagrammatic expressions of “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which 
each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza Ethics I D5) where 
attribute is the essence of substance (Spinoza Ethics I P19 D) and essence is the 
expression of being in substance: substance manifests its essence as being through an 
infinite number of attributes each expressing an aspect of its being.101 Mathematically 
speaking, perspective becomes a transductive102 process whose axiomatic veracity is 
based upon the duality expressed in incidence103: in the symmetrical relation between 
lines and points, in the strict correspondence between a pencil and a range, the 
intromission and extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality 
emerging from the perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a 
point. In the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point 
onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the “there”, the 
duality of perspective states that they are both the same and simultaneously 
reciprocally created. 
Although the fold of the Baroque as an ontological notion emerges out of 
Renaissance optics and mathegraphies, the development in full of its implications will 
only be able to be expressed through the understanding of projective geometry as a 
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generalized form of geometry. Girard Desargues (1591-1661), a French mathematician 
and engineer, friend of Descartes, Fermat and Pascal, published a pamphlet on 
perspective, Brouillon project d'une atteinte aux evenemens des rencontres du cone avec 
un plan, which laid the groundwork for projective geometry. In it, Desargues “shows 
that the visual convergence of parallel lines is the logically necessary result of the 
geometrical definitions of point, line, and plane, in terms of each other, devoid of and 
prior to all metrical assumptions” (Ivins, 1964: 89). In terms of the ontological quantum 
leap of the Baroque described in The Fold, the key phrase in this quote is "devoid of and 
prior to all metrical assumptions" for this expression as presented through Desargues' 
Theorem is what allows the Deleuzian fold to take hold.  
 
Fig. 1 Desargues' Theorem as a Fold. In Hilbert, D. Geometry and the 
Imagination. 1952 
The theorem states: "Two triangles ABC and A'B'C' in space being given, let them 
be so placed that the lines connecting corresponding vertices pass through a single point 
O. Then the three pairs of corresponding sides have points of intersection, R, S, and T, 
and these points of intersection are, moreover, collinear" (Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen, 
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1952: 121). To derive an ontology based on two triangles, a point, and an additional line 
called the directrix, as per the figure is almost unfathomable but this is what provides 
the rationale for the fold.  
If we take point O as the eye of the observer, and the two triangles ABC and 
A'B'C' to be perspectival images projected through O, external reality is projected 
perspectivally inwards, represented here as triangle ABC, and the corresponding image 
created within as A'B'C'. For the sake of empirical coherence, correspondence and 
consistency as a foundation of rationality, needs to be a homotopic mapping of external 
reality subject to the strictures of perspectivism and thereby remain a valid 
representation of external reality—the internal image must conform with the external 
as corroborated by the pictorial image that substantiates it conformally. Given a focus, 
i.e. a point of attention, and an observer, i.e. a subjective point of view, the directrix is 
the axis of symmetry which defines the validity and guides the integration of the 
internal perspectival projection. "Subjectivation is created by folding" (Deleuze, 
1988a:104): the fold is the expression of the directive subjective agency between the 
"retinal" image impressed inwards and its projected correspondence and concurrence 
with the perception image created in the mind as a monad—it is an individuation inside 
the individuation considered as an individualization. It is what holds together the 
concordance between the image of the exterior and its internal manifestation as a 
perception image as a memory image. The directrix as the hinge of the fold, as the apex 
of the crease, as an axis separating two instances of the same perspectival projection, 
acts simultaneously as a hinge and as origin of the separating fissure; it serves as the 
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"linking factor" (Deleuze, 1988a: 65)104  between the two projections, "between matter 
and soul, the façade and the closed room, the outside and the inside" (Deleuze, 1993: 
35). The void as a zone of indeterminacy hides the process between that which is 
projected onto the back of the eye and the creative integration of the screen as the 
concept. The void between the two projections is not empty; it is full of folds (Deleuze, 
1993:36) and is imbued with "infinite comprehension: it "envelops the infinite" (Deleuze 
1993: 49) as a multiplicity: it is filled with the myriad folds of other projections 
constituting other retinal "cepts" which are tied to the directrix of subjectivity as 
integrative. "It is a world of captures instead of closures" (Deleuze 1993: 81). The folds 
within the fold as implicated projections define each other within the process of 
becoming as an actual entity different from its constituent components and 
immediately go on to become the objective data for a new becomings. In Whitehead’s 
organic philosophy of process, this is what constitutes the prehension and the object-
subject-superject flow of relation within the event as an actual occasion as constitutive 
of the process of "continual relinking which takes place over the irrational break or the 
crack" (Deleuze, 1988: 65). 
Most "everyone" understands what we see as that which is imprinted on the 
retina: vision is traditionally understood as a Cartesian mechanical process expressed in 
terms of a linear causal chain consisting of object—waves—lens—retina—nerve 
impulses—brain activity within a passively percipient subject. Therefore, this conception 
of the image takes as a given the visual impression as pre-constituted: it lands on the 
                                                          
104
 Deleuze states in Foucault that the void is the 'linking factor'. 
142 
 
retina's surface as a planar whole—the external world as that which we see because 
that is what is imprinted on the retina. But as was discussed in chapter 2, that which we 
"see" is not that which we see: if we still our head and look out into the world, we see 
the world; but if we move our eyes, the world remains static as the eyes dart about—we 
do not see "that which is imprinted on the retina" as the eyes take in the scene! If we 
saw "that which is imprinted on the retina" then the world would be a succession of 
swish pans and not the coherent vision of the world as a screen upon which our eyes 
can wander as the "stabilized" immersive concept as the that which appears before us. 
This implies that the impression on the retina, triangle ABC is not what we see; what we 
"see", triangle A'B'C', is a (re)collection and a (re)membering of the various ocular 
wanderings as graspings, of ABC "cepts" brought together and assembled as a 
conceptual whole—this reveals vision as a screen as a reconstitutive and integrative 
memorial process which guided by the directrix "retains its irreducible point of view. It is 
the accord of singular points of view, or harmony, that will replace universal 
complication" (Deleuze, 1993:24). The memory image emerges out of the chaos, with 
the imperceptible infinite celerity of becoming with the intervention of the screen as an 
integrative catch all. Without the screen, "Chaos would be a pure Many, a purely 
disjunctive diversity, while the something is a One, not a pregiven unity, but instead the 
indefinite article that designates a certain singularity. How can the Many become the 
One? A great screen has to be placed in between them" (Deleuze, 1993: 76). 
This impression of focused luminous energy which is projected inwards is not a 
mirror image of the world and neither is it a planar whole taken in as such, but an 
143 
 
inverted and reversed projection. The world exists spatially for our stereoptic eyes as a 
3-D scale-invariant projective conception which reconciles binocular disparity maps 
itself conformally as the Cyclopean 2-D plane, as a flat image, so that even if the 
information of the third co-ordinate appears to be lost in the transformative 2-D 
mapping, the 'fixed' geometry of the eye as a constant105 provides us with spatial depth 
intuitions which are cybernetically learned in conjunction with other senses and which 
remain stable over time. Thus, we have a mapping of the 3-D world as a 2-D image 
which in turn is projected, i.e. cast backwards and inwards, to create the perceptual 
image as an impression which can be grasped and made available for storage, i.e. 
integrated as a memory image, under the regulatory guidance of the directrix as a 
faculty. But given the concept of continuity from Kepler—the space of 1-D subspaces in 
2-D space so that a straight line can be extended on both ends ( to +∞ “forwards” 
before us and to –∞ “backwards” behind us, where they eventually meet, as a 
reconciliation of the two extremities at infinity so that the line has the structure of a 
circle of infinite radius)—where at the juncture of the two extremities we have a 
laterally reversed and vertically inverted image, do we not have as resultant an imagistic 
Moebius strip? Which if we extend laterally gives us a Klein surface to satisfy the 
strictures of the extensive continuum as a monadic closed surface of infinite extent? 
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 The retina as a local projective plane, as the totality of all 1-D subspaces of a 3-D space is the projective 
plane for all lines through the origin (the lens) in 3-D space is the same as the plane z=1 (where the eye's 
constant geometry constitutes the unitary measure) allows the transformation of homogeneous 
projective coordinates (including those at infinity) into finite Euclidian coordinates as constituent of the 




Fig. 2 Klein Bottle or Surface. From 
http://scientifik.tumblr.com/search/klein+bottle 
A more formal way of expressing this would be to say that we develop the 
connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a closed surface (Hilbert and Cohn-
Vossen, 1952: 313-324). In this way, we have "an outside, more distant than any 
exterior, [which] is 'twisted', 'folded' and 'doubled' by an Inside that is deeper than any 
interior, and alone creates the possibility of the derived relation between the interior 
and the exterior" (Deleuze, 1988a: 110). This affords us another interpretation of the 
Latin plicare, which we have been reading as fold but which is also legitimately 
translatable as twist. This surface has no inside or outside, has no discontinuity and has 
no windows. Thus, "the general topology of thought, which had already begun 'in the 
neighborhood' of the particular features, now ends up in the folding of the outside into 
the inside: 'in the interior of the exterior and inversely' "(Deleuze, 1988a: 118).  
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* * * 
In terms of becoming one with the screen of cinema as a production of a fold, 
the cinema as a medium makes the spectacle as fold-friendly as possible. By feeding the 
eyes static frames that are actually only alive in terms of novelty only 25% of the time, 
the brain has lots of time to sit back and enjoy the film's unfolding.106 Depending on 
where we sit in the cinema and how one prefers to enjoy the screening, because of the 
constant screen-size to spectator relation, the cinema frame presents us with images 
that are already "chunked" and easy to digest; most often, the eyes can remain static on 
the screen so that the projected image cast inwards is much the same image as that of 
the inner screen: there is very little chaos to contend with and lots of time to 
"appreciate the variation" in the difference and repetition of one frame and the next. 
Yet our relation of oneness with the screen is topologically maintained as just described 
so that "if the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, between them there is 
a topological relation: the relation to oneself is homologous to the relation with the 
outside and the two are in contact, through the intermediary of the strata which are 
relatively external environments (and therefore relatively internal) (Deleuze, 1988a: 
119). 
* * * 
Our interpretation of the fold as based on the articulation of optical perspective, 
projective geometry and the topological expansion of the projective plane into a 
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 If the film is running at 24 frames per second, and half the time is spent in darkness, and the same 
frame is shown twice, a new frame is being dealt with only 25% of the time; a second 25% is only 
affirmative repetition of that which has been seen and as such requires limited comparative crunching. 
The remaining 50% is blackness. 
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continuous one-sided surface is that which allows Deleuze to develop the concept of the 
fold. Unfortunately my limited, intuitive grasp of the mathematics and its pidgin 
articulation do not do full justice to the topic at hand but it is my contention that this is 
what is operative. Deleuze's Fold fits into a “mathematics as ontology” scheme and its 
mode of expression relies on different aspects of the mathematical ideas presented 
above to express its unfolding: there is a mathematical/geometrical system as its basis 
and an ontology founded on its metaphoric interpretation.107  
Deleuze deals with memory cursorily in Foucault (1988a) and The Fold (1993). In 
Foucault, memory is engaged with overtly but cursively in the "Foldings or the Inside of 
Thought" chapter. In Foucault, Deleuze refers to "a taste for trips down memory lane" 
and directly refers to the folding or doubling as Memory, as the "real relation to oneself, 
or the affect on self by self" where "time as subject, or rather subjectivation, is called 
memory" (Deleuze, 1988a: 107). If this is tied to "Subjectivation is created by folding" 
(Deleuze, 1988a: 104) and "To think is to fold" (Deleuze, 1988a: 118) it would seem to 
imply memory as folding is temporality's subjectivity as thought—which in itself is a big 
conclusion and something we will look at in our next chapter. Yet, behind the 
mathematics in The Fold, there is a more constant allusion to memory as imagistic 
process and its presence is felt throughout though it is only explicitly mentioned twice in 
the entire book. Chapter 3, "What is Baroque?", contains one of the mentions and 
within this chapter we detect incessant suggestions as to memory as integrative by way 
of references to urbanism "fold after fold, revealing the city" (Deleuze, 1993: 31) and 
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 We have not engaged the concept of the differential in this chapter because it would distract from the 
line of development of imagistic thought.  
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architecture—"For ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a 
sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room" (Deleuze, 1993: 27). 
Anytime one encounters these terms, memory lurks near as integrative of experience. 
When Deleuze mentions the studiolo and compares it to the monad, we can 
immediately connect this to the Memory Theatre of Giulio Camillo (1480-1544) with its 
"many images, and full of little boxes" (Yates, 1992: 136) as a memory system as an 
adaptation of the classical art of memory. "The Studiolo of Florence, with its secret room 
stripped of windows: The monad is a cell. It resembles a sacristy more than an atom: a 
room with neither doors nor windows, where all activity takes place on the inside" 
(Deleuze, 1993: 28). And where the activity is all memory work. As such, the monad is 
where memory work as integration takes place—it is the work which takes place behind 
the façade of faciality as autonomous process of the gazing back which comes to look at 
one in the face as becoming. But Deleuze ratchets it up on the memory front by tying 
the studiolo as reading room to the book as the fold of the Event: "The monad is the 
book or the reading room. The visible and the legible, the outside and the Inside, the 
façade and the chamber are, however, not two worlds, since the visible can be read and 
the legible has its theater" (Deleuze, 1993: 31). And he continues with "emblems"—
another memory idea. The book becomes the reading room as the explicatio of memory 
as event—the book, is an image of memory but one divorced from imagistic thought as 
a container of the imageless epitomes transferred to the printed book and the 'method' 
of memorizing through dialectical order which rejects and forsakes imagination (Yates, 
1992: 230). The monad is the integrative image of the memory of the world. Our next 
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chapter explores the image of the concept as the internal image that organizes memory 
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On the Creation of Image Concepts 
In the last chapter we examined the process of how the "external" becomes 
"internal" in terms of the optical image through the intermediary of the fold and posited 
the screen as the integrative composite of perception as the Concept. As part of the 
process as perceptive, the Concept is not like that which we normally consider a 
concept. However, the way the concept has come to be understood as part of the 
tradition of thought which considers memory as imagistic process is quite informative of 
the dynamics of integration within the internal Concept.  Thus, in this chapter, we look 
at how the development of memory images led to the creation of image concepts in the 
service of rhetoric by way of pictorial Renaissantist mnemonic devices called imagines 
agentes. We then seek to show how these give rise or contribute to such important 
concepts in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari as the machinic assemblage, the 
constitution of territorialization, the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of 
consistency and the plane of immanence. One will also be able to see emerge an 
interesting processual correspondence between the workings of the internal screen and 
the external image of the world: even if both types of images are seen as different in 
nature—to wit, the internal workings will inform the understanding of the external and 
vice versa in a way that echoes the ritornello of the operational unity of the universe as 
part of the mnemonic tradition in terms of an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation 
of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the 
parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, of the outside and the inside: "As above, 
so below".  
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* * * 
In the Middle Ages, the arts of memory shifted from the rhetoric to ethical 
considerations (Yates, 2000: 69) where they were principally put to work in the service 
of religion for the support of ecclesiastical oratory in order to organize and expound on 
the virtues and vices. In the Summa Theologiae (1265–1274), St. Thomas Aquinas 
presented an extensive study of memory as incorporating a moralising interpretation of 
the rules of memory its foundations but which still kept the old Latin precepts presented 
in the Ad Herennium. He proposed four precepts for memory: similitude, a considered 
order, solicitude108 and affection, and frequent meditation—these in turn are rendered 
as images, loci, sympathy and habit/repetition (Yates, 2000: 85). But when memory is 
enlisted into the service of Christianity and dons a pietistic teleology, memory goes 
beyond the moral dimension given to it by the Roman rhetors and acquires both a 
directed dynamism to the cohesiveness required for its integration and a telic dimension 
which as part of the neutral rhetorical techniques it never had as part of its constitution. 
The acquisition of a moralistic teleology gives memory intentio109 which provides it with 
a teleological drive towards Virtue and the Good Life and thus makes it an inherently 
active and directed striving, whereas in the Latin Ars Memoria, movement was simply 
                                                          
108
 Yates ascribes Aquinas' replacement of solitude by solicitude to simple error. I believe it is part of a 
larger project by Aquinas to integrate the ideas of the Stoics into his thought. Solicitude fits in with an 
etiology of sympathy advocated by the Stoics and particularly by Posidonius. 
109
 Sympathy and intentio are both derived from the Stoic philosophy of Posidonius (135 BCE- 51? BCE) 
and possibly absorbed through the study of Cicero's writings or through Neo-Platonism, a philosophy to 
which he was considered to be the first proponent. He is considered to be "a visual thinker, the defender 
of monism, the proponent of the doctrines of cosmic sympathy and vitalism," and in these respects he can 
be seen as a precursor to Bergsonian and Deleuzian thought. In his etiologies, Posidonius ascribes first 
cause to teleology. In his view of things, "God pervades the world; the passions follow the leadership of 
rational insight; man is here to contemplate and act." Edelstein, Ludwig. Entry on Posidonius. The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy vol. 6 Logic to Psychologism. New York: Macmilan Publishing Co. & The Free 
Press. 1972. p. 413-414) 
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provided by the pedestrian translation from one locus to the next. Its "solicitous" aspect 
aligns it with an etiological sympathy which as an expression of associative similitudes is 
constitutive of the body. 
For Aquinas, as was for the Ad Herennium, artificial memory is perfected through 
its two traditional aspects, namely loci and imagines, which according to Yates, when 
harnessed in the service of piety are transformed into "corporeal similitudes", they can 
provide striking memory images as vices and virtues which can be readily cognizable as 
human characters with human bodies. In the service of pietism, religious orators would 
structure their sermons by using "corporeal forms in which to clothe the spiritual 
intentions which he wished to impress on the souls and memories of his hearers" (Yates, 
2000: 95) and which they called imagines agentes. These mental "images" were invisible 
in that they existed in the memory of its user and worked in accordance with the 
mnemonic dicta of creating interior images that were remarkable or unusual in 
character and which were to be set in striking dramatic situations. These internal 
imagines agentes were "clothed" per accidens110 with pictorial attributes which while 
being unusual could easily be associated to the conceptual make-up of these characters 
and make them more readily remembered. As imagines agentes, they were intended to 
be complete and active, capable of prompting ideas coherently and without vagueness 
so as to allow them to vehicle moving spiritual intentions. The rationale for the use of 
these striking and memorable human-like images can be traced back to the Stoics, and 
specifically to Posidonius' (ca. 135 BCE-51 BCE) fragments on memory: "For I think you 
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 Accidental in terms of being external to the internal causal nexus provided by the essence. 
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have long since observed how people are not frightened or distressed when persuaded 
by reason that some evil is present or approaching them, but only when they get images 
(phantasia) of those things. For how could one excite the irrational by reason, unless 
you present it with a sort of picture (anazographesis) like a visible one?" (Sorabji,  1996-
1997) Originally intended as internal memory images for the oratorical reconstitution of 
sermons by the clergy, the imagenes agentes were externalised as pictorial imagery 
during the Renaissance as part of the movement to secularize knowledge and to 
vulgarize mnemonic techniques during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Once 
outed, pictorial imagenes agentes provided a new way to express a substantive 
consistency of ideas.  
In terms of the Ars Memoriae, the first kind of artificial memory is memoria 
rerum (things); the second kind is memoria verborum (words); and according to Cicero 
'memory for words' is much harder than 'memory for things' (Yates, 2000: 24). A 
memory of things is relatively straightforward because things are visible and as such 
their visual attributes and their location in space in relation to other entities serve the 
function of being able to reconstitute them objectively as images in the mind. But words 
and the "language in which the subject matter is clothed," require a different treatment. 
Obviously, the words we are dealing with are not visual signifiers such as "tree" but 
abstract idea-words which can only be appreciated intellectually and which have no 
programmatic or emotional content. The obvious word to use here is "concept", but we 
have to keep in mind that the word "concept" did not enter into use in the English 
language until 1591 (and only as a variation of the word "conceit") from the late Latin 
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conceptus and concipere, derived from capere, to take—which brings us back to 
perceive as grasping, so that the concept is that which allows the creation of a mental 
subjective/objective relation to an ideatic conception of that which is grasped and 
possibly grasps in return111. Thus through the pictorial depiction of these imagenes 
agentes as corporeal beings, concepts as mental entities understood by their 
components are made graspable, perceivable, as objective visual formations which 
could be perceived in their entirety, so that a concept such as Gramatica (see Fig. 1 
below) would be represented as a human being dressed up with all its conceits as a 
memory image from which an instantaneous, coherent, comprehensive and integrative 
understanding of the concept could be made.  
 
Fig. 1 Johannes Romberch, Gramatica 1533 
                                                          
111
 In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari write "From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, 
Christianity made the impresa the envelope of a "concetto," but the concetto has not yet acquired 
consistency and depends upon the way in which it is figured or even dissimulated" (1994: 92). The 
impresa or seals will be examined later.   
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The rationale for this transformation is a valid one according to Aquinas, 
"because human cognition is stronger in regard to the sensibilia, and therefore 'subtle 
and spiritual things' are better remembered in the soul in corporeal forms." (Yates, 
2000: 85) So for the narrative re-constitution of concepts in oratory, the imagenes 
agentes were adequate as memory images that would allow the (re)membering of all 
the aspects of a concept without necessarily prescribing a strictly defined, rationally 
linear development: they offered a means for the (re)collection of the concept, 
completely and coherently, in all its fullness as a real-time spoken-word (re)cital as the 
performative gesture for its énonciation.  
Although the imagery of the imagines agentes was originally only to be used as a 
mental mnemonic device, it was only to be a matter of time before they were 
"externalized" and presented as pictorial images. Experimentation with the creation of 
imagines agentes to render them more striking and vivid for purposes of memory 
released new possibilities as to "what a body could be" and thereby "what a body could 
do". The portrayal of these 'subtle and spiritual things' as corporeal forms, in terms of 
an accessible vulgate understanding, allowed the laity to (re)member ideas as graspable 
entities and provided them with an intellectually unrestrained creative freedom they 
had never been able to enjoy. And as these figures of initiated learning became more 
widely available, they gave rise to a wildly creative aesthetic output. The wide-spread 
creation and propagation of striking imagery pushed the drive towards the complexified 
narrativization of memory images and provided impetus to the secularization of 
159 
 
knowledge and the emergence of the encyclopaedic movement.112 Although the 
imagenes agentes as conceptual memory images were extremely useful for the revival 
of a laicized Ciceronian oratorical rhetoric which drove the "second wave" of the Italian 
Renaissance in Venice113, they were also instrumental in the furthering of occult thought 
and the natural sciences as well as innovation in the modalities of transmission of 
knowledge. The new graphic expression pushed the envelope of conceptual thought not 
only through the creation of new concepts derived pictorially, but through the release of 
the expressive potential of the image of thought as a sophisticated pictorial means for 
the communication of ideas, procedures and possibilities whose veracity could be easily 
and immediately grasped and directly ascertained by their presence on paper: their 
ideatic power was undeniable. The outlandishness of the imagery in the imagenes 
agentes pushed the limits and expanded the horizon of what could be thought, how it 
could be thought and how it all held together. And in the service of memory as 
expressive of an integrative drive to the understanding of the universe—now in terms of 
"As above, so below"—these inventive ideations acquired a dynamic cosmic dimension 
when they were tied to Cabalistic mysticism and occult Hermetic thought as expressed 
in all aspects of Renaissance natural philosophy as science: mechanics, chymistry, 
                                                          
112
 This secularization of the imagines agentes also spurred the creation of "secret" memory images as 
"occult" visual narratives which revealed all, yet hid everything and served as a covert visual language 
used to express occult teachings and explain alchymical procedures. Unlike the many esoteric images 
illustrative of spiritual processes, the memory seals devised by Giordano Bruno in the late 16th century 
are more diagrammatic than imagistic. The wildly creative and oftentimes erotic memory images were 
one of the reasons for the demise of the Ars Memoriae. The Catholic Church deemed imagines agentes 
too racy for its 
113
 The Venetian Renaissance in contrast to the Florentine Renaissance. The Italian Renaissance (1330-
1550) emerged in Florence and was its cultural centre until the mid 15th century when it was supplanted 
artistically, intellectually, commercially by Venice. 
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astronomy, medicine and mathematics.114 To think of Cabalistic mysticism and occult 
Hermetic thought as minoritary during the High Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the 
Reformation represents a questionable conclusion as an acceptance of the simplistic 
gospel of the Christian Churches as a perverse one-sided victor's rendition.  
So in these imagines agentes we have a new conception for the expression of 
the idea-word, of the concept, as an imagistic object made up of various components 
which together constitute a graspable entity—and central to this "conception" of these 
imagines agentes as corporeal similitudes is the body, so one can speak of a body-idea 
as a representational embodiment of thought. And thus, we end up with a pictorial 
image as an integrated, coherent and graspable whole, something like a perception 
except that the imagine agente before us on paper is a pictorial re-presentation of a 
mental creation and not a perceptual image which is the result of the senses—what 
emerges from these images is what Deleuze and Guattari would call in What is 
Philosophy? a concept. From the example of Gramatica, we can see that an imagine 
agente as an "embodied" pictorial representation of a concept is a multiplicity defined 
by the summary association of its components—it is simultaneously a One and a 
Many—but the sum total is not so much greater, a more than, as it is of a different 
nature than the components: if we mix water and salt, we do not have "more than" or 
"less than" water and salt, but something different: we have brine. The concept itself is 
"incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated" in a body (Deleuze and 
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 Where the imagines agentes came into being in service of the Church as a memory method for 
remembering sermons, they were now being used to transmit secular ideas in new ways divergent from 
Catholic orthodoxy and to develop esoteric  thought which of course ran afoul of the Church. There is also 
a linguistic dimension to these operations which activated categories within grammar as to their 
explicative possibilities in terms of metaphysics. 
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Guattari, 1994: 16) and though the image of Gramatica is literally a human body which 
embodies a concept, Deleuze and Guattari use the term incarnated body as a fleshed-
out idea whose consistency, whose substantiality in terms of a unified matter, 
constitutes a body in the widest sense of the term. The image of Gramatica, for 
example, is "a whole which totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 16) in that its sundry components are fragments of a 
discourse, distinct and separate yet inseparable within itself. "Each concept will 
therefore be considered as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of 
its own components" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 20) which will allow the expression 
of its entirety and completeness. In this respect, "the concept is real without being 
actual, ideal without being abstract" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 22): it exists as such 
as a construct which in itself cannot be ascertained by touch but only by indicating or 
pointing out its agency. It reveals itself through what Deleuze and Guattari, refer to as 
"speaking the event" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 21) where its application as an event 
is the re-collective re-alignment of discourse into a new circuit of becoming according to 
a new set of activated possibilities actualized by the expression of the concept, by its 
enunciation.  
In the move from an internal memory image to an external pictorial image, there 
is a big difference in the way that the consistency of the concept is not only seen but 
conceived and expressed. The first observation that can be made here is the obvious 
establishment of a plane of consistency on the flat panel upon which it is created. By 
virtue of the components being found together on the same surface, the concept as 
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image is coherent, it holds together, by the sheer virtue of existing together on the 
same plane. Further, the components are contained within a frame which serves as a 
container which collects the components and coerces them to co-exist surrounded by a 
border. Thus, the concept as a delimited entity, contained by the frame which 
circumscribes it, defined by the terms held captive by the limiting border, bound 
together by its operative coherence and identified by name all together constitute a 
very cogent expression of what the definition of the concept entails. As a pictorial 
entity, its coherence appears instantly, and as a figure, it can be perceived at once. And 
because the constitutive elements co-exit within the frame there is harmony and 
compatibility, even if it is forced, because sight does attest to their co-existent 
agreement on the pictorial plane.115 The fact that it is pictorial makes it objectile, 
internally harmonious and thus coherent and imbued with (a semblance of) truth value.  
But the imagine agente needs the concept word as an a priori to permit the 
aggregation of components which define the consistency of the concept—its 
endoconsistency—as well as its limits as a horizon in terms of possible association with 
other concepts—its exoconsistency (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 19). This establishes 
the two diametrically-opposed enabling constraints which inform the formation of the 
concept-image: we have the openness of the concept motivated by inclusion and 
tending towards extensive comprehensiveness and then there's the need for correction 
and containment by a rule. The concept as a body is a continual, adaptive reconciliation 
of a meta-stable dynamic between that which, on the one hand, constitutes its internal 
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 I believe that this is a significant aspect of René Magritte's art. 
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consistency and, on the other, its external accidental coherence. This meta-stability 
which constitutes the concept becomes a quandary which now plagues all objects, 
mental or physical alike, graspable as such: they need to simultaneously satisfy their 
polyvalency as a social being as a unit while allowing the sympathetic associative 
promiscuity of its components engaged as concretized participants in other conceptual 
entities. But even if the concept as an imagene agente is enclosed and delimited by the 
frame which surrounds it, it does not mean that the concept is a transcendental 
unchangeable entity. 
When Deleuze and Guattari, write that "concepts are not eternal" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 27) it does not mean that their shelf-life is limited but that modalities of 
non-transcendence take on a different complexion. The concept is changeable and 
variable in that different modes of becoming will activate a concept and transform it so 
that operatively it fulfills the same rhetorical function even if its endo- and exo-
consistencies are altered. So that in accommodating and adjusting to the conditional 
milieu of its use, the concept may lose some components or acquire others that 
transform it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28) or activate some and de-activate others 
that are not required for operational efficacy within the given conceptual ecology. This 
wiggle room in the expression of the concept reveals a rift in the ritornello of durational 
becoming of the (re)called concept within the creative advance of actuality: on the one 
hand, the open potential for creativity afforded by its adaptability speaks to its 
indeterminacy, i.e. lack of a total and complete specificity, and, on the other, the 
repressive drive towards full objectification as a lock-down which maintains total control 
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over associative potential and expressive freedom. As such, the assemblage as a 
machinic process is vague, indefinite and non-transcendental—in its creation of 
coherence and consistency it is the serial alternating progression of dissolutive 
deterritorializations and successive novel constitutions of coherence and extensive 
reterritorializations based on linkages between conceptual incorporations that 
constitute Guattari's conception of the machinic. The process is on-going by virtue of 
the breaking/making of linkages of relation and the demand/satisfaction dynamic of 
out-of-phase completive drives implicit in desire. Thus, the over-determination of 
concepts kills their vitality yet a certain specificity is necessary to establish planes of 
consistency that are operationally durational and functionally legitimate. Thus, the 
concept creates a vibratory meta-stability between the creative inflection of its open 
advance and the conservative involution of its controlling repressiveness.  
The concept does not emerge without the propitious conditions for its creation 
and a label with which to identify it, (re)call it into being and give "it the forces it needs 
to return to life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28). As a gathering or cluster, the image-
concept as a structuring changes the "happening" of the concept, i.e. its duration, not 
only in terms of its temporal perduration over time, but also in the temporality of its 
constitution. While the concept in itself can be said to be instantly grasped as an image 
simply through the intercession of its label, or the instantaneousness of its (re)cognition, 
its reconstitution has an uncertain and indeterminate duration and an unsystematic, 
non-linear, internal, self-referential causal dynamic: "it posits itself and its object at the 
same time it is created" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 22). This is not to say that an idea 
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or a concept expressed abstractly, non-imagistically, i.e. discursively enunciated through 
language, does not have these aspects as part of its conception, but that the internal 
consistency of imagines agentes self-consciously calls attention to themselves as having 
a specific constitutional make-up. The accretion of consistency, the gain of bodily 
definition, need not take place as a method, as a strict protocolary ordering; the concept 
as a pictorial image can be (re)cognized in the same way that vision works as ocular 
saccades in what can almost be deemed a non-linear, haphazard manner where each 
attractor as an element contributes to the ultimate form not as a gradual accumulation 
of corpuscular clumps but as processual meldings, as an agglutinative process of 
discursivity or performance, which changes the consistency of that to which they glom 
and alter the manner in which it will glom to that which will come next in the 
clustering/glomming sequence. The order of accretion, the process of description as an 
accumulation of meaning, is almost irrelevant as it is the final operational coherence as 
a "graspable" entity which is of import in that it can be identified and named. Almost in 
that there is a "critical path" which establishes the circuit of operational coherence of 
becoming assemblage which must be respected as dictated by the attractors. 
But apart from their being corporeal similitudes which concretized the image-
locus memory linkage, they expressed a deeper integrative role for the place of 
humanity in the universe. The Stoics, particularly Posidonius, considered that everything 
was one organic, natural whole where the body was not only a participant but an image, 
an expression of a universal, cosmic unity interconnected by sympathy and in this 
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respect the corporeal similitude of the human imagines agentes provide a resonant 
memory circuit between the worldly and the cosmic order of the universe.  
We can begin to see that through the structuration of memory with the aid of 
imagines agentes there is an inkling towards a dynamic, image-based understanding of 
the world as foundation for an image-based or "visual" philosophy. Curiously, Edelstein 
refers to the Stoic philosopher Posidonius (ca. 135 BCE-51 BCE) as a visual philosopher 
(Edelstein, 1972: 413-414)—an exponent of an image-based understanding appealing to 
"pictorial representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the concept of 
substantial existence" (Edelstein 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived as a 
dynamic process. The generation of conceptual novelty resulting from the creation of 
imagines agentes as concepts tied to memory as integrative of the understanding of the 
workings of the universe resulted in dynamic imagistic systems which were not only 
explicative of the internal workings of conceptual bodies, but of bodies in general and of 
the cosmos as a whole. To express the operational unity of the universe, these 
dynamised memory systems were not understood as machinic in the sense of the 
Cartesian mechanistic philosophy of parts and atomic corpuscles but in terms of occult 
powers and forces whose integrated coherent, consistent functionings could only be 
understood by the initiated—so that those who "...have not had the Hermetic 
experience, have not achieved the gnosis, have not seen the vestiges of the divine in the 
fabrica mundi, have not become one with it by reflecting it within" (Yates, 2000: 265). 
Thus, to express the operational unity of the universe as part of the mnemonic tradition 
one needs to be able to formulate its functioning as a dynamic whole which maintains 
167 
 
an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from 
the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the 
mind, "As above, so below".116  
The imagenes agentes were capable of doing this "locally" as zones of 
consistency of operational coherence as 'local' monads. But to understand the whole as 
a monadic categoreal survol composed of the plurality of the many, one has to come to 
terms with the universe as an operational unity, as a functioning dynamic whole—as a 
processual machinic assemblage operating within expanses of consistency capable of 
being expressed as a single monad but also capable of being expressed as the plurarility 
of the many and their interconnected intertwined functioning as a subjective One. The 
Memory Wheels of Giordano Bruno based on the work of Ramon Llull and Cosmos 
Rossellius117 were capable of doing just that: they could integrate the local and the 
universal as a machinic memory system capable of expressing the functioning of the 
universe as a coherent image-based apparatus which was capable of "harnessing the 
inner world of the imagination to the stars, or reproducing the celestial world within" 
(Yates, 2000: 212). The apparatus consisted of interlocked discs which could rotate 
relative to one another. Each disc was divided into 30 sectors, each representing a 
conceptual entity. The discs could be made to turn relative to each other in order to 
realize conceptual combinations reflective of the myriad potential of the world in terms 
of 7 levels of knowledge or understanding which could be tied to cosmological schemes. 
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 There is no more apt depiction of the integration of dualism than the Hermetic Caduceus. 
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 Ramon Llull (ca. 1232 – ca. 1315) and Cosmos Rossellius (Venice, 1578) created less complex 
combinatory memory wheels which provided movement to the integrative expansiveness of conceptual 




Fig. 2 Combinatory Memory Wheel by Giordano Bruno. De Umbris Idearum, 1582 
Although one cannot properly speak of universal operational unity without 
engaging the extensive as an expression of meshings of local operational truth, the 
combinatory memory wheels of Giordano Bruno sought to do just that. His apparatus 
attempted to provide an exhaustive machinic combinatorics by bringing together 
variegated concepts side-by-each as to create montages118 capable of novel and 
unexpected associative novelty. As existing on a plane and bounded by the machinic 
framework of the interlocked wheels, the various combinations extended the principle 
of internal coherence of the imagenes agentes to a mechanistic combinatoric which 
putatively exhausted the entire universe of possible expression by the simple rotation of 
the wheels relative to each other. Each sector on a wheel represented a concept, and 
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when rotated relative to another concept-sector, the association would create a novel 
combination whose expression would be of a different nature than the constitutive 
concepts of the associated grouping; thus, expanses of novel meaning are created by 
the relative movement of image-blocs adjacent to one another which when set in 
motion could be termed machinic. The movement involved is of a second order yet 
exists on the same plane: the first order arises from the discursive conceptual 
associative activity taking place within each of the concept-images existing within each 
square; the second order is the dynamised expression of meaning arising from the 
movement of thought emerging from novel associative combinatorics resulting from the 
movement of the wheels relative to one another.  The causal determinism at play in the 
emergence of meaning is immanent and results from the association itself as an 
integrative move and not from the imposition from above nor from an internal or telic 
essential drive.  
The heraldic device as generative of expanses of consistency in the emblematic is 
possibly the simplest expression of what Deleuze and Guattari, express as imagistic 
conceptual machinism identified as such. To label the heraldic emblem machinic is to 
hearken back to Bruno's "Hermetic-Cabalist mysticism" and the late medieval and 
Renaissance conception of the impresa or device (Yates, 2000: 173) as identity119. Here, 
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 "An impresa (plural: imprese) first appeared in the Burgundian French courts in the late fourteenth 
century. Rapidly, imprese became popular with the European nobility, who displayed them in heraldry, on 
embroidered clothing, in tournaments, painted them in portraits, described them in literature, and even 
carved into wooden ceilings. Then, the impresa as badge or insignia continued to be popularized during 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Daly, Peter Maurice. Companion to Emblem Studies. New York: 
AMS Press: 2008. p. 252. William Camden in his Remaines published 1605, gave this definition:  "An 
imprese, as the Italians call it, is a devise in picture with his Motte, or Word, born by noble or learned 
personages, to notifie some particular conceit of their owne." In Clark and Wright's annotations to William 
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the vulgate Italian impresa does homonymic double-duty as enterprise and as a 
derivative of impression, so that enterprise, understood in French as an entreprise, as an 
under-taking—as in grasping that which comes from above—is meshed with impression 
as sensorial and perceptually unitary. Impresa is played against device, etymologically 
rooted in division or parts, as the action or faculty of devising, of invention, of ingenuity 
as an arrangement, plan or contrivance that was immediately grasped as a cognizance 
or badge. The jump from imagenes agentes to impresa constitutes a marked shift: it 
represents the quantum leap from the "set logic" of mere containment to conceptual 
emblematic integration as constitutive of a coherent and identifiable originary concept-
image assembled upon a "plane of consistency" permeated through and through by 
mechanisms120 for its perpetuation and propagation. The impresa as an heraldic 
emblem was also a device with a motto which tied everything together to 
synechdochically distinguish the bearer personally and bring together the signs or marks 
which make out the identify of the bearer as a character.121 The conceptual cluster of 
ideas surrounding impresa would indicate that the bearer of the device is the 
prototypical conceptual persona—the owner of the device as the reconstitutive capacity 
of identity through memorial integration. The impresa not only identified one individual 
as exemplar but categorized all those sporting the same impresa as members of a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Shakespeare's The Tragedy of King Richard II. Clarendon Press Series. English Classics. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 1884. p.119 
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 We could say permeated through and through by lines but this would require an additional level of 
metaphor where lines constitute a plane of identity projectively from an origin and the creation of 
homogeneous coordinates.   
121
 These ideas also allow us to think of the commercial enterprise as an incorporation, as a corporate 
entity whose identity is expressed by its logotype and brand as image. 
171 
 
house122—their own singular identity adumbrated by the application of the impresa to 
constitute a corporeal expanse of like-minded individuals operating under the aegis of 
the same ideatic identity in order to perpetuate the enterprise and further its interests. 
The shield as a coat of arms—ecu in French—is thereby an instrument which 
(re)members the bearer's identity as integral to the enterprise of the social corporation 
in terms of a bond to the vesting power of the impresa.123 The impresa as an image is 
bounded by the edges or borders of the coat of arms to protect the integrity of the 
associated contents.  
It is as part of this imagistic tradition that Guattari and Deleuze posit the mirror 
concepts of ecumenon and planomenon124 as components of the machinic assemblage 
in terms of establishing planes of consistency as "territories of replacement" (Guattari, 
2011: 11), as an adumbrative montage, where the machinic refers to the relational 
dynamic producing operational coherence between constituent parts of consistency and 
their extensions to create expanses of relation as constitutive of territory. Though 
Guattari applies the label 'machinic' to the unconscious as an imagistic process, it is 
equally applied to the plane of consistency to stress that it "is not only populated with 
images and words, but also with all kinds of machinisms that lead it to produce and 
reproduce these images and words" (Guattari, 2011: 10). This machinic perpetuation 
can be understood as a desire-driven assemblage creative of intensive perduration and 
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 The tie-in to cosmic mechanisms of identity subsumed to celestial houses of the zodiac should be quite 
obvious although the dynamic projective implications of the conception might not be. 
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 The relation here to currency and finance is overt. 
124
 Ecumenon and planomenon are sister concepts which are created by D&G to expresses planar creation 
processes; the ecumenon represents a locative milieu of consistence whereas the planomenon is the 
formal consistence of immanence in itself. 
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driver of memorial reconstitution, but the relational machinism Guattari refers to is not 
one which constitutes the internal agglutinative coherence, the endoconsistency, of the 
concept.  
In addition, this internal agency can be said to extend outwards from rhizomic 
junctures or folds (the "axillary buds") as extensive "feelers"125 within the serial 
disaggregation and amalgamation of regions of consistency as constitutive of the 
associative linkages which allow the successive process of extensive territorialization, 
the internal process of consistency also extends outwards to create a plane of 
consistency. This dynamic latticework implies a reticulate structure of internal relation 
between the corpuscular126 elements of the concept as constitutive of "a crystal of the 
possible which catalyze connections" as it extends outwards to other conceptual entities 
(which are to be themselves regressively understood as being constituted in this way all 
the way down to irreducible forms): it is reminiscent of the balls and sticks of molecular 
or crystallographic models where the atom is a node and the sticks are the bonds which 
keep the whole together and as one constitute the unitary replicative structure upon 
which the aggregative pattern of extension is based upon. If we pursue the 
crystallographic model, the seed crystal is the causal patterning agent around which 
expanses of similarity take form as expressive of the seed crystal's noesis or intellect 
through the guiding bonds of an informed empathy towards similar minded nodal 
entities recognized as such. It is interesting to note that these see-through ball and stick 
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 Again, in the Whiteheadian sense of feeling as presaging of prehensive process. 
126
 In the sense of body-like individuations but which can be understood as particulate entities as 
coherent constituent parts.  
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models have no adumbrating unifying corporeal silhouette127 and are usually 
understood simply as the expression of the structural constitution of its parts, in that 
the crystal seed was nothing but atoms and bonds without requiring the superposing of 
the crystal's outward faces. The crystal's consistency in the ball and stick model, if one 
can call it that, is simply the organizational structure of the constituents but not 
expressive of a facialized entity nor of a machinic expression—it putatively just identifies 
the crystal seed as a genetic initiator conducive towards the creation of extension. 
Although it is an interesting illustration of the process of the production of extension, it 
is a misleading conception since extension is not the repeated agglomeration of simple 
likeness which replicates and reproduces the seed towards the creation of a repetitive 
pattern. Extension can better be seen as aggregative expanses of machinic entities 
meshing together as functional operative systems working synchronously on one plane 
yet also capable of meshing with operative expanses coming into being above and 
dissolving below. The metaphor works if we take the notion of the crystal as a 
homogeneity of identity pointing towards the indivisibility of that which is named as 
basis for comparison but the dynamic at work is not one of patterning the relation.     
The adjective machinic when applied to the image of thought can be said to be 
an appropriate descriptor in terms of its implication as a transformative device 
producing identity as creative novelty. To be considered machinic, and not simply as a 
simile of machinic—not "like a" machine, or machine-like but actually functioning as 
one—a conceptual entity would need to be constituted of parts that mesh together 
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"mechanically", where pieces connected to each other act as the efficient causes of 
movement of each other, and whose coherent operational functionality works in such a 
way so as to transform "something" given, usually external to the machine, into a 
product or outcome. But before one can even call the conception machinic, one would 
have to consider the image not in terms of a coherent whole but as a rational operative 
coherence of parts. It requires a shift in how we understand the transformation inherent 
in cohesive association: from the remapping of the layout of constituent elements as a 
static federative ensemble and the removal of quasi-arbitrary territorial borders of parts 
to an internal coherence based on the dynamic inter-relation of parts as a 
transformative entity. The consistency of the machinic assemblage then arises from the 
operational logic of interlocking parts working together, synchronously, in phase, as a 
transformative undertaking or enterprise—it is not simply a result of an enforced 
coherence from above which arises from the categorical designation applied as label to 
the containment of its constituent parts within the frame; it is the expression of the 
memorial integration of the concept in terms of an operative need as a transformation. 
This establishment of machinic endo- and exo- consistencies maintains an integrative 
symmetry through the reconciliation of dualities expressive of being as internally 
coherent and externally extensive—and vice versa. This represents a complete 
paradigmatic shift as to the understanding of the concept in terms of the one and the 
many as it creates an integrative vibrational dynamic advance of reconciliation between 




Fig. 2 Machinic Portrait of Kant. In Deleuze and Guattari (1994)128 
Based on the ideations of the imagenes agentes and the impresae, Deleuze and 
Guattari can propose their "Machinic Portrait of Kant" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 56). 
The machinic label applied to this image in particular exposes a variety of conceptual 
twists not readily apparent—it takes what is essentially a memory image in the 
Ciceronian rhetorical style as a coherent synoptical illustration of Kant's thought and 
labels it machinic: with this imagine agente, we not only discursively (re)member Kant's 
thought as a process, one identifies "Kant the conceptual persona" as the auteur 
function of Kant's Thought. So to refer to the image as a "Machinic Portrait of Kant" 
underscores the inherent limitations of Kant's thought: it is machinic in that it is 
demonstrative of a dynamic and integrative transformational process but it falls back 
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 The functioning of this image is irrelevant to this discussion. A full explanation is given in Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994: 57) without our having to repeat it here.  
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into the dialectical-system of thought in that on its own the portrait lacks the creative 
relational expansive freedom of the rhizomatic.  
The Machinic Portrait of Kant is self-sufficient and coherently machinic in that its 
transformative operational functioning is exclusively self-referential and therefore 
closed off—it is machinic only within its own limited plane of consistency and through 
its discursiveness. And to call it monadic would be inaccurate for "it lacks the sensitivity 
to outside information" (Simondon p.5). It is machine-like rather than machinic in that it 
appears open and relational—it has no frame to circumscribe it or enclose it but it is a 
self-contained assemblage. As a result of its bounded operational integrity, it invites us 
to use it objectively, prosthetically as a tool—we can use it purposefully and watch it do 
what it does without being implicated in the process. It lures us to engage it to create 
limited territorializations but it is hardly the rhizomatic machinism we wish to extract 
from immanence. "Most important, it invites us to go further" (Foucault in AO: xii) and 
create other machinic assemblies which will be more open and relational in the 
expression of their transformative possibilities. 
The associationism at play between the constituent elements is not solely and 
simply "a chain of propositions and reasonings" as Hume would have it in Essays: Moral, 
Political and Literary (1825: 257) nor is it a simple reticular arrangement of nodal 
associations. The concept does not emerge without the propitious conditions for its 
evocation and a label with which to identify it and (re)call it into being.129 The 
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 Concepts as operational entities act as anonymous agents within processual advance until they are 
discovered. As such, concepts can be  hidden, invisible and unidentified, working behind the scenes of 
faciality. And herein lies the principal task of philosophers: they are the revelatory agency behind the 
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simultaneous co-arising and reciprocal necessity of the constituent parts of the 
conceptual image (including its location) create an exclusive internal self-referential 
consistency regulated by the concretized association of components: at face value, the 
coalescence is instantaneous and given, imbued with infinite celerity. Yet, while being 
closed and exclusive, for the concept to remain relevant and vital, it must retain "a 
certain margin of indetermination" (Simondon, 1989: 5) for it is this dynamic 
indetermination arising from the relational loose ends produced by the process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization as constitutive of bodies that allows for the 
assemblage's receptivity to outside information and enables it to endure the adaptative 
evolution which affords it its perduration as a machinic assemblage—it is the organicity 
of the polyvalent indeterminacy as wiggle room which allows for its machinic 
perduration. Contrary to Bergson's assertion that impetus, i.e. the original impetus of 
life as process itself "is the fundamental cause of variation" (Bergson, 1944: 98), 
evolutive adaptation is possible because of the indeterminacy inherent in the  
becoming-consistent of the image-concept as a relational entity. Impetus sustained, i.e. 
if there is no inertial change to the system, it is a steady-state and therefore 
unchanging—if it is disturbed by a force, the system's dynamic composure will be 
altered at which point the variation will be causally motivated and responsible for one 
singular alteration. It needs to be persistent or directed. Further, the original impetus of 
life should be applied as a resultant unitary agent applicable to the monad as the One; it 
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does not apply universally to the constituent Many. As an individuated discursive unity, 
as a closed set of serial performative gestures, the concept can be described as a linear 
accretion of consistency, of corporeality or formal substantiality, but its becoming 
cannot be thus understood or construed as a static unchanging entity—it needs to be 
considered as a dynamic vibratory meta-stable system of endoconsistent coherence and 
as an exoconsistent perduration. The internal associations and sets of relation are not 
simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every constituent element relates to every other 
constituent element concretely and reciprocally to every other constituent element as 
an on-going dynamic process. And it is through this associative process that the 
conceptual image defines itself, gains definition as a body which while gaining 
consistency, loses degrees of associative freedom that curtail its potential for relation 
but imbue it with an intentio, an attentive discrimination,  selective focus, directive in 
terms of subsequent association in movement which comes to be expressed as what a 
body can and cannot do. But the loss of associative freedom described here is no more 
permanent than the body gaining definition: the landscape of becoming is dynamic and 
ever-changing—the only transcendance here is the operative haphazard constancy of 
change. 
The constitutional make-up of the concept cannot be found in their genus or 
species, but "in something indiscernible that is not so much synesthetic as 
syneidectic"130 (Deleuze and Guattari,: 20). Bergson writes that "life does not proceed 
by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division" (Bergson, 
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 Synesthetic: Involving more than one sense. Syneidectic: Serving to connect, as a conjunction; 
copulative or conjunctive. 
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1944: 99) and this would be the statement to which Deleuze (Deleuze, 1989: 10) refers 
when he writes that Bergson forgets what he posits in Matter and Memory. In this 
decidedly dialectical move, Bergson dissociates himself from an integrative imagistic 
ontology to one based on dissection and division where the image is broken down into 
pixels—an idea echoed by Whitehead's notions of atomistic indefinite divisibility of 
extensive continuity: "An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the 
various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess 
common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derived from these primary 
relationships. The notion of 'continuum' involves both the property of indefinite 
divisibility and the property of unbounded extension" (Whitehead, 1985: 66). In terms 
of images and image-concepts, it is critical to remember that the image is not pictorial 
and as such is not composed of dots or of an "infinity of elements infinitely small" 
(Bergson, 1944: 100)131. The image is constituted as a fractal immanent continuity of 
concretized synesthetic machinic assemblages engaged in the satisfaction of desire 
drives and the creation of new ones as the process of memorial (re)constitution. The 
machinism of the concept as syneidectic drives towards inclusiveness and integration 
both inwards and outwards so that in its transformative expression it tries to create a 
plane of consistency as functionally extensive as possible in an attempt to fulfill the 
Hermetic drive towards totalization and unity.  
The plane is not all there is to the process: the establishment of the plane of 
immanence is a prehensive process—it expresses temporal continuity as well as 
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 Apart from its retinal breakdown analogy, the impressionist's pointillist conception of the image was a 
major point of contention with the post-impressionist's efforts to re-think imagistic assemblages.  
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expanse. The syneidectic promiscuous polyandry of its constituent elements not only 
works transversally as constitutive of regions of consistency in lateral extension but 
vertically as well. It extends its associative machinism downwards within underlying 
planes as meshed to processes of disaggregation and gears upwards into overlaying 
regions of becomings-consistent of simultaneous aggregative processes. These same 
processes occur diachronically through the strata as part of the accrual process of 
planes of consistency as a layered build-up of syncopated aggregating and 
disaggregating territories constituting and disbanding zones of extended consistency 
expressive of a sympathetic resonance resulting in the synchronized, rhythmic 
thrumming of undamped enthusiasm132. Thus we can move from an infinitely thin film 
(Deleuze and Guattari's décalcomanie) or membrane of immanence to a stratified zone 
of shimmering, pulsating becoming where the plane of immanence is the midst, where 
the participants do double-duty crosswise as extension as spatial linkage and vertically 
through strata as expressive of temporality as anionic time. The internal associations 
and sets of relation are not simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every constituent 
element is reciprocally associated to every other constituent element, their 
determination concretely expressed as a reciprocal dependence within the on-going 
dynamic process. Thus the surface of becoming is more like the indeterminate surface 
of a cloud's becoming where the molecular fuses with the molar as the impossibility of 
distinguishing between the internal and external determinant processes of becoming or 
between the temporal and the extensive even if the process is construed as ontogenetic 
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and set apart from the totality of process. In this way the machinic assemblage of 
stratified becoming constitutes the associated milieu of spacetime where the various 
plateaus of consistency exist as zones of concretized temporality. 
The apparition of a concept within an associative milieu as a discernible event 
within memorial reconstitution provides the concept "the forces it needs to return to 
life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28). The creation of the concept within an associative 
milieu as an assemblage constitutes an event as a memorial systemic shift in that its 
constitution is processually transformative, integrative and reliant on the 
(re)membering of the constituent elements to the becoming-body of consistency; as 
such the concept as a novel circuit of memory as a détourné memorial process is an 
event. The coming into being of the concept as a functional entity is a durational process 
both in terms of its taking time as the celerity of becoming-operative as well as in the 
embedding of a new temporality in the implication of the double (re)collection and 
integration of components and environmental enabling conditions: double, in that the 
process is in itself both collective and integrative, but once again remanded when the 
satisfaction of operational functionality is attained as a meta-stability between the 
promiscuous polyandry of its components and the re-implication of desires and 
satisfactions as a perduring dispositif concretised to other entities as an emergence of 
extended consistency as a plane of immanence. The establishment of the functionality 
of a concept is as immediate as its positing in that the communication of its intention is 
felt as the immediate diffusion of the transductive wave through the system, as the 
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expression of an operational drive engaged towards the teleonomical fulfillment of its 
designation experienced as the foregrounded memorial (re)constitution as becoming.  
Although "the concept always has the truth that falls to it as a function of the 
conditions of its creation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 27) we can also say that its 
expression and functional validity, its operational coherence in terms of an extensive 
machinic assemblage, as an associated milieu, is a dispositif of truth. The dispositif, as a 
machinic assemblage, as a functional technical object, is "the part of a judgement that 
contains the decision separate from the opinion" (Agamben, 2007: 7). So that in the 
sense that "the concept is realized by becoming the field of experience itself" (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 18), its operational coherence expressed as the causal determinacy 
of embodiment is self-contained and casts off its status as a machinic assemblage in 
order to become "being and praxis" as a dispositif. The move is significant in that one 
results in a mechanism of external agency upon the participative constitutive terms as 
an imposed transformational force majeure, whereas the second constitutes an 
emergent subjective immanence whose constitution is driven by its narrative coherence 
as part of an immediate progressive process of implication, enfolding recurrent desires 
and satisfactions entrained and required by the (re)current activation of the associated 
concretization of consistency in the actualization of the plane of immanence as the 
process of memorial integration as actuality. Truth lies in the expression of its 
operational coherence—if the assemblage works, it expresses truth. And no matter 
what it expresses, if it is expressive, it is truth—even if its machinic truth is the creation 
of lies.   
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The concept-image while being a truthful expression of the ideal concept, will 
always be lesser than its virtual, idealized counterpart because it will never actualize or 
exhaust the full potential of the Ideal; as an image, as a participant in its emergence in 
the plane of immanence, it will be able to actualize potential to the full extent that the 
ecology of becoming at hand makes possible, but no further—there will always be a 
residual relational potential at hand to activate the image in different and novel ways. 
And as such, although the image is less abstract, it will always be unfaithful (but not 
disloyal) relative to the concept as an Ideal Form. As such, it will be a liar by omission—
not devoid of truth value, but untruthful. As an objectile entity, the image-concept's 
indeterminate and fallible relational determination, while being its most powerful life-
giving qualities, exposes the major weakness of imagistic conception and undermines its 
truth value, reliability and solidity as an integrated entity within orthodox dialectical 
thought.  
This has very heavy implications on the foundations of that which constitute the 
Principles or Laws of Thought and as to what constitutes the ontologically real, the 
cognitively necessary and what can be taken as uninferred knowledge. The Law of 
Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle133 cease to have 
the (false) certainty afforded by subjective and objective entities with precisely defined 
borders or components and calls into question fundamental aspects of coherent 
thought, logical systems and universals. A coherent system of thought is impossible to 
                                                          
133
 The Law of Identity: If a thing is A then it is A; the Law of Noncontradiction: A thing A cannot be A and 
not A at the same time (at the time it is A);  the Law of Excluded Middle: A thing A is either A or not A. 
Angeles, Peter A.  Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981. 
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construct on the "Yes, but..." or the "You know what I  mean..." imagistic order of things 
where exceptions, ambiguity and vagueness continually call into question the validity of 
the structures of knowledge and their expression. There will always be uncertainty in 
the coming to terms with becoming: compromise will wend its way whether we accept 
the looseness of expression resulting from unbounded creativity and the sham certainty 
and more controlled expression afforded by Formal formulaic thought. As such, the 
ideation of rhizomic thought calls out for a philosophy which allows leeway and 
looseness to the definition of categoreal schemes and the bodies they create to take 
into account the accidental differences in dissimilar repetitions of what can be likened 
as exemplars of the same "thing"—its thought would be "anexact yet rigorous" but its 
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Conclusion: The Whatness of Immanence 
 
The primary concern of Becoming One with the Screen has been the question of 
how experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic 
process. The work that has been carried out as such constitutes a serious engagement 
with many aspects of speculative thought; through a (re)contextualizing discourse on 
memory as integrative of experience I have (re)membered it to the tradition to which 
speculative thought belongs. Through the writings of Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson, 
Whitehead, Simondon, Deleuze, Guatttari and Deleuze and Guattari we have re-
positioned the memory-image as constitutive of the concept and enabling the 
explication of a constellation of other key concepts; namely, territorialization, faciality, 
the creation of bodies, desire, the plane of imanence as a machinic assemblage, and the 
fold among others.  
Becoming One with the Screen is important and relevant in that it defines and 
anchors many of these concepts in the memorial-imagistic tradition from which they 
emerge by engaging them technically through their constitution. Various writers have 
activated these concepts in creative and remarkable ways so that they acquire an 
operational consistency which gives them definition and affords them a flexibility and 
openness which allows for tremendous expressive leeway in idéatic generation. 
However, the downside to this openness has been conceptual incoherence brought on 
by a lack of formal definition and the frequentative familiarity with the concepts. This 
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lack of unambiguous definition leads to accusations of obscurantism, banality and 
confusion as well as admonitions appealing for precision. In my opinion, these 
accusations are all too often founded, but perhaps wrongly motivated: for example, in 
Fashionable Nonsense (1998) Sokal and Bricmont attack speculative thought on concept 
abuse but they don't get the imagistic/memorial underpinnings to the concepts so that 
their derisive ridicule of the morphological field is of questionable validity. I do believe 
that Becoming One with the Screen provides the concepts with a coherent and 
consistent foundation which serves to cogently and succinctly define them 
constitutionally so that reading Deleuze and Guattari, for example, becomes less of a 
daunting task. 
An important part of these thesis has been the (re)integration of memory to its 
image-based origins. And in doing so, we have come to terms with the concepts as 
memory work. We have conceptually reposited them by (re)creating the causal 
conditions for their (re)collection, for their being (re)called into being and 
(re)membering them performatively through the writing as a process of discovery. This 
expository approach is not a traditionally academic one—our thesis is more of a record 
of a path of discovery, more of a tracing of thought as research-creation than it is a 
systematic summary or survey of the Big Ideas. Becoming One with the Screen is a 
creative diary of sorts in that the thesis is the record of the emergence of our 
comprehension of these concepts as memory process. When we began writing we had a 
very limited understanding of the concepts and no structure to articulate their 
unfolding. As such, the project became a work of memorial self-discovery and self-
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understanding in that I was more concerned with the relevance of the concepts to my 
existential scheme of things than in systematically presenting the work of the thinkers 
we have been reading. So when we started to write, we had a title, a gnawing anxiety 
about the problem and the constellation of concepts and little else. Yet, like the 
navigational channel markers on inland waterways which present themselves into view 
as they are needed, the expository direction of the concepts revealed themselves as we 
created propitious conditions for their emergence through the writing. And as a record 
of that progressive revelation, our thesis presents recurring concepts as players in the 
theatre of memory as an evolutive dynamic; the changing milieus which activate the 
concepts as they are articulated sometimes gives them a plasticity that more inflexible 
schemas might balk at but to me is part of the implicit degrees of freedom available as a 
consequence to the imperfection of prehensive becoming. This might sound like we are 
recanting on precision, but we think there is a rigour to the exposition which rounds out 
the account. 
In this respect, Becoming One with the Screen has always been a very personal 
undertaking and not the customary academic endeavour—my pursuit can ultimately be 
deemed selfish but as a writer and thinker we feel one should be more responsible to 
oneself than to the world. This is not to say that our work is not academic, but that it is 
academically different. The cheminement is more of a personal pursuit than a scholarly 
one in that the need to find an answer to the question of experience as integrated into 
the general unfolding of actuality was more of an existential research/creation rather 
than intellectual curiosity—so that the mastery was not so much the mastery of what 
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others have said but the mastery of their contribution to our thought on our own terms. 
Deleuze is fond of his intellectual offspring ill-begotten from the philosophers he works 
with and we feel we have created similar progeny with the memorial take on the 
concepts—like the creatures that run around the space-station in Tarkovsky's Solaris.  
Thus, our research has been an interdisciplinary study which combines 
philosophy and film studies to come to terms with experience as immersive, i.e. how 
one becomes one with the screen in film spectatorship and more generally in the image-
world of actuality. It is not about the analysis of film but about how one relates with the 
unfolding spectacle as imagistic process. It has to do with the way one forgets oneself 
while watching a film or while being in the world. Usually this is seen as a rift between 
the spectator and the film, between the me here and the world over there, between the 
inside and the outside, between the subject and the object, but our thesis contends that 
the experience is not divisive in this way but relationally integrative. To prevail over this 
conventional divide, we present the experience of participating in a film screening as a 
relational and associative process in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen 
relationship reflective of the subject/object relation. And to do this we progress from 
the consideration of being immersed in a film screening as a large scale event to the 
topological twist that arises at the juncture of what traditionally has been seen as the 
inside and the outside of experience. The twist here is memorial, figuratively and 
literally, but I need to clarify here that memory is not to be understood as an 
individualization of pastness, as a static image depicting the past as pictorial but as a 
process descriptive of individuation as the integrative touch that assembles relationality 
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as the quality of participation as constitutive of the unfolding of actuality. Memory is the 
process which holds the repeatable to account for its becoming and the memory-image 
as what may be understood as an integrated image not of pastness as what came before 
expressed pictorially but as an expression of the relational in terms of the activation of 
potential as a circuit of memory. 
We begin our thesis by asking how does an emergent interconnected 
relationality arise and how does one locate its happening? If memory is constituted as 
image and place, we look at the 'external' image as part of the tradition of 'memory as 
integrative process' to better understand what the image as experience contained 
within place is about. We present the relationship between the me and the world as an 
associated milieu in order to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place 
between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an ecology where the 
milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form as 
experience which does not differentiate between the human and the non-human. In this 
way, the associated milieu is the setting and environment of concretion where 
participants condition each other in order to form something which in turn, 
simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves. But perhaps the 
most important aspect of this analysis is that these conditionings are considered 
participants in the event as simultaneously constitutive of space and time as 
temporality—they are simultaneously and reciprocally cause and attribute to the 
creation of the event: as such, the gradual accretionary effect of progressive 
territorializations constitutes and expresses an integrative immanence “as the unity of 
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efficient and formal cause” (Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen 
as the result of linear cause and effect but as an interdependent co-arising or what 
Deleuze calls a reciprocal determination as a parallel line of development to 
Whitehead's thought. 
To re-activate memory as a concept has literally required "a kick in the 
imagination, a wrenching of tired words" (Daly, 1985: 190) where imagination is both a 
noun and a transitive verb. Thus we have explored memory as an integrative process 
and examined and re-activated the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory not 
only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical tradition 
from which speculative thought emerges. Over the past three centuries the fuller 
meanings of this cluster of words have lost their relevance and their significance taken 
for granted and forgotten in favour of a scientific definition of memory based on the 
stockpiling of information. Instead of the mechanistic transfer of sensorial impressions 
to the brain and their conversion into memories through electrochemical operations, 
we have proposed an alternate mechanism for memory predicated on the processual 
memory-image as a performative (re)creation of the image content as a directive urge 
which (re)produces the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the relations and 
(re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires 
duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative 
(re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its 
(re)collection of constituent relations as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory 
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circuit, in which it is operative. We can now see the complex of words around memory 
in such a way that we can better appreciate its integrative dynamics.  
In discussing the image of thought in Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze 
considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with 
philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual 
experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of 
referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can 
be known implicitly without concepts. And to do this we have revisited the 
complementary concepts of Faciality and The Fold from the point of view of the 
relational aspects implicit in imagistic thought and memory. Central to the discussion 
has been the prehensive process of adumbration by which the many become one as the 
perpetuum mobile of the eventual continuity of change in actuality as becoming. Our 
project has advanced that the façade of becoming actual of the world as a moving 
imagistic front constitutes perception as the integrated affirmation of becoming one 
with the world as constitutive of the fold. And as flawed as it may be, this part of the 
project is of particular importance in that it fleshes out the work of Michel Serres, 
renders it explicit and takes it up a notch to bring it to be able to do what Deleuze does 
with it. The description of the coming to being of the operative function of directivity 
within the fold was developed through the intertwining of geometry, optics, and the 
activation of Girard Desargues' theorem as the culmination of perspective and the 
instauration of projective geometry as a possible model for the apparatus "of 
correspondence between mind and matter" (Bergson, 1944: 398). This was further 
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developed as the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a single closed 
surface which allows for the expression of a continuous associative motion of surficial 
territories (which need not be seen as continuous surfaces) as expressive of local 
machinic activity within the movement of process.  
The final chapter completes the picture, so to speak, in order to look at the 
'internal' imagistic process as conceptual. The first chapter dealt with experience, the 
second with the image of the world, the third with processual advance, the fourth with 
the interfacing of the internal and the external and the fifth and last chapter detailed 
the process of imagination as a faculty. This last chapter is of particular significance in 
that it reviews the historical evolution of the arts of memory through the image in order 
to show how the development of memory images led to the creation of image-concepts. 
We then show how these give rise or contribute to the big concepts in the thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari, namely, the machinic assemblage, the constitution of 
territorialization, the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of consistency and the 
plane of immanence. The importance of this work is that it links the thought of Deleuze 
and Guattari to an image-based or visual philosophy which calls upon a "pictorial 
representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the concept of substantial 
existence" (Edelstein 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived as a dynamic process. 
It has also worked out the processual correspondence between the workings of the 
image concept as an 'interior image' and the 'external image'. Even if both types of 
images are seen as different in character, we have established a correspondence 
between the way a concept is constituted internally within imagistic thought and the 
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event in actuality—to wit, the internal workings inform the understanding of the 
external and vice versa in a way that echoes the ritornello of the operational unity of the 
universe in terms of an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical 
ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the 
whole, of the body and the mind, of the outside and the inside: "As above, so below". 
Yet all this leads to a very big problem. We have been referring to the 
constitution of the image in terms that are pictorially-friendly but which act otherwise. 
The pictorial as constitutive of the imagistic is simply the premise to be able to 
formulate the relational as foundational, so assuming that we are ready to divest 
ourselves of an atomic corpuscular foundation to the ontology, what will replace it as 
constitutive of the image yet allow it to function imagistically?  
To be able to posit these ideas we have come up with the concept of whatness 
as a surrogate of matter. Thus far we have been elaborating  the concepts by relying on 
material or physical properties in that they agglutinate, aggregate, gain consistency, 
integrate, are amassed and constitute bodies which interact and constitute other 
bodies. We can of course ask ourselves what constitutes this material physicality and fall 
back on matter as traditionally done and arrive at the same unsatisfactory conclusions 
which plague our understanding of participation in the world. But breaking away from 
the habit of the sophistry of physicality is a daunting task in that it is difficult to cast 
aside the I refute it thus! In order to do this, I conclude my project with a left-to-be-




1. Whatness is monadic in that it is without parts and without extension.  
2. Whatness is not a composite, it is constitutive of relational becoming. It is 'not 
describable in terms of the morphology of a 'stuff'" (Whitehead, 1985: 41). 
3. Whatness is corpuscular in that it is beyond the threshold that limits something 
as not nothingness but it is not atomic. It is constitutional in nature with a 
discriminatory tendency towards corpuscularity in the sense of making bodies in 
the widest sense of the term. 
4. Whatness is the in-the-midst of reciprocal relational conditioning constitutive of 
being. 
5. Whatness is not a given; it is virtual until activated. 
6. Whatness arises out of the expression of the need for its existence—it is called 
into being but in no way does whatness beget itself. It neither comes into being 
nor will it cease to be as its becoming has neither been nor will it be. It simply is 
in the midst as being. 
7. The inner make-up of whatness is not alterable or capricious. It is felt as an 
affective tonality within the midst of participation but otherwise it is 
indiscernible and non-presentable. There is nothing to transpose or change or 
transmogrify in whatness because there is really nothing to change as it becomes 
ready-made as made-to-fit in its taking place as it is called into being. Thus it is 
neither substance nor accident.   
8. Whatness has a quality of being unique to itself and that is its perspectival 
discriminatory tendency as differentiation. In that way it can be differentiated 
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from all other whatness and because of its unique slant on the state of affairs, it 
makes sensible the distinction between participation in one or another.   
9. Thus, it is necessary for whatness to be different from one state of participation 
to another. There are no two instances that are perfectly alike which would call 
into being the same whatness.  
10. Because every created being as a participatory enterprise is constituted 
differently, the affective tonality of the whatness in question steers the 
contraction of participation differently in every instance and produces the 
differential in action as the indeterminate point of its possibility at the incipience 
of becoming of the eventual as pure détournement. 
11. Whatness conditions the mode of being of its participation as the internal logic 
of its own coherence. It configures the locus of participation as a neighbourhood 
of conditioned relational occupation as taking up space and taking time where 
participation sustains the meta-stable tension between that which takes place 
and that which gives room as temporality.  
12. Within whatness there is no internal complexity for the complexity is complicity 
in the reciprocal relational conditioning of participation. It is the concretising 
bridge of relation by which participants become otherwise by way of completive 
satisfaction. The shared concretization of relation as reciprocal and mutual is the 
realization of completion in the advancement into novelty of the event's 
information as the very operation of taking on form as a body.  
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13. In the complicit complexification of whatness, concretization happens as a pluri-
dimensional functional associative bridging of temporalities and operational 
functionality.  
14. The satisfaction, the completive perfection, of each of these conditioning 
concretive fusions activates and enables the future becoming desire for 
coalescence of the consequence of the process as a paradoxal reconciliation, as a 
bridge between the coalescence of that which we consider the past that yields it 
and the future it is begetting to which it is coalescing as prehension as actual 
present, i.e. as "the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion 
of other things" (Whitehead, 1985: 52). This prehension as enfolding is "a world 
of captures instead of closures" (Deleuze 1993: 81). The prehension folds within 
folds as implicated perspectival projections defining each other within the 
process of becoming as the object-subject-superject flow of relation within the 
event as an actual occasion. The state of passage which prehends the becoming 
and understands the multiplicity in the unity is perception.  
15. "The action of the internal principle which produces change, that is, the passage 
from one perception to another, may be called appetition" (Leibniz, 1965: 150). 
Appetition  arises from novelty: newness creates new desires along with their 
attendant integrations thus perpetuating the appetition of novelty. Hence, 
appetition is implicit in the novelty as incessant and insatiable desire for 
completive integration which perpetuates the appetition of/for novelty as the 
drive of self-perpetuation of processual becoming.  
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16. The advancement of process has forward-feeling desires whose satisfaction 
moves the process towards a coherent whole as operational perfection. The 
logic to the process proceeds from the (pre)existing conditioning as a given to 
that which follows as the memorial advancement through being called to 
participate and integrating within the operational coherence of the enfolding of 
experience which incites "the basic generic operation of passing from the 
objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question" 
(Whitehead, 1985: 40). The guiding apparent purposefulness of the process is 
unknowable and beyond understanding and its perfection is in the moment at 
hand in the immanent arising of actuality.  
17. If this creative advance into novelty is somehow remarkable, important "as an 
aspect of feeling whereby a perspective is imposed upon the universe of things 
felt" (Whitehead, 1968: 11) and repeatedly bears (re)producing, the multiplicity 
of whatness of these associated conditionings can be (re)called into play so that 
they can be (re)collected, (re)membered into a society as "a nexus of actual 
entities which are 'ordered' among themselves" (Whitehead, 1985: 89). In the 
memorial (re)petition of (re)calling to order, the process of concrescence as the 
processual creation of coherence becomes its own reason, by which the lure for 
feeling is admitted to efficiency (Whitehead, 1985: 88)134 and allows us to say 
                                                          
134
 Although Whitehead's concrescence and Simondon's concretization come from the same root, the first 
refers more to the creation of coherence in a cross-section of the universe as a duration (Whitehead, 
1985: 125), whereas the second refers to " the multi-functionality of operative solidarity... toward future 
uses." (Massumi, “Technical Mentality” Revisited: Brian Massumi on Gilbert Simondon. With Arne De 
Boever, Alex Murray, and Jon Roffe). 
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that memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as the 
constitutive dynamic of the coming together of actuality. 
18. Whatness is directed and intentioned so in that in its appetition it can be said to 
be  perceptive. Merely by taking place and through their affirmation of the 
directionality of the relation, they restrict movement, limit degrees of freedom, 
curtail the potential of what can happen. These constraints induce relation to be 
expressed in specific ways, if anything to make sure the event unfolds coherently 
as an integrated individuation within the general unfolding of actuality. As 
environmental pre-constituents, they impose not only conditions for how and 
when, but they colour the event itself in that all participants will engage (or not) 
each other as a function of the relational preconditions established by the 
spatiotemporal disposition of these relational inductions. The directionality and 
intention of whatness informs specificity as to that which can unfold and how it 
will unfold as occupation in terms of a discernible individuation. 
19. The gradual accretionary effect of progressive agglutination constitutes an 
integrative concretized immanence “as the unity of efficient and formal cause” 
(Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen as the result of linear 
cause and effect but as an interdependent co-arising through a systemic causal 
reciprocity in becoming. 
20. Whatness cannot perish or cease to exist as its being as the cusp of becoming is 
relational potential activated and actualized by memorial invocation when 
(re)called into operational participation. The tonality of relation as operational 
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participation is the affect of the directionality and intention of whatness 
associated. 
21. Even if we cannot considered it as a singular entity, whatness is eventful. The 
manifestation of associated whatness as discernible process is event. 
22. The discretionary ability afforded by the specificity of whatness is perceptive 
quality which when associated as event becomes perception as a subjective 
faculty.  
23. The concretizing of relation changes the whatness of the associative 
concretization as novelty. Novelty as expressive of eventful change heralds the 
eventual unfolding of becoming while adumbrating that which conditions it. This 
successive process of eventual alteration is what characterizes the memorial 
unfolding: it changes that which has transpired, that which is transpiring and the 
way the future transpiring will take place.  
24. Memory can be described as an expression of the relational in terms of the 
activation of potential as a consequential circuit of memory. Memory is not to be 
understood as a storehouse of pictorial imagery, and neither as an 
individualization nor as an activation of pastness as the that which has been. It is 
the dynamic process informing individuation as the integrative touch that 
assembles relationality as the quality of participation as constitutive of the 
unfolding of actuality. Memory is the process which holds the associative 
recollection to account for its becoming. Memory is thus paradigmatic in that it 
keeps track of the synced, out of phase desires of the multiplicity by 
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(re)membering whatness and gives heft by integrating them into the ecological 
economy of operational becoming. 
25. Memory guides the (re)constitution of the relational as the eventual coming 
together which (re)constitutes the event through its (re)petitioned becoming by 
not only (re)calling itself into being, (re)collecting the elements and 
(re)membering them as the unfolding of the actuality as event. The information 
of the event as memorial is durational through its gradual coming into definition 
as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of its self-expression as an 
individuation as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its 
(re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage within the 
memory circuit in which it is operative. In this way memory is not essential to the 
event but conspiratorial with it and with the rest of the world which allows its 
operation. In this way, memory is not eidetic but paradigmatic in that it is self-
informing without any external coercion. 
26. The directed whatness as eventful expressed as a panoply of perceptions as a 
conception is the image. The image of becoming is always distinct.  
27. The constitution is a fragile attentional coercion induced by the relational 
directivity of the coming-to-being of the event. This relational directivity is not to 
dictate the outcome of the event, but to (re)call and (re)collect the elements 
that together as a coming-to-being lead to the event's constitution. The 
relational directivity of the associative operational coherence of environmental 
factors is constituted by the gradual application of a set of accretionary 
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inductions that can be understood abstractly as compelling the unfolding but 
which act in a concrete way to activate relations which lead experience where it 
needs to go. These accretionary shifts which inform the becoming event are 
eventual, in that they are events which alter the unfolding thereby changing the 
dynamic as reflective of the activated memorial circuit as becoming. 
28. The event is the dynamic directed détournement composed of the gradual inter-
penetration of the immanent co-arising of territorialities and bodies. 
Territorialities can be understood as active, material and non-material 
conditioned expanses of relation that are neither internal nor external: they are 
open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zones of integrated relational intensities where 
that which conditions constitutes ingression and cohesion.135 As such, these 
territorializations as expanses of consistency or operational coherence interact 
as relational entities that condition as they themselves become the becoming 
aggregative accretion of the event as an individuation. 
29. That which is advanced in novelty is also operative in repetition if the constituent 
causal determinants remain in place durationally. As such, what was just 
eventual has become the event perfected as the consummation of the relational 
possibilities as an operational coherence proffered by the agencement of the 
conditionings in place—here agencement is understood simultaneously as 
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 the intersection of territorializations of potential engagements constituting the event as an open, 




agency and information136 immanently arising from the relational conditioning as 
causal determinant resulting from the disposition of the participants as an 
assemblage. The agencement as a fielding of conditioned relationality as 
subjective arises from the immanent territory which takes places as a plane of 
experiential consistency as operational coherence where activity informs the 
becoming as the eventual (re)calling into being of the individuation as memory 
pulled along by the lure for feeling. 
30. The agencement as a memory-circuit brings round the relational potential 
available for engagement of the constellation of the could be of the already-has-
been as sheets of past; it seeds the activation of the reconstitution of relationed 
fields of experience as memory-images; it sets the relational stage for a novel 
agencement of conditioned causal becomings; it posits propositions for 
relational conditioning—it adds a new dimension to existence as a possible 
activation of potentials to redirect the unfolding of actuality by producing a shift 
within the integration of actuality as a memorial process. 
31. memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as content which 
urges us to (re)produce the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the 
elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as 
memory acquires duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body 
through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to 
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 Information in the Simondonian sense. 
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participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a 
machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which it is operative. 
32. The advance of the creative front of novelty is a machinic assemblage identified 
as such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false 
fabrication—thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the 
image of truth in the world. And by extension, the abstract machinic assemblage 
can be seen as the processual creation of truth. In the clash of collision of planes 
of consistency, the ensuing deterritorializations and arising territorializations will 
constitute an event which will set up new planes of consistency and thereby 
machinic assemblages different from our pre-conceived memorial expectations. 
33. The advance of the creative front of novelty is faciality and it indubitably and as a 
machinic assemblage truthfully reveals all that has been locally activated or at 
least perceived within the local horizon of becoming but dissembles its 
constitutional emergence: it is a mask, a disguise, a front in that it conceals 
coming to being as a processual becoming, covers up the durational structure of 
its underpinnings, usurps the value implicit in becoming as a creative enterprise 
and presents itself as what is. Faciality as a machinic assemblage identified as 
such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false 
fabrication—thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the 
image of truth in the world. It is not a question of the Leibnizian best of possible 
worlds but the only one that ads up as an integrated becoming as the convenient 
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individuation which incorporates all discernible and indiscernible local 
individuations. 
34. The adjective machinic can be said to be an appropriate descriptor in terms of its 
implication as a transformative device producing identity as creative novelty. But 
before one can even call the conception machinic, it requires a shift in how we 
understand the transformation inherent in accretionary association: from the 
remapping of the layout of constituent elements as a static federative ensemble 
and the removal of quasi-arbitrary territorial borders of parts to an internal 
coherence based on the dynamic inter-relation of parts as the transformative 
entity. The coherent consistency of the machinic assemblage then arises from 
the operational logic of interlocking parts working together, as a transformative 
undertaking or enterprise—it is not simply a result of an enforced coherence 
from above which arises from the categorical designation applied as label to the 
containment of its constituent parts within the frame; it is the expression of the 
memorial integration conceptually in terms of an operative requisite co-arising 
as the transformation. 
35. The primary fact of truth is the expression of the immediacy of feeling as the 
"generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity 
of the actual entity" which is a process (Whitehead, 1985: 41). Becoming as 
expressive of a processually emergent efficient causalilty is a contingent truth 
expressed as a machinic assemblage incorporating and integrating areas of 
functional coherence and operational consistency. Here machinic refers to the 
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relational dynamic producing operational coherence between constituent parts 
of consistency and their extensions to create expanses of relation as constitutive 
of territory. 
36. Directional agency can be said to extend outwards from junctures or folds within 
the serial disaggregation and amalgamation of regions of consistency as 
constitutive of the concretization of whatness called into play as the successive 
process of extensive territorialization. This establishment of machinic endo- and 
exo- consistencies maintains an integrative symmetry through the reconciliation 
of dualities expressive of being as internally coherent and externally extensive—
and vice versa. Extension can better be seen as aggregative expanses of machinic 
entities meshing together as functional operative systems working 
synchronously on one plane: it is a dynamic vibratory meta-stable system of 
endoconsistent coherence and exoconsistent perduration as its whatness. The 
internal associations and sets of relation of whatness are not simply binary, but 
polyandrous, in that every zone of constituent element relates to every other 
constituent element concretely and reciprocally to every other constituent 
element as an on-going dynamic process—the associative concretization is a 
dimensionally infinite topological manifold. And it is through this associative 
process that the conceptual image defines itself, gains definition as a body which 
while gaining consistency as an accretion of whatness, loses degrees of 
associative freedom that curtail its potential for relation but imbue it with an 
intentio, an attentive discrimination, selective focus, directive in terms of 
208 
 
subsequent association in movement which comes to be expressed as what a 
body can and cannot do. 
37. The prehensive molting of the creative advance does not cast off its processual 
has-been as a memorial carapace, but enfolds the exfoliation as part of the 
integrative vibrational dynamic advance of reconciliation of the paradoxal 
expression of wholeness as such and the synthetic aggregation of parts.  
38. As a subjective entity, the creative advance of actuality as a becoming does not 
exist preindividually so that in the progressive, transitional gradation of its 
becoming there are no modifications to or of a pre-existing individual nature. 
The invocation of the event is not an ordering "initiated by the spark of the 
exceptional event" (Simondon, 1989: 156), but a directed activation of fields of 
relational potential at hand—it has a life of its own. The directionality of the 
memorial unfolding of actuality is nudged so that a new dynamic becomes 
gradually operative through the integration of new linkages of relation. This 
veered unfolding of memory as the détournement of the eventual is expressive 
of a conditioning causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of the 
proposition as an individuation through the progressive and gradual integration 
of the fractal recursivity of the accretionary process constitute the informant 
memory which results in the body of the event—as an individuation it gains 
definition, acquires focal clarity and corporeal heft. The progress of becoming is 
progressive and gradual in that the becoming is fraught with persistent eventual 
change which shifts the existent memorial circuit as a given giving way in its 
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completion to a new memorial circuit as a momentous event—by definition, the 
event is the outcome of any contingent dynamic which alters or disrupts the 
unfolding of the integrative process of memory; the event is deemed accidental 
in that for change to take place, it's cause would need to be external to the 
"uneventful" unfolding where the unfolding of life as process is all event. 
39. The directionality of the memorial unfolding of actuality is détourné so that a 
new dynamic of whatness becomes gradually operative through the integration 
of new linkages of relation. This veered unfolding of memory as eventual is 
expressive of a conditioning causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of 
the proposition as an individuation through the progressive and gradual 
integration of the fractal recursivity of individuation which taken together as an 
accretionary process constitute the informant memory which results in the local 
event and in the infinite expression of extension as the oneness of unity as the 
Image Universe. 
40. This unity as such is unique, necessary, efficient, self-motivating, operationally 
coherent and infinitely functionally continuous and extensive. It is 
simultaneously internal and external, many and one as the reconciled integration 
of both paradoxal modes of co-existence.   
41. Thus, the perfection of integrative unity is not the stultifying satisfaction of 
completion but the simultaneous satisfaction of consummation of whatness 
implicit in the advance as the awakening of the directed desire of novelty. 
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42. Becoming as the "on the cusp" or "at the point of unfurling" of being, while fully 
satisfied and imbued with limitless potential, is imperfect and incomplete yet not 
lacking.  
43. There are no essences to speak of in the Image Universe, only a propensity to 
create folds as necessary being in terms of the functional coherence of 
processual advance as the ever-changing operational truth of actuality.  
44. The present is not de-actualized to become past or future. The present is eternal 
in that it has no beginning and no end but is one continuous becoming. It is 
untimely in that it does not exist within time but is infused with temporality as 
an expression of relational density and intensity.   
45. The Image Universe is necessary being in that it can only happen in the way that 
it happens—not in a pre-determined manner but in the happening that takes 
place as it becomes. As such becoming is not pre-ordained but occurs on the 
spur of the moment at the cusp of becoming as a having to take place 
unhindered. As unimpeded, it exercises the perambulation of the memory 
circuit—it fulfills its destiny as it is happening. 
46. The Image Universe has no will other than that which is expressed as it 
expressed as the logic of its own integrative memory. It is not a best fit or linear 
extrapolation as the best possible but it is the only fit possible—this could be 
understood if we could follow the fractal recursivity of the causal determination 
of functional extension and operational coherence. By definition, it is the only fit, 
because it is the one that takes place. 
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47. Perduration within the Image Universe is immaterial as no aspect of becoming is 
ever permanent: there is no permanence, only change with less intense or more 
intense zones of relation which constitute territories of operational solidarity as 
individuating bodies. These bodies are the continual prehensive fulgurations of 
zones of local becoming which change the becoming as the reciprocal recursive 
causal determination of relations that are taking hold as an individuation.  
48. The Image Universe becomes an integrated “system of individuations, an 
individuating system and a system individuating itself” (Simondon, 2009: 7). 
Thus, the Image Universe as an event becomes an immanent, dynamic, coherent 
whole, a body composed of a multiplicity of bodies informed by enabling 
constraints, inflected by the action of their reciprocal, directed induction as their 
ability to engage relation. Within the Image Universe as a frontal surface of 
becoming, the power to exist is the expression as the actualization of all 
potential as the accretionary prehensive whatness of becoming which through 
the recursive fractality of concretization expresses the All in infinite detail 
according to the directed intention of the unhindered fulfillment of its destiny as 
it is happening. As such, this expresses the subjective, perceptive and 
appetitiveness of becoming. 
49. Being does not come into being nor cease to be. Creation is the becoming as 
being; there are no active components and no passive components; no 
discernible action and no discernible reaction. There is no perfection in the sense 
of an ideal transcendent teleonomy that is being striven for. Perfection is in the 
212 
 
moment as the prehensive completion of the advance into novelty; there can be 
no attribution of activity or passivity as becoming integrates simultaneous 
reciprocal conditioning as memorial becoming. 
50. All of creation is an equal-opportunity occupation. There are no superior beings 
and no inferior beings; there is no justification to the claim of superiority, of 
greater value, of a higher nature, of permanence, of immunity to change—just 
adequacy in the satisfaction of the necessity of extension so that the extensive 
continuum which emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling into being, of 
the propositional expression "without that this cannot be" and its implied 
corollary, "without this that cannot be" so that the necessity extends itself not 
only locally but throughout the Image Universe. Relation as such is infinitely 
multi-dimensional in that it is not only relation between two terms, or three 
terms, but in that it is a relational articulation to infinite concretized relational 
possibility in number and extension. Their complicated existence belies a 
harmonious attunement of perfect accommodation. 
51. The Image Universe does not intervene directly in the individuation process as it 
is the process itself as immanent unfolding of whatness. If we can differentiate 
between participants in becoming, each participant reciprocally conditions the 
becoming whatness of each and every other participant recursively and scalarly 
across the Image Universe.  
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52. As such, there's an interdependent and reciprocal relation of scalar 
concretization of power to power in terms of relational potential to be actualized 
whose directive whatness is determinant.   
53. There is an infinity of possible becomings that exist virtually as potential 
outcomes but only one becoming that does actually takes place. The outcome as 
resultant is not a question of choice but of sufficient reason: becoming is not 
susceptible to arbitrariness or capriciousness as it does not choose between one 
outcome and another. 
54. Within the processual advance of becoming as the exercise of whatness and its 
sufficient reason expressed through the integrated concretization of relations as 
the Image Universe, bodies come and go as fuzzy-bounded expanses of 
functional relational coherence. Consistent expanses of relational coherence are 
being created while some are being dissolved so that there is no perfection, no 
attainment, no permanence inherent in the creative advance of novelty as the 
Image Universe. There is no reason to believe in a moral underpinning to the 
directivity of whatness or to apply a value-laden normativity to memorial 
integration of actuality in terms of good or evil.  
55. Because there is no moral underpinnings to becoming, an ethics can only be 
descriptive of whatness and accretion and not prescriptive of the processual 
becoming. What is considered as evil and imperfect as undesirable, 
objectionable, detrimental or harmful is no different from that which is deemed 
beautiful and good as desirable, useful, advantageous or pleasing in the 
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constitution of becoming. They co-exist as manifestation of various aspects of 
becoming in that which is deemed from one perspective as constitution is seen 
simultaneously as dissolution from another perspective within the Image 
Universe—e.g the unfurling of a wave can be seen simultaneously as the 
breaking up of one wave but as the pre-constitution of the succeeding one.   
56. The concretized associations and sets of relation are not simply binary, but 
polyandrous, in that every constituent element is reciprocally associated to every 
other constituent element, their determination concretely expressed as a 
reciprocal dependent co-arising within the on-going dynamic process. It is not a 
question of mirroring or reflection—the surface of becoming is usually referred 
to as a plane, but it is more like the indeterminate surface of a cloud's becoming 
where the molecular fuses with the molar as the impossibility of distinguishing 
between the internal and external determinant processes of becoming, the one 
and the many or between the temporal and the extensive even if the 
individuation is construed as ontogenetic and set apart from the totality of 
process.  
57. "And as one and the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether 
different, and is, as it were, perspectively multiplied" (Rescher, 1991: 200) but 
still remains one city, there is but one Image Universe. In the same way that "the 
projections in perspective of the conic sections of the circle show that one and 
the same circle may be represented by an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, 
and even by another circle, a straight line and a point" (Leibniz, Theodicy, sec. 
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357), the plane hinging about the directrix and cutting the parent cone becomes 
a screen or planar projection which allows the infinite enfolding and expression 
of the totality. Thus, by slicing from one conic section to the next, or by radially 
sweeping from one view to the next, one can see in the continuous deformation 
the extensive non-metrical manifestation of continuity and of the possibility of 
infinite attributes and implicit potential of the same. Each slice can be said to 
characterize the directed perspectival point of view of whatness and the 
sweeping as the continuity of extension of whatness. Given the directionality as 
established by whatness, an axis of symmetry or directrix defines the validity and 
guides the integration of the perspectival projection. It is what holds together 
the concordance between the image of the exterior and its internal 
manifestation as a perception image as a memory image. The directrix as the 
hinge of the fold, as the apex of the crease, as an axis separating two instances 
of the same perspectival projection, acts simultaneously as a hinge and as origin 
of the separating fissure; it serves as the "linking factor" (Deleuze, 1988a: 65)  
between the two projections, "between matter and soul, the façade and the 
closed room, the outside and the inside" (Deleuze, 1993: 35). 
58. Orderliness reveals itself in the relational correspondence revealed in 
perspective whereas variety is brought forth through the dynamic nature of 
process.   
59. Mathematically speaking, perspective becomes a transductive process whose 
axiomatic veracity is based upon the duality expressed in geometrical incidence: 
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in the symmetrical relation between lines and points, in the strict 
correspondence between a pencil and a range, the intromission and 
extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality emerging from the 
perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a point. In 
the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point 
onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the 
“there”, the duality of perspective states that they are both the same and 
simultaneously reciprocally created. By continuing this line of thought, we can 
develop the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a closed surface 
(Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen, 1952: 313-324) which has no inside or outside, has no 
discontinuity and no windows. Thus, perspective "ends up in the folding of the 
outside into the inside: 'in the interior of the exterior and inversely' "(Deleuze, 
1988a: 118). 
60. Thus, if we were to describe whatness as a delimited entity, we could posit that 
it is created by neighbourhoods of conditioned relational occupation as 
operational coherence where the homeostasis afforded by participation sustains 
the meta-stable tension between that which takes place and that which gives 
room within the milieu. The locus of operational coherence as that which takes 
place is easy to conceive as the body of the event and its shape is the 
manifestation of the event itself as localized in its unfolding—contained by the 
frame which circumscribes it, defined by the terms held captive by the limiting 
border, bound together by its operative coherence and identified by name all 
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together constitute a cogent expression of what the definition of the concept as 
a body entails.  
61. A locally identified individuation as a named functionality exhibiting operational 
coherence harmoniously accords up and down the line of fractal recursivity and 
across the extensive continuum with any and all other local processes, identified 
or not. Consequently, the operational unity of the Image Universe expresses its 
coherent functioning as a dynamic whole while maintaining an integrative 
symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the 
microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, "As above, so 
below". As such, that which can be deemed simpler individuations, i.e. as 
exhibiting lesser relational activation, are locally operationally coherent and 
enfolded in, integrated within that which can be understood as more complex as 
a machinic memory system capable of expressing the functioning of the Image 
Universe as a coherent image-based apparatus. The memory of whatness which 
emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling into being, of the propositional 
expression "without that this cannot be" and its implied corollary, "without this 
that cannot be" so that the necessity extends itself not only locally but 
throughout the Image Universe. Whatness as such is infinitely multi-dimensional 
in that it is not only relation between two terms, or three terms, but in that it is a 
relational articulation to infinite concretized relational possibility in number and 
extension. The complicated existence of whatness belies a harmonious 
attunement of perfect accommodation as universal concretization. 
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62. Whatness is thereby infinitely linked to all other whatness as the concretized 
expression of the whatness of the Image Universe—whatness vinculates the 
integrated concretized relatedness of being as becoming. One cannot think the 
consistent as a uniform, unchanging, unvarying constitution—the only constancy 
within the gaining consistency as process is the operative constancy of change in 
the perduration of processual continuity. That which is acquiring consistency by 
definition also comes to constitute a body in the most general sense of the term.   
63. To ascribe bodies to becoming is to continually fall back upon an inadequate 
approach to the conception of the whole where individual parts as part of a 
hierarchy of perfection strive individually towards perfection as corpuscular 
entities constitutive of a greater ordering. This approach which looks to the body 
as "an integrated aggregate dominated by an entelechy" (Rescher, 1991: 220), 
always seeks to define the body as an entity striving for perfection as an 
idealised, complete and satisfied state of physical, mental or moral flawlessness 
which concurs with some previously ascribed definition expressive of normative 
values.  
64. There is no difference  between that which we deem artificial and that which is 
deemed natural. To differentiate between the artificial and the natural, the 
organic and the machinic, the wordly and the divine, the material and the 
spiritual is to introduce speciesism as constitutive of distinctions of hierarchical 
superiority where there should be none. If we describe process as machinic, we 
need to imagine it differently; not in terms of the machinic order of the 
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mechanical domain but one of functional integration as the flow of forces and 
energy as constitutive of the advance of novelty. The process at work can be 
termed transduction as the transmittal of energy and forces as an (in)formation 
which communicates novel aggregative belonging to organizational structure 
through its cooptation to a functional becoming instantaneously felt throughout 
a system as operational integration. In this way, the transmission of information 
ceases to be an accidental process—accidental not because it arises by chance 
but because the forces are seen to flow from outside the process as a surficial 
mechanical transmission—so that (in)formation can be seen instead as the 
replicating machinic process itself of an unmediated structuration as contiguous 
operational functionality.   
65. In this we can see that the consistency of process as constitutive of expanses of 
operational solidarity seem to create a montage of moving parts that works as 
an apparatus, as a machinic assemblage of organizational and functional agency. 
The device that emerges here can be likened to a machine where the cogs and 
gears work together to create operational coherence constitutive of a something 
other: the machinic assemblage as a processual entity emerges through the 
expression of its operational constitution as a working-together of parts, as a 
multiplicity, which at its most naive understanding can be seen as an apparatus 
contained—as the constituent parts inform themselves into a functional whole, 
the assemblage acquires a vinculating carapace which provides it with a 
homogeneous faciality which expresses itself as the integrity of operational 
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coherence. But to speak of cogs and wheels working together is too concrete 
and mechanical an assemblage—the machinic looks at the ensemble as a 
functioning-in-unison, as an individuation constituted of parts which do not 
transform anything in particular but together generate temporality as 
subjectivity. The constitutive elements participate in the co-operative 
functioning according to a reciprocal necessity within the machinic assemblage 
where the parts maintain their individual integrity yet can only fulfill the role 
attributed to them as participants contributing to the functioning of the 
apparatus as a coherent whole. That which is produced by a machinic 
assemblage is not to be found in the individual parts nor in the entity as a whole; 
that which results is something indivisible, of a different order than that which 
constitutes the apparatus itself or the participation in its functioning. Ultimately 
what is being produced is time as temporality but it bears pointing out that the 
time being referred to here is not a metricized time but the temporality of 
being—what Deleuze would call aionic time—which refers to the individual 
expression of processual density and texture as a quality, as an affectual 
manifestation of intensities that is experienced in some way as feeling, where 
each assemblage articulates its being through a particular affective quality. Thus, 
they become instigators, attractors, proponents of relational meshings in 
machinic assemblages as productive of the fabric of relation as a continuum so 
that the circulation of forces, intensities and potentials as a diagram. The image 
is constituted as a fractal immanent recursive continuity of concretized machinic 
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assemblages engaged in the satisfaction of desire's appetition and the creation 
of new ones as the process of memorial (re)constitution.  
66. The machinism at play is syneidectic137 in that it drives towards inclusiveness and 
integration as a scalarly recursive modality within all frames of reference. It is 
functionally extensive to fulfill the Hermetic drive towards operational 
totalization and unity. 
67. Thus there is no thing in the Universe which is "fallow, sterile or dead" (Rescher, 
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